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The impact of marketised discourse on the interaction between 
drug representatives and physicians 
 
Jost-Tilo Alexander  G E H R K E 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Drug representatives (‘drug reps’) visit physicians to present and promote 
pharmaceutical products (‘drug detailing’). Against the background of a continuous 
innovative slow-down, drug companies have shifted strategic emphasis towards 
marketing and selling. With regards to drug detailing, I am investigating how this shift 
towards marketing is manifested in discursive terms. I show how the detailing 
discourse is impacting the attitudes and behaviours of those involved in it, namely 
physicians, drug reps and their managers. By means of qualitative interviewing I access 
the individual meaning-making and attitudes towards the phenomenon of drug 
detailing. I demonstrate how discourse is designed, transformed and responded to. In 
that, I point to a system of incompatibility resulting in unproductive action. Marketised 
discourse as devised by management is not fostering collaboration between the 
industry and the medical profession. Moreover, it leads to a growing detachment of 
drug reps from their organisations. By highlighting the issue of drug detailing for the 
first time from a drug rep perspective my research demonstrates that the industry is not 
an integrated ideological whole. I conclude by advocating a more transparent conduct 
of business, suggesting controlling means to improve the quality of information 
delivery. Last not least I want to stimulate a critical public discourse about the sublime 
ways of constructing and disseminating marketised pharmaceutical information.     
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Motivation 
 
This project was originally sparked by my own professional experience that drug 
marketing is increasingly failing to convince physicians. In particular, visits by 
pharmaceutical representatives (‘drug detailing’) showed to have a decreasing leverage. 
Market performance figures and customer feedback pointed to a growing wear out of 
sales initiatives versus physicians. In response to these developments, product 
positioning and customer segmentation have been further refined in an attempt to make 
the product offering more convincing and relevant to physicians. However, increase in 
marketing toil did not significantly improve the situation out in the market. Gradually, I 
came to realise that the issue at hand must be of fundamental nature. In my view the 
relationship between industry and profession is in a state of disruption.  
 
As a matter of fact, relationships between the industry and the medical profession are 
manifold. However, in the area of drug marketing the most important connection is 
clearly the one between drug reps (also referred to as ‘detailers’) and physicians. From 
a management’s point of view, drug reps act as transmitters of management’s 
marketing ideas to physicians. Out in the field, drug reps are visiting physicians in 
order to discursively disseminate the marketing brief. Detailers thereby link 
management to physicians and vice versa. In every drug company, detailers make up 
the biggest single group of employees. In short, detailers are important, both from a 
strategic and from an investment point of view. Physicians, on the other hand, are 
regarded to be the key arbiter between industry and patients. Both, office-based and 
hospital doctors are prescribing or recommending ethical drugs (i.e. drugs only 
available on prescription) to patients. Furthermore, physicians are a source of 
information as they regularly feedback their experiences with particular drugs, 
therapies and patients. Thus physicians are the crucial point of contact for any drug 
company.  
 
In my search for systemic perturbations, I decided to take a closer look at the 
interaction between drug reps and physicians. When approaching the detailing complex 
I identified three key elements: the drug rep, the physician, the talk. As talk is the 
bridging element between the two it became the focus of my investigation. To me, 
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examining the detailing encounter implied examining its discourse. In the pursuit of the 
project, however, I recognised that the phenomenon of discourse in drug detailing is 
not only shaped by drug reps and physicians. Equally important are the role and 
attitudes of managers who by means of strategy, design and training provide the 
discursive patterning that drug reps are instructed to follow. Based on this insight my 
research project was expanded to investigate how talk is forming – and is formed by – 
the three different protagonists in drug detailing. In this respect, I believed that 
discursive interaction should be approached from a cognitive perspective in order to 
identify crucial differences in values and motivations. Therefore, I was interested to 
explore the individual meaning-making, perceptions and attitudes that carry the 
discursive interaction. It was only later that I found that this area is highly under-
researched and that demand for qualitative investigations is high. This was aptly 
illustrated in the opening chapter of a WHO sponsored study on drug promotion, where 
it reads: 
 
Studies on people’s attitudes to promotion rely too much on quantitative surveys, on 
the use of convenient, accessible samples, and on describing the prevalence of 
attitudes rather than relationships between attitudes and other characteristics. 
Qualitative studies are needed in this area.     
                                                   (Norris, et al., 2005, p. 7) 
  
 
 
1.2. ‘A priori’ beliefs and research questions 
 
As indicated this project was essentially driven by my ‘a priori’ belief that discourse 
between industry and physicians is somehow disconnecting. In other words, the 
parties’ respective codes of communication are not matching. Certainly, this can have 
many reasons yet on closer inspection one cause stood out rather prominently: 
professional background. Whether by training or occupational socialisation, managers, 
drug reps and physicians are rooted in very different social systems. I assumed that 
both managers and drug reps fit in the self-interested world of business, while doctors 
belong to the collectively oriented world of medicine. To my anticipation, different 
occupational socialisation, norms and objectives would lead to divergent motivations 
with respect to drug detailing. Simply put, I expected drug reps to reproduce 
management’s self-interested commercial rhetoric to the advancement of sales and 
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profit generation. In this context, I came to employ the term ‘marketised discourse’ as a 
marker for promotional talk, clearly with reference to Fairclough’s work on the 
phenomenon of ‘marketization’ of social spheres through discursive processes 
(Fairclough, 1992).  
 
At the other end, I predicted that doctors would resist these discursive practices on 
grounds of morale, divergent ideology and professional pride. Altogether, I thought 
these cognitive contrasts to be the main cause for unproductive drug detailing. At the 
same time, I presumed that it must be challenging for drug reps to continuously 
perform promotional discourse in front of a professional group that largely rejects the 
commercial idea. The notion gained in relevance considering the fact that drug reps 
spend the majority of their time in a medical environment compared to rather few 
contacts in the world of their corporate employers.  
 
Based on these projections the following research questions emerged: 
 
1.  Is there discursive construction of marketization in drug detailing? 
2.   If there is marketised discourse how does it manifest in discursive terms? 
3. How does such discourse impact the roles and attitudes of drug reps & physicians? 
 
I like to reveal that in several parts my a priori beliefs were confirmed by my empirical 
work. However, my research findings also show that the phenomenon of promotional 
discourse – its design, implementation and reception – is a much more complex process 
than anticipated. The research highlights that managers, drug reps and physicians all 
have different motivations to engage in discourse, whereby the cognitive gap between 
managers and drug reps is surely the biggest surprise. The findings further reveal that 
despite all efforts the three actors fail to achieve their objectives respectively. The 
results point to a system characterised by incompatibility and waste, in which drug reps 
constantly balance between organisational goals, own motivations and customer needs. 
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1.3. Research background 
 
With the rise of neo-liberalism in the last quarter of the 20th century a strong trend of 
commercialisation of the medical profession (Relman 1980, 2008; Angell, 2004) was 
observed. Commercialisation implies that provision of a service is bound to its 
economic return. Thus the service becomes conditional, negotiable and ultimately a 
commodity. This stands in contrast to the moral belief that wellbeing is a generic right 
to every human being which must be unconditionally protected and supported 
(Gewirth, 1978). While there is debate about the degree of unconditionality there is 
broad agreement that wellbeing belongs to the cultural core of society. On the basis of 
functional expertise, rational conduct and collective orientation society has appointed 
physicians to act as guardians to the right of wellbeing (Parsons 1939, 1958). As a 
matter of mandate, physicians must stand diametrically opposite to the idea of treating 
healthcare as a commodity. While many social theorists (e.g. Durkheim, Parsons, and 
Freidson) have regarded physicians as a protecting element against the onslaught of 
capital, doctors’ guarding powers are in fact shrinking. The world of business has 
targeted medicine for profit making. Capital is constantly pooled to yield an even 
greater return. To leverage capital’s full breeding potential, efficient organisational 
structures are put in place, dividing up medical work similar to the division of labour 
process in industrial production (McKinlay & Arches, 1985). Vast knowledge 
production in medicine is further aiding the process of specialisation and labour 
division. Physicians’ autonomy and authority with regards to providing healthcare is 
increasingly challenged. 
 
For many years drug companies have been experiencing a diminishing rate of 
innovative return. This is indicated by the declining number of truly innovative drug 
molecules launched each year as shown in Figure 1 on the next page. Regression is 
partly caused by research exhaustion in the area of traditional chemical compound 
pharmacy while new areas like biotechnology are not yet effectively mastered.  
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            Source: CMR International 
Figure 1:  New Molecular Entities (NMEs) first launched worldwide 1990-2006 
 
Critical observers like Angell (2004) argue, however, that innovative scarcity is equally 
caused by the industry’s financial greed which fosters a risk-averse research & 
development (R&D) policy. In any case, the number of new molecular entities 
registered in the market each year is gradually shrinking. In order to compensate the 
innovative slow-down, firms are eagerly trying to increase sales productivity of 
existing as well as marginally improved ‘new’ drugs. The ratio between entirely new 
drugs and slightly modified drugs is breathtaking. While in 2006 only 25 entirely new 
molecular entities were launched world wide, in the same year 2’640 ‘new’ drugs were 
registered in Germany alone (BfArM, 2009). These drugs are mostly variations in 
form, size or dosage of existing drugs. Pseudo innovations put growing pressure on the 
drug rep to ‘sell’ his products to the physician. Given the products’ low innovative 
profile, drug reps are facing the paradoxical task of having to sell more of less. As per 
industry sources (Bayer Healthcare, 2007; Novartis, 2004) today’s marketing of drugs 
is essentially modelled on consumer marketing which focuses on brand building and 
promotion rather than on technical and scientific minutiae.   
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1.4. Geographic research focus 
 
The research focuses on Germany, a central European country with 82.5 million 
inhabitants and a GDP of about 2.5 trillion Euros of which c. 10% are spent on health 
related products and services. Pharmaceutical companies in Germany experience the 
same innovative decline as elsewhere in the Western world. In addition to research 
exhaustion and focus on profit maximisation, also came restrictive research conditions 
which further aided to the innovative decline. Germany – once considered “the 
pharmacy of the world” – experienced a drain of experts and research laboratories, 
which moved to other countries, preferably to the US. Responsible for this intellectual 
draw off was the fact that in the 1980s German politics largely blocked the use of 
genetic technology to develop and produce drugs. Furthermore, bureaucratic 
restrictions slowed down or obstructed research activities.  
 
At the medical professional end, the German market principally shows the same 
dynamics as other Western healthcare markets. German government is forcing 
economisation of healthcare in order to control cost and lift service efficacy. This 
brings along rationalisation and bureaucratisation of medical work. Yet, the German 
healthcare system, which is based on a premium financed social insurance, equally 
displays fundamental differences compared to tax-financed or private insurance 
systems. Systemic differences allow for different leverage points in terms of 
controlling and changing the system. To illustrate this I have listed the specifics of each 
system in the table on the next page. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 17
 
Table 1: Overview of healthcare systems 
 
Characteristic 
Properties 
Tax-financed 
system 
(Beveridge type) 
Premium financed 
system  
(Bismarck type) 
Private insurance 
system 
Type National Health 
Service 
Social insurance Pluralistic 
(Medicare/Medicaid 
– Managed Care) 
General 
definition 
Government 
regulated care with 
health services 
Health care as 
guaranteed basic 
right 
Health goods are 
largely consumer 
goods 
Finances Taxes. Every tax 
payer contributes 
Contributions from 
employees/employers 
Largely private 
finance 
Service 
organisation 
Public Private/public Largely private 
Service package More supply-
oriented 
More demand-
oriented 
Demand-oriented 
State 
intervention 
Strong/direct Mostly direct Weak/indirect 
Payment 
transfer 
Indirect Largely indirect Direct and indirect 
Role of 
professional 
associations 
Not very strong Strong Very strong 
Opinion-
forming 
Top-down Bottom-up Bottom-up 
Examples U.K., Scandinavian 
countries, Italy, 
Spain, Greece, 
Canada 
Germany, France, 
Japan, Belgium, 
Netherlands, Austria 
USA, Switzerland 
 
Source: Schmidt, et al. (2001) 
 
In the following I will brief the reader about the German health care system as well as 
the country specific features of the drug industry. 
 
 
1.5. The German healthcare system – Emergence & overview 
 
The modern day healthcare system in Germany dates back to the foundation of the 
national health insurance in 1883 as part of the Bismarckian social security legislation. 
The legislation was introduced to buffer the growing social contrasts and political 
tensions following the process of industrialisation in Germany during the 19th century. 
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The national health insurance was designed as a compulsory insurance and was 
gradually expanded to cover workers and employees in industry and other business 
enterprises. The system was carried by larger insurance associations as well as 
thousands of small insurance companies which all entered into individual contracts 
with physicians. This led to conditions of vast complexity, legal uncertainty and highly 
diverse quality of medical service within the system. As insurance companies were 
granted the right to determine the type and number of physicians they wished to 
collaborate with in a given region, physicians became highly dependent on insurance 
companies. A large part of them was completely excluded from the statutory service. 
To strengthen their position against insurance companies, in the year 1900 physicians 
founded the German association of physicians (‘Leipziger Verband’, later called 
‘Hartmannbund’). Yet, ever more powerful insurance associations, leveraging their 
right to individual contracting, led to a continuing imbalance of power between the two 
parties, resulting in severe struggles and labour disputes. The situation of conflict 
prevailed throughout the first three decades of the 20th century until the economic crisis 
and global recession in 1931 led to a systemic re-design. On the physician side, 
associations of statutory health insurance physicians (organised by region) were 
granted the status of public bodies and could now enter collective contracts with health 
insurance companies. The contracting parties were granted the right for self-
administration by the government. At that stage, about 60% of the people in Germany 
were covered by statutory health insurance.  
 
However, shortly after the National Socialist Party rose to power in 1933 
administrative autonomy was replaced by central gearing according to the ‘Fuehrer 
principle’. All insurance companies were merged to a single insurance body 
(‘Reichsversicherung’) and subjected to state control. Physicians were ordered to join 
the national chamber of physicians (‘Reichsärztekammer’) controlled by the ministry 
of the interior. In 1938 all Jewish doctors (c. 13%) had been deprived of their 
approbations and subsequently denied to treat any publicly insured patients. In 1945, 
after the end of the Third Reich the system and its various organisational bodies ceased 
to exist. Since 1949 until re-unification in 1990 there were two different political as 
well as two different healthcare systems in Germany. Analogous to the system in the 
Soviet Union, in Eastern Germany a centrally organised healthcare system was 
established, yet – in contrast to the Soviet system – with a clear organisational division 
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between ambulatory and stationary (in-patient) service. After re-unification, the newly 
formed German states were fully integrated in the healthcare system of the West.  
 
After World War II, in Western Germany a structure developed that in many aspects 
resembled the system in place prior to the Fascist period (Preusker, 2008).  Elements 
largely unchanged to date are the public corporation format of statutory health 
insurance companies, the tying of insurance obligation to employment status, the 
linking of insurance fee calculation to individual income level, the splitting of fees 
between employer and employee and the dualism of statutory and private health 
insurance. As indicated in Table 1 (p. 16) these elements are still prevailing in the 
current system. The statutory healthcare system is essentially financed by employment 
related contributions (premium financed system) with only a small portion coming 
from taxes. For 2009 this means that 14.9% of a person’s gross salary goes to statutory 
health insurance, of which 7.9% is paid by the employee and 7% by his employer. 
Those who are self-employed and those who are earning above a certain income level 
(for 2009 the level was set at 44.100 Euro per year) are exempted from joining the 
statutory system. Yet many employees voluntarily remain in the system because 
coverage is automatically extended to one’s children without any extra charge. 
Currently, 90% of Germans are members of the statutory health insurance system while 
only 10% percent are privately insured.  
 
Consequently, in Germany physicians’ remuneration is largely coming from statutory 
health insurance. Approximately 80% of their earnings are generated through the 
system by which the individual physician is balancing accounts directly with the 
Association of Statutory Health Insurance Physicians. In turn the associations are 
collectively balancing their accounts with the insurance companies belonging to the 
statutory system as displayed in Figure 2 on the next page. 
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Figure 2:  Relationship between the insured, service providers and insurances   
 
In contrast to the private market the statutory insured patient is not directly charged but 
simply has to provide proof of insurance. Thus patients are unaware of the actual cost 
of their treatment which according to critics of the system is aiding to wasteful 
behaviour also known as ex post moral hazard (Pauly, 1974; Nell, 1993). To further 
illustrate this, people in Germany go to see a doctor 18 times (in 2007) a year on 
average, which is one of the highest visit frequency rates in the world (BMG, 2009).  
 
In 1993 German government first introduced a budgeting system to control cost. Since 
then, the budgeting system has been revised several times to manage an undiminished 
rise of healthcare cost. To put this into perspective, between 1993 and 2003 the costs 
for statutory healthcare have grown by 2.9% per year on average. However, over the 
same period the GDP has only grown by 2.5% per year on average resulting in a net 
loss in total.  
 
Different from many other healthcare systems in the world, in Germany hospital 
facilities are not meant for out-patient treatment but are essentially reserved for in-
patient treatment only. The ambulatory service is mainly left to family physicians and 
specialists who are office based. This duality of service is also reflected in the absolute 
physician numbers. Altogether 311’230 physicians are working in Germany (as of 
169* Statutory Health 
Insurance Companies  
(Public bodies) 
Physicians as part of 17 
regional associations 
(Public bodies) 
 
Members / Insured 
(90% of population) 
Service for insurance proof 
Collective contracting 
and compensation 
Source: Based on Preusker (2008) 
(Compulsory) Membership, 
Entitlement to services, 
Obligation to fee payment 
*  as per Feb 1, 2010 
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31.12.2006) of which 148’322 (47.7%) are working in a hospital setting and 136’105 
(43.7%) as office-based practitioners. The remaining 26’803 (8.6%) physicians are 
working in non-clinical areas (Bundesärztekammer, 2009). On one hand, the large 
network of office-based doctors allows high medical service coverage. With 264 
inhabitants per physician (in 2006) Germany has a relatively high physician density 
compared to other markets (e.g. Japan = 476, UK = 433; USA = 385). On the other 
hand, the duality of medical service is producing a high degree of duplication. For 
example, costly diagnostic procedures are often replicated once patients move between 
the two sectors. In many areas medical care is simply available twice – yet often 
delivered at very different quality levels – leading to costly inefficiencies of supply. 
Compared to other European countries, Germany – with altogether 2’100 hospitals – 
has the highest relative number of hospital beds available (6.2 per 1’000 inhabitants 
compared to e.g. 3.7 in France and 2.2 in the UK; Source: OECD, 2008). However, 
these capacities are largely underused with an average bed occupancy rate of just over 
76% (in 2006) although Germany shows the longest average residence time (8.6 days 
in 2006) in Europe (OECD, 2008).  
 
Altogether, the German system is characterised by oversupply and duplication of 
medical care which is artificially stimulating demand for service. At the other end, 
statutory insured patients, who neither have information nor control about actual 
therapy cost, tend to exploit the system (ex post moral hazard). German government is 
forcing economisation of healthcare in order to control cost. This brings along 
rationalisation and bureaucratisation of medical work. Since 2000 governmental 
healthcare reforms are fostering a higher degree of integration between office-based 
and hospital care whereby local doctors and hospitals are collaborating in form of 
integrated healthcare networks. The number of hospital beds is constantly reduced to 
cut idle capacities and improve efficiencies. Medical procedures are increasingly 
monitored and standardised (e.g. via treatment guidelines following evidence based 
medicine) to increase and align quality across the spectrum. Budgeting of office-based 
medical therapy is further refined. For each quarter of the year physicians are assigned 
an individual budget calculated by combining average treatment cost rates per 
professional speciality with the physician’s individual treatment and prescription 
profile of the previous year period. This method was issued at the beginning of 2009 to 
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increase overall efficiency and to stop physicians to enhance income through applying 
expensive procedures to their patients.  
 
Next to cost containment measures, office-based healthcare provision gradually moves 
from a single practice mode to a large practice setting (ambulatory care centres). 
Increasingly, integrated healthcare networks similar to HMOs (health maintenance 
organisations) in the US are installed in Germany. In this context government is 
advancing privatisation of large parts of hospital care by transforming e.g. municipal 
hospitals into private corporations or by selling them to already existing corporations in 
the field. Privatisation also affects university hospitals at traditional universities like 
Marburg or Giessen. Furthermore, ambulatory care centres are allowed to be run by 
non-physicians opening medical service to capital interest. Private healthcare 
corporations have been granted the right to enter into individual contracts with 
statutory health insurance, thereby undermining the collective contracting between 
statutory health insurances and physician associations.  
 
Attempts to restructure out-patient care are judged critically by both physicians and 
patients. In Germany, healthcare service is (still) conceptualized as a highly 
individualized service where each patient is expecting to have his ‘personal physician’ 
(Münch, 2009). The working mode and organisational form of medical healthcare still 
very much resembles that of pre-industrial craftsmanship where cluster-artisans are 
surrounded by a pool of helpmates (Münch, 2006). Emotionally, German society 
largely ignores the fact that with circa 500 million physician-patient contacts per year 
healthcare has long become a mass market.  
 
To illustrate this in figures, the total healthcare market in Germany is worth 
approximately 250 billion Euros or 10% of GDP. This figure includes all healthcare 
related products and services. In 2008, statutory health insurances spent 161 billion 
Euros (64%), of which 32.7% (52.6 bn) went to hospital care and 15.1% (24.3 bn) went 
to office-based medical services. 18.2% (29.2 bn) were spent on drugs (AOK, 2009). 
As such pharmaceutical drugs are a significant matter of expense. The majority (c. 
87%) of drug expenditures come from prescription drugs. Of these, circa 85% are 
generated in ambulatory care (office based doctors) while the remaining 15% come 
from acute hospital care. This does not imply that hospital doctors are irrelevant in 
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terms of prescribing. On the contrary, prescriptions by hospital physicians have a 
signalling effect to office-based doctors. Therefore, both hospital doctors and office-
based doctors are critical target groups for drug companies. 
 
 
1.6. The pharmaceutical industry in Germany 
 
At 35 billion Euros Germany is the largest drug market in Europe next to France. In 
Germany, roughly 127’000 (BPI, 2009) people are employed in pharmaceutical 
industry sector, of which approximately 20’000 are working as drug reps. The industry 
is estimated to spend around Euro 2.5 billion on drug reps (Korzilius & Rieser, 2007) 
resulting in approximately 25 million doctor visits per year, which makes each call 
account for c. 100 Euro on average. Statistically, one drug rep serves 14 doctors, 
however, considering that pharmaceutical firms only cover the relevant doctors in their 
respective target segment the figure comes down to five (i.e. five doctors are covered 
by one drug rep). As a rule of thumb in Germany, 20% of all prescribing doctors are 
responsible for around 60% of total scripts. Consequently, high prescribing physicians 
in large therapeutic segments like cardiology or gastrointestinal are literary overrun by 
drug reps. Those doctors are estimated to receive visits from seven drug reps on 
average per day (Glaeske & Janhsen, 2007). 
 
1’031 pharmaceutical companies are currently registered in Germany distributing 
8’764 different drugs coming in over 50’000 presentation forms (i.e. different pack 
sizes and application forms per drug) (BPI, 2009). Just over 20% of the 8’764 different 
drugs account for 90% of scripts in Germany. Among the listed 1’031 companies 
76.8% employ less than 100 people and only 5.9% of firms have more than 500 
employees. The top 10 pharmaceutical companies in Germany account for 35% of drug 
sales (IMS, 2008). Compared to the US market where the top 10 firms account for 51% 
of total market sales Germany shows a much lower market concentration. Table 2 on 
the next page displays the top 10 pharmaceutical companies in Germany side by side 
with the top 10 players in the world: 
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Table 2:       Top 10 pharmaceutical companies 
 
Rank Germany* World** Global Sales 2008** 
1 Hexal (generics) Pfizer 44.2 bn 
2 Novartis GlaxoSmithKline 43.0 bn 
3 Sanofi-Aventis Novartis 38.0 bn 
4 Bayer Sanofi-Aventis 36.0 bn 
5 Pfizer AstraZeneca 31.6 bn 
6 AstraZeneca Johnson & Johnson 24.6 bn 
7 Kohl Pharma (imports) Merck 23.6 bn 
8 Ratiopharm (generics) Roche 21.0 bn 
9 GlaxoSmithKline Eli Lilly 19.3 bn 
10 Boehringer Ingelheim Wyeth 19.0 bn 
Source*  : IMS PharmaScope Germany, basis: ex factory pharma sales in Euro in 2008 
Source**: IMS Health Inc., basis: ex factory pharma sales in USD in 2008 
 
As per their financial statements big pharmaceutical companies spend between 25-30% 
of sales value on marketing and selling. Pharma critical researchers like Angell (2004) 
argue that the real number is even higher because some marketing activities are simply 
‘hidden in the books’ by allocating them to non-marketing cost centres. An example 
would be continuous medical education programmes – which are in fact drug specific 
marketing & communication measures to physicians – becoming part of the R&D 
budget. As per my own experiences actual marketing and selling expenses are rather to 
be located in the 30-40% (share of total sales) bracket. 
 
Yet even at 25-30% the average share allocated to marketing is significantly higher 
than expenses for R&D. According to the European Federation of Pharmaceutical 
Industries and Associations (EFPIA) the R&D to sales ratio was only 17% on average 
(Europe) in 2007. In Germany the R&D rate is slightly above average at currently at 
18.5% of sales (BPI, 2009). Although the amount spent on marketing and selling 
significantly outweighs the amount spent on R&D, pharmaceutical companies are 
eagerly presenting an image as innovators to the public. Firms point out their enormous 
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investment into drug innovation while downplaying their vast expenses of drug 
marketing (Angell, 2004).   
 
Sales visits by pharmaceutical representatives (‘drug detailing’) is the primary 
marketing instrument in the ethical (i.e. prescription only) drug business. Traditionally, 
drug reps visited physicians to inform doctors in detail about their products, an activity 
for which the term ‘detailing’ was coined within the industry. With the rise of so called 
generic drugs (i.e. low priced replicas of original drugs which have lost their patent 
rights) companies began to send their drug reps also to ‘detail’ pharmacists. This was 
done in response to a governmental policy by which the individual physician can 
determine whether or not a particular drug can be substituted (‘switched’) with an 
equivalent drug at the point-of-sale (i.e. pharmacy). This policy – called ‘aut idem’ 
(lat.: ‘or the same’) prescription – was introduced by German government in 2002 in 
order to advance the use of low priced generic drugs. Currently generic drugs make 
47% in unit and 20% in value share of the total drug market in Germany (IMS, 2009). 
Hence, marketers of generic drugs are increasingly focussing their detailing activities at 
the pharmacy channel, trying to ensure that ‘aut idem’ prescriptions are ‘switched’ 
their way. In contrast, marketers of patent protected original products continue to focus 
their detailing activities on physicians, making sure that their product stands out among 
the numerous highly similar ‘original drugs’.  
 
Although the share of generic drugs is rising and the top selling company in Germany 
in 2008 is a provider of generics (see Table 2, p. 23), the German market continues to 
be driven by patented drugs. This is due to the fact that there is essentially free pricing 
for patent protected drugs in Germany. Ex-factory prices are determined by 
manufacturers without either negotiations involving governmental agencies, direct 
price controls or profit controls (WHO, 2009). Only if drugs run out of patent are they 
subjected to forced rebates in order to be reimbursed by statutory health insurance. 
However, to manufacturers of original drugs post patent marketing is financially 
unattractive and thus their internal return on investment projections usually end at the 
very day the patent expires. Instead, original manufacturers rather try to prolong patent 
protection or they reformulate their existing drugs just enough to be granted a new 
patent.     
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In the market of ‘innovative’ patent protected drugs (i.e. 80% of total market in value 
terms) detailing of office-based as well as hospital physicians plays a crucial role. Thus 
leading drug companies send out teams comprising of many hundred drug reps to visit 
doctors. Drug companies thereby precisely differentiate physicians according to a 
number of factors, including prescription potential, loyalty or opinion leadership. As 
per my own experience, increasingly physicians are classified by their projected 
likelihood to adopt a certain attitude or behaviour in line with a drug’s brand 
positioning (Bayer Healthcare, 2007). These projections are based on qualitative and 
quantitative research with physicians executed prior to a product’s launch. Physicians 
are subsequently structured into (behavioural) segments of different value. Typically, 
drug reps are instructed to visit doctors belonging to a highly valuable segment more 
often than others. This implies that highly relevant physicians are visited several times 
a month while those of lesser importance are only called upon once or twice in a 
quarter. Depending on a company’s target market (i.e. speciality) drug reps visit 
between 5-10 physicians per day. According to industry sources as well as my own 
research findings, a detailing encounter in Germany typically lasts between 5-15 
minutes.  
 
 
1.7. Research objective 
 
This research is carried out to investigate if marketization is discursively constructed in 
the context of drug detailing in Germany. Moreover, it is to show how such discourse 
is actually figured according to those involved in it. Centrally, it is to understand the 
impact that a (presumably) marketised discourse has on the roles and attitudes of drug 
reps and physicians. Further to that end, the study is to present physicians’ attitudes 
towards drug representatives but equally it will reveal drug reps’ stances towards 
physicians as well as to their own company management. The latter two aspects are a 
highly under-researched area to date. The fact that very little is known about drug reps’ 
attitudes to physicians as well as to their own company management could be due to 
the following: First, pharmaceutical companies grant little access to their – often 
publicly criticised – promotional practices and hence are reluctant to invite external 
researchers to study their detailers. The second and probably more important reason is 
that research interest is likely driven by assumed scale of change. Unsurprisingly, the 
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focus is on those who are expected to change, namely physicians, rather than on those 
who have to sell that change. Social scientists so far have done little to challenge the 
common belief that the detail man’s mind-set is always in line with the promotional 
strategy of the company he represents. Yet drug reps’ year long exposure to medical 
professionals could equally make them experience a conflict of interest followed by a 
discord in identity. My research will thus shed light on how drug reps assess and deal 
with the situation of presenting a marketised discourse to physicians.    
 
 
1.8. Research approach 
 
My study is about investigating if and how promotional discourse is cognitively 
influencing physicians, detailers and managers. As such I am researching the results of 
individual meaning-making, which implies that there is no objective truth to discover. 
The research rests on the ontological belief that social reality is constructed. 
Furthermore, it assumes that language is the chief instrument for crafting social reality. 
Consequently, by analysing discourse one gets access to meaning which makes 
discourse studies a central element of my research. The particularity of my research 
approach is that it examines discourse about marketised discourse. Hence, the term 
discourse is to be understood in two different ways: (1) as a source for accessing 
meaning and (2) as an instrument for swaying physicians. In order to further clarify 
this, the two notions of discourse must be precisely defined. With regards to the first 
connotation I define discourse as spoken accounts given by drug reps, physicians and 
managers. These accounts have been provoked by means of qualitative interviewing of 
altogether 24 respondents, of which there were ten physicians, ten drug reps and four 
managers. Interview data was transcribed and subsequently structured into themes, 
followed by interpretation of their underlying content. The second notion of discourse 
is talk performed by drug reps during their interaction with physicians. In other words, 
it is the discursive practice employed in drug detailing. This talk - which is expected to 
be marketised - is the key matter of interest when interviewing drug reps and 
physicians.   
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1.9. Thesis structure 
 
At the outset I will review the emergence and concept of professions. In turn, I will 
discuss the various outlooks on the profession of medicine. In doing this, I will 
distinguish between sustaining and non-sustaining theories. According to the former 
set, physicians have a norm controlling function in society and thus are predicted to 
continue to play an outstanding role. The other set is assuming that due to economic 
pressures and continuous functional differentiation the medical profession is gradually 
loosing its significance, changing into an ‘ordinary’ occupation. Subsequent to the 
reviewing of physicians I will turn to examining the emerging role of drug 
representatives. Along this context, key perspectives on the purpose of drug detailing 
will be discussed. In the second part of the literature review I will introduce various 
ideas on language and meaning followed by a detailed discussion on marketization of 
discourse.  
 
In the middle section, emphasis will be laid on presenting and debating the theoretical 
framework, research questions and empirical method. Theories and uses of analysis of 
discourse and qualitative interviewing will be discussed in detail. I will round off the 
chapter with presenting my approach to sampling. 
 
The final section will be dedicated to presenting and discussing the research findings. 
This will be done by structuring my results alongside a theory model. Subsequently, 
outcomes will be balanced against research questions. I will conclude my thesis by 
demonstrating both the theoretical and practical relevance as well as implications of my 
research findings. 
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2. Perspectives on professionalism 
 
Investigating the phenomenon of discourse in drug detailing requires understanding 
about its context. This involves obtaining knowledge about the medical profession as 
well as about the pharmaceutical industry and their concept of drug detailing. In the 
first part, I will introduce the reader to the concept of medical professionalism. 
Importantly, the development of the medical profession is essentially related to the 
emergence of professions in Western societies. Thus before I present the evolution and 
idiosyncrasies of modern day physicians I like to review the idea of professions and 
professionalism in general.   
 
 
 
2.1. The idea of professions 
 
According to White (2006) professions are defined as group of occupations that 
provide highly specialised services, typically based on esoteric knowledge, which only 
they can measure. Members of a profession have autonomy over their own work and 
often direct others (mostly lower qualified individuals) in the conduct of their 
occupations. Thus professionals have monopolistic control in their area of expertise 
and exercise dominance of subordinate occupations. A key guarantor of professional 
power and monopoly is its exclusive licensure by the state. In exchange for 
professional autonomy, members promise to adhere to a code of ethics (e.g. the 
Hippocratic Oath in medicine) by which they are required to put their client’s interest 
ahead of their own. As such professionals confess themselves to a relationship of trust 
with their clients, thereby subordinating any self-interested profit-making. Committing 
oneself to a code of ethics must be judged as being largely a symbolic act because 
governance remains with the professional body. As such the professions basically 
govern themselves (Freidson, 1970). 
 
Today’s notion of profession is historically linked to the emergence of occupations in 
the early modern period (Conze, 1972; La Vopa, 1988). Essential to that period was the 
gradual dissolving of the corporative state (the three estates), further accelerated by the 
upcoming industrialisation coupled with urbanisation. The concept of occupation was 
significantly differing from the organising principles of the feudalist system in that an 
occupation is actively chosen rather than is the privilege of an ascribed social status. 
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By choosing an occupation the individual can attain social attributes, which he or she 
would have been prohibited from gaining under feudalistic rule. Hence, the rise of 
occupations gradually stopped the arbitrary structuration of society. By means of 
personal accomplishment subjects were overcoming the formerly rigid and 
predetermined social order. Functional achievement increasingly challenged ascription 
in form of inherited status. 
 
Within this development ‘professions’ emerged to be a particular type of occupation. 
Differing from holders of plain occupations, members of a profession began to treat 
their underlying occupational idea in a highly reflexive manner. Occupational 
knowledge and ethos were cultivated, discursively crafted and codified in order to 
convert it into a body of theory and ultimately into an academic teaching profession 
(Abbott, 1988). By institutionalising their occupational body (Freidson, 1986), 
professionals are equally shaping and serving the social claim associated with the 
profession in society. Evans & Laumann (1983) thus describe professions as standing 
in particular close relation to the 'core' parts of the cultural system. Core parts of 
Western society are broadly defined by man’s relationship to himself (medicine), to 
others (law) and to God (theology) (Stichweh, 2008). By connecting the corpus of 
professional knowledge to the cultural core parts of society, professionals secure 
themselves an exceptional position in the system. Starr (1983) spoke of ‘cultural 
authority’ in this respect. Professionals manifest their exceptional status by 
emphasising inaccessibility to the corpus of knowledge as well as by suggesting 
completeness in terms of number of professions (Stichweh, 2008). As such 
professionals have gained a new kind of independence and autonomy, formerly only 
granted to those holding property. Professionalism thus allows a decoupling of 
autonomy from property and capital. Instead, professionals are functionally 
legitimizing their autonomy by means of institutionalised knowledge.  
 
To many, the professional complex was - or is again - seen as a stabilising counterpart 
to the world of capital (Parson, 1939, 1951; Freidson, 1994, 2001). Parsons was 
convinced that organisational forms modelling professional associations will steer 
society in the future. Freidson (1971) predicted a ‘professionalized’ society and 
Halmos (1970) was expecting the service ethos of the professions to be generalized to 
society as a whole. He predicted a society in which personal service is valued more 
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than power and material gain. In contrast to these euphoric views, Becker (1962) 
declared that profession was rather a folk concept, a semantic technique for winning 
occupational status and minimizing occupational constraints. 
 
Traditionally, the professions of theology, medicine and law have served the cultural 
spectrum of needs. However, constant evolution of society’s cultural core equally 
brings changes to the relevant corpus of knowledge. This, in turn, alters the 
composition of professions within a social system. Enlightment, realism and 
scientification, for example, have gradually marginalised theology as a profession in 
Western society. At the same time, demands for e.g. technical (engineers) or 
management (consultants) knowledge have brought new professional groups to the fore 
(Ackroyd, et al., 2007). Concurrently, functional differentiation takes place among 
existing professions such as medicine. For example, over the past 50 years the 
profession of medicine has produced dozens of new professional subgroups 
(specialities), each of them carefully delineating their respective body of knowledge & 
skill. Ongoing functional differentiation is driven by the professions’ exponential 
production of scientific knowledge. Providing the whole spectrum of professional 
knowledge now requires professionals to organise themselves (or to be organised) 
beyond the level of collegial cooperation (McKinlay & Arches, 1985).  
 
However, growing functional specialisation and interdependence plus public 
dissemination of expert knowledge (Haug, 1973) is weakening the professions’ cultural 
authority. Loss of significance in turn impacts their function as a stabilising element 
against the self-interested world of capital. The world of capital is developing in the 
opposite direction. Capital is pooled to leverage an even greater return. Further to this 
end, new areas like education or medicine – once firmly under professional rule – are 
targeted for profit making. Subsequently, efficient organisational structures are being 
established in order for capital to leverage its full breeding potential. In summary, 
professions essentially come under pressure from two ends: growing capitalisation and 
knowledge explosion. Professional work is thus subject to change and professional 
status is challenged in many ways. In chapter three I will portray and discuss this 
development in detail with respect to the profession of medicine. I like to introduce this 
by making a short excursion to the origins and approaches to research on professions.   
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2.2. Research on professions 
 
The critical importance of the professions in political and economic society was 
initially highlighted by Max Weber in his central work “Economy and Society” first 
published (after his death) in 1922. It was central to Weber’s work to understand the 
idiosyncrasies of capitalism in Western society. In particular Weber was concerned that 
the rise of capitalism, along with the forces of rationalism and bureaucratization, would 
result in an “iron cage of servitude” (Weber, 1952). This view was supported by Émile 
Durkheim who hoped that professions would function to organize scientific and expert 
knowledge into associations of colleagues, forming a ‘moral authority’ that would 
serve as a buffer between the public and the onslaught of industrialization (Durkeim, 
1933, p. 26 in Hafferty & Light, 1995). To Durkheim professional associations played 
a central role in advancing trust and stability in a society otherwise driven by utilitarian 
self-interest. In line with Durkheim, sociologist Carr-Saunders (1928, 1933) regarded 
the rise of professions as an important source of standards, services and moral authority 
in the modern world of corporations and markets. Truly foundational in this respect 
was the work on social control of E.A Ross (1901/2009). Ross raised the question of 
how social order and social cohesion can be established and preserved. Ross opposed 
the utilitarianism behind economics which believed that the economic interests of the 
individual would be sufficient to ensure social cohesion. Instead he promoted the 
notion of professions as independent experts in the service of public interests.  
 
Within the group of professions, medicine was given particular attention by 
sociologists. Physicians were perceived as an important occupational class that sought 
to advance public welfare by strengthening licensing laws, by opposing commercialism 
in medicine, by driving out proprietary medical schools, and by attacking the 
‘hucksterism of the nostrum industry’ (Light, 1989).     
 
Despite the grounding works of Weber and Durkheim research on professions became 
an Anglo-American domain. Particularly in the US – with its fast expansion of high 
capitalism – sociologists were interested to understand the motivations, dynamics and 
conflicts of professional work that is allegedly focussed on public welfare and which 
enjoys high social status and autonomy. The ever prevailing conflict between market 
and morale seemed to have sparked researchers’ interest. During the 1950s and 60s 
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numerous research projects in the US were investigating the current as well as the 
future role of the professions. The most prominent protagonist of that period was 
sociologist Talcott Parsons who devoted much of his work to decipher the medical 
practitioner’s pattern of action as well as his role and function in modern society. Yet 
Parsons’ perspective had largely emerged out of theoretical analysis not substantiated 
by direct empirical research. His interpretation of professionalism is therefore of 
normative quality, essentially viewing professionalism as a value system (Evetts, 
2003). In that Parsons followed the traditional definitional approach to professions as 
previously exercised by e.g. Durkheim. The definitional or taxonomic approach to 
professions (Klegon, 1978) was continued by researcher like Barber (1963), Wilensky 
(1964) or Goode & Etzioni (1969).  
 
More sustained research and analysis of the actual ways professionals practised (e.g. 
Freidson 1970) triggered a significant turn within the research on professions in the 
1970s and 1980s. Focus was now placed on aspects like social closure, domination and 
self-interest, which altogether resulted in a critical view of professional conduct. The 
critical (‘professionalism as ideology’, Evetts, 2003) research approach began to 
acknowledge the social meaning as well as social consequences of professional work. 
Thus it recognised that there is an internal and external dynamic of professionalism. 
Contemporary research on professions is more concerned with the diminishing 
leverage of professional power before the background of economic, social and political 
change (e.g. Hoff, 2001; Domagalski, 2007; Adler & Kwon, 2007). Throughout the 
various stages that research on professions underwent, studies on the medical 
profession always took a central role (e.g. Parsons 1958, 1963, 1975; Freidson 1970, 
1986, 1994, 2001; McKinlay & Arches, 1985; Hoff 2001, 2003). 
  
 
2.3. Summary 
 
In this chapter I have shown that the professions have reached an extraordinary 
position – or what Starr (1983) called ‘cultural authority’ – by addressing the core 
needs (e.g. health, legal order, and religion) of a society.  Importantly, members have 
treated the underlying occupational idea and knowledge in a highly reflexive manner, 
cultivating and discursively crafting it into an institutionalised professional body. 
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Against this background, professionals were able to gain a large degree of autonomy 
over their work. Their independence and authority was seen as a stabilising counterpart 
to the forces of capitalism. Yet I have equally displayed that members of the 
professions are selfishly manifesting their exceptional status by limiting access and 
suggesting completeness in terms of professional service. However, it has also been 
demonstrated that professional leverage is increasingly weakened by growing 
functional specialisation. Furthermore, many professional areas like medicine or 
education are now progressively rationalised in the pursuit of profit.  
 
In the second part I have introduced the key developments in the research on 
professions. It became clear that research approaches have changed along with the 
standing of the professions in society. While at the outset researcher followed a 
definitional approach, they subsequently reverted to a more critical style by pointing to 
the social consequences (e.g. misuse of power) of professional work. Due to the rise in 
economic and structural pressures, current researchers are preferably addressing the 
professions’ adaptation to environmental changes.     
 
Having addressed the professional complex in general, in the following chapter I like to 
focus on the medical profession specifically. 
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3. Perspectives on medical professionalism 
 
There are many outlooks on the medical profession arguing from e.g. normative, 
critical or realist positions. I could easily take on this labelling structure to guide my 
review of the literature. Yet I prefer to organise the works differently, namely to group 
them into two main strands differing by future prospect. One is predicting physicians 
an outstanding and controlling function in society, the other is assuming that doctors 
continue to loose in significance, gradually becoming an ordinary occupation. Based on 
this approach I am e.g. joining the normative work of Parsons with the critical studies 
of Freidson. This is suitable in my view because despite all of Freidson’s criticism 
about professional conduct, both authors essentially plead for a strong position of 
physicians in society. Importantly, as the various perspectives have been developed and 
brought forward at different points in time they are not based on the same corpus of 
empirical knowledge. Naturally, some authors would probably revise their points of 
view given a more up-to-date knowledge of the factual developments of the profession. 
On the other hand, the most influential writings – like the work of Parsons – are 
normative in kind. Thus they should be seen as timeless provisions for an ideal role 
function and positioning of physicians in society.  
 
In the following, I will present and discuss the two clusters of perspectives to medical 
professionalism. For the purpose of clarity I have called them ‘sustaining’ and ‘non-
sustaining’ theories. I will begin with presenting the sustaining theories of medical 
professionalism. In that context, Parsons’ theory of structural functionalism plays a 
fundamental role because his view of the medical profession is still influencing the 
academic debate as well as the perception of physicians in contemporary society 
(Naber, 2005).    
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3.1. Sustaining theories of medical professionalism  
 
3.1.1. Parsons’ interpretation of medical professionalism: still internalised today? 
 
3.1.1.1. Parsons’ structural functionalism 
 
The idea of professional life as the embodiment of service to the public was advocated 
by Parsons (1939) who characterized professional work as universalistic yet 
functionally specific, rational, and altruistic (Hafferty & Light, 1995). This 
characterization followed Parson’s theory of structural functionalism and the embedded 
concept of ‘pattern variables’ to describe the individual’s behaviour in social context. 
The focus of Parsons’ theory is on how individuals’ actions are organized through their 
roles in social institutions in ways that contribute to society’s basic functional 
requirements. Pattern variables in this respect are dichotomous types of social 
behaviour which individuals have to decide between. This refers to a series of specific 
choices individuals make within the normative guidelines of their society. It is for 
example describing whether an individual is following a collective or personal interest 
in his work. Parsons used this concept to describe the idiosyncrasies of professional 
work. When he portrayed professional work e.g. as ‘functionally specific’ he argued 
that technical competence – which is the key determining factor of role and status 
within the academic professions – is always limited to a specific area of knowledge and 
skill (Parsons, 1951). Specialist knowledge fosters professional or academic authority 
over lay people who are less or not at all familiar with the subject in question. This type 
of authority is not based on ascription like family heritage or ethnic background but 
solely on knowledge acquirements. While Parsons was originally concerned with 
professionalism in general he was subsequently applying his theory to the medical 
profession specifically. 
 
 
3.1.1.2. Parsons’ patterning of physicians 
   
In his employment of pattern variables Parsons emphasised the medical practitioners’ 
universalistic orientation. To his expectation, physicians treat each patient equally, 
regardless of class, gender or race. Thus doctors are receiving everyone in need of 
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medical care. On the other hand, universalism allows physicians to refrain from 
establishing a too personal or intimate relation with patients. Physicians maintain 
‘affective neutrality’ by approaching each patient case in an objective and rational 
manner, thereby waiving any personal preferences. However, according to Parsons, 
neutrality is not be confused with keeping a cool distance but implies that physicians 
are showing empathy to their patients. Physicians are collectively oriented in that they 
submit their personal interest to the wellbeing of the patient. Thus doctors should not 
turn away patients in need even if they cannot fully pay for their treatment. Physicians 
act functionally specific by limiting their service to their area of medical expertise. 
Altogether, Parsons sees physicians as being moral actors who by their altruism, 
knowledge and impartiality have been assigned a social organising function. I will be 
elaborating these points in the following sections.  
 
 
3.1.1.3. Physicians as moral actors 
 
Parsons carefully followed and chronicled the development of medical service in the 
USA. He was particularly interested in medicine and healthcare because he was 
convinced that health is a prerogative for a functioning social system as illness makes it 
impossible to fulfil social roles (Parsons, 1958). Parsons’ perception of illness has an 
important ethical dimension to it. If one acknowledges that wellbeing is a prerequisite 
for social being, health becomes a generic right to each individual. Following Gewirth 
(1978) the generic right for wellbeing is not to be compromised and hence should be 
given unconditional support. According to Gewirth, physical (and psychological) 
integrity is thus a fundamental right equal to freedom. From this perspective, healthcare 
can not be left to the individual to deal with. Society – through its representatives – has 
the obligation to supply a functioning area-wide system of healthcare. Additionally, 
society must support those who do not have the resources to pay for medical care. 
However, the question of unconditional support is frequently balanced against the 
individual’s obligation not to impair his own health (e.g. Bobbert, 2003). Should 
individual risk-taking or neglect of one’s own health be penalised? From a utilitarian or 
self-interested perspective, the question is typically answered by issuing a positive list, 
defining conditions for unrestricted access to medical care. Healthcare thus becomes 
conditional, negotiable and ultimately a commodity. From a deontological or 
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collective-interest view, ‘wrong’ behaviour submits to moral obligation. In other 
words, society can not penalise someone who neglects his health by restricting (e.g. 
through higher pricing) his access to medical care.  
 
This is a complex subject in that one needs to consider social causes for health neglect 
as much as ‘ex ante’ moral-hazard. As such it goes far beyond the scope of this project. 
My point simply is that physicians, who – according to Parsons – should adhere to a 
collective orientation, consequently must take issue with treating healthcare as a 
commodity. With respect to drug detailing this implies that physicians are expected to 
oppose any promotion beyond the medical use value of a drug.          
 
 
3.1.1.4. Physicians as norm managers 
 
Parsons’ view on healthcare goes past the question of moral. He is particularly 
interested in reflecting on social norms as well as on roles taken under condition of ill-
health. To Parsons, morbidity is not only a biological phenomenon but a way in which 
individuals react to social pressure. According to Parsons’ understanding, morbidity is 
a means for individuals to escape their social roles – at least for a given time – which 
assigns the notion of illness a socio-psychological dimension. Consequently, if 
morbidity is to a certain extent socially determined it must also be open to social 
influence.  Out of this logic Parsons postulates a functional requirement of society to 
control disease. Fundamental in this respect is the temporary character of ‘role 
deviance’ (Parsons, 1975) with relation to sickness. While the individual is ‘allowed’ to 
retreat from social obligations for a short period of time, he is expected to eventually 
return to his role and to meet the demands the social system brings to him. The 
physician on the other hand is expected to pave the patient’s way back to the societal 
norm.  
 
This all leads to institutionalized role behaviour on part of doctors and patients. A 
society that accepts disease only as temporary deviance from the norm, assigns clearly 
defined rights and obligations to the protagonists of disease control. What follows is 
the development of a stable system of interlinked behaviours and roles, which Parsons 
believes can be best analysed und understood via his categorical toolbox (i.e. the 
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pattern variables). To Parsons, the medical practitioner is exercising social control to 
enforce (organisational) norms of society. Parsons defends such superior standing in 
society: “With respect to the inherent functions of effective care and amelioration of 
conditions of illness, there must be a built-in institutionalized superiority of the 
professional roles, grounded in responsibility, competence, and occupational 
concern“(Parsons, 1975, p. 271). Next to being a moral actor, according to Parsons, 
physicians function as social norm managers.   
 
 
3.1.1.5. Criticising Parsons’ conception of physicians 
 
Contemporary researchers like White (2002) come to a different assessment of 
physicians and the medical profession as a whole. White is emphasizing the self-
interested practices of social closure, of doctors seeking to maintain their occupational 
autonomy, their pursuit of high incomes and the maintenance of their social status. 
Furthermore, White notes: “Whereas Parsons emphasised the long period of training, 
the knowledge base and the commitment to service and ethics, contemporary 
sociologists point to the gate keeping exercise of closing off training options for other 
health practitioners, the self-interest and the venal motivation of the profession” 
(White, 2002, p. 107).   
  
Hafferty & Light (1995) critiqued Parsons’ innocence with respect to his belief in the 
restraint of self-interest on part of medical practitioners. They argued that “no attention 
was given to the ways in which the enlightened paternalism of doctoring, that Parsons 
extolled, resulted in part from cultivating ignorance, helplessness, and a sense of 
incompetence in patients as techniques of social control” (Hafferty & Light, 1995, p. 
134).    
 
Further critique of Parsons’ work is concerning the lack of empirical substantiation. 
Balog (2000) remarked that based on his theoretic concept Parsons made statements 
regarding causal and functional interactions that legitimately could only have been 
done if based on empirical analysis (Balog, 2000, p. 94). Parsons’ claim of the medical 
profession’s altruistic and long-term collective orientation in fact has the status of a 
hypothesis. Nevertheless, it is presented as if based on empirical evidence.  
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Overall, Parsons’ work is criticized for normatively overstating the professional 
complex leaving little room for behavioural heterogeneity and inconsistencies (Cohen, 
et al., 1975; Naber, 2005). Parsons’ concept of structural functionalism is hence 
disapproved of for being too reductionistic and simplistic (DiTomaso, 1982). Further 
critique is focussing on Parsons’ strict and idealistic behavioural patterning. In contrast, 
physicians are rather believed to manoeuvre in between the dichotomous behavioural 
options. Firm adherence to one idealistic extreme – like Parsons postulates it – is found 
rather unlikely. 
 
 
3.1.1.6. Why is Parsons’ theory relevant to studying drug detailing? 
 
While Parsons’ functionalistic approach might be perfectionist in kind, to me it is 
nicely demonstrating how Western societies came to look on the medical profession. 
Conceptualising physicians as collectively oriented moral authorities standing in 
contrast to the self-interested forces of capital – despite numerous criticism – has 
provided a strong cultural scripting. Further to that end, Parsons’ perspective that 
disease is socially produced leads to a convincing theory of why the medical profession 
is perceived as a normative guide to society. All this becomes a vital reference point 
when assessing reactions and conceptions about physicians by de facto lay people like 
drug representatives. It is important because, as Goffman (1959) postulated it, people’s 
attitude and behaviour versus other people in society is strongly determined by their 
respective socio-culturally assigned roles. In other words, for the gearing of 
communication it is still more important how an individual is thought of as role model 
than how he is presently experienced in a given situation. With regards to my research 
topic of drug rep vs. physician interaction, it implies that each party’s attitudes are not 
only driven by individual experiences and perceptions. Primarily they are determined 
by the internalised socio-cultural norms with respect to the other party. If according to 
Parsons, society assigns a superior role to medical doctors, drug reps will incorporate 
this in their attitudinal modus.   
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3.1.2. The power approach: uncovering the dominance of medicine  
 
During the later part of the 1960s Parsons’ functionalistic approach of system stability 
and consensus was gradually pushed aside by what became generally known as the 
power approach. This critical school of thought disapproved of Parsons’ harmonistic 
model, in particular its attempt to justify doctors’ privileged status in society with a 
higher collective calling. To the contrary, in their analysis of the medical profession 
they pointed to the exertion of power to protect particularistic interests like social 
prestige, high income or self actualisation. While Parsons was criticised for not 
substantiating his theory with empirical evidence, followers of the power approach 
took to intensive field work to support their stances. 
 
In contrast to the functionalistic approach, the power approach interprets the 
dominance of physicians not as a result of an apolitical act of modernisation. The 
power concept emphasises conflicts and claims of power, which characterised an 
apparently natural rise of modern medicine.  From the power approach perspective, the 
process of (medical) professionalization serves the objective of monopolization. 
Physicians are not seen as altruistic fiduciaries of society’s collective values but as 
socio-economic agents of power (Naber, 2005).  
 
The most prominent representative of the power approach was its founding father Eliot 
Freidson. His research was sparked by the “accusations of greed, hubris, fragmentation, 
insensitivity to patients” (Hafferty & Light, 1995, p. 135) Freidson had observed 
among the medical profession by the late 1960s. At the same time he detected that the 
interpersonal basis of authority was rather weak. Hafferty & Light carve out the 
revolutionary difference between Freidson’s and Parsons’ work, when noting that 
 
Parsons may have emphasized that authority emanates from technical knowledge, 
but that locus alone leaves professionals with little more than their powers of 
persuasion. To solve this problem professions seek to institutionalize their authority. 
They use licensure and public identity to attract clients suffering from a persistent 
problem. They gain control over valued services and facilities, like prescription drugs 
and hospitals and medical excuses from work.       
        (Hafferty & Light, 1995, p. 135) 
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Freidson distinguished between the pure scientific knowledge and theory and the 
application of that knowledge in practice (Freidson, 1970), with which he meant to 
highlight that medicine as a science is essentially neutral or apolitical. In contrast to 
this, the application of medicine was powerfully organised by the professional bodies 
to primarily meet the self-interest of its members. Freidson is deeply concerned about 
the growing gap between society’s health care needs and a system of health care 
provision controlled by a privileged and self-idealising medical profession legally 
empowered to monopolistically define disease and even to control all adjunct medical 
occupations (Naber, 2005). In his early criticism of the medical profession’s actual 
conduct Freidson pleas for a ‘social’ opening of medical training. He regards this as a 
means to break with the predominantly white, male, middle class phenotype that is 
representing the profession in Western societies. He also supports a greater scientific 
evaluation of medical practice within the profession and asks for greater transparency 
towards patients.  
    
It is important to note that Freidson is not questioning the crucial role of 
professionalism in medicine for society. He is however criticising the deviation from 
the ideal typical by members of the profession ‘in realitas’. Different from Parsons he 
is probably less naive about the effects a privileged position will have on medical 
doctors’ conduct in the long-term. In his early works Freidson was literally bashing on 
the medical profession’s self-serving conduct of business. Nevertheless he was having 
a clear picture of what medical professionalism should comprise of, that is not far from 
Parsons’ view. Freidson equally believes that doctors have the power to organise and 
control their own work. They should have power over the division of medical labour, 
the medical labour market as well as medical training. Similar to Parsons Freidson also 
demands from medical professionals “an ideology serving some transcendent value and 
asserting greater devotion to doing good work than to economic reward” (Freidson 
2001, p. 180).  
 
In contrast to Parsons’ perspective, Freidson is not one-dimensional in his view of 
professionalism’s relevance to society. While to Parsons, professionalism is the centre 
of social gravity, to Freidson, professionalism is just one out of three pillars carrying 
modern society. In his later work “Professionalism: The Third Logic” (Freidson, 2001) 
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he is promoting the theory that modern society’s structure and actions are driven by 
three complexes (logics): the market, bureaucracy and professionalism. Interestingly, in 
this work Freidson returns to a normative approach to professionalism. Freidson 
critiques that over the last two decades of the 20th century, the relative importance of 
the three logics have come out of balance. He diagnoses an expansion of market and 
bureaucratic ideologies at the expense of professionalism. Responsible for this shift is 
the rise of neo-liberalism connected with managerialism and consumerism during the 
last quarter of the 20th century. Freidson sees managerialism with its focus on cost 
reduction and hierarchical control as driving medicine towards standardization. At the 
other end, Freidson suspects that the ideology of consumer freedom is undermining the 
medical practitioner’s authority over his patients. Consumerism which is fostering 
transparency of information and freedom of consumer choice is gradually tearing down 
the wall put up to protect the dominant role of suppliers characteristic of late Fordism.  
 
 
3.1.3. Making peace with medicine: Freidson’s turn 
 
Surprisingly, Freidson’s differentiated and critical view of the medical profession’s 
conduct is not resulting in a gloomy outlook. On the contrary, he believes that doctors 
will regain and eventually even strengthen their social position if they just remember 
and comply with the ideal typical form of medical professionalism. This seems a 
surprising conclusion that puts Freidson remarkably close to Parsons’ apology for a 
privileged position of medical practitioners. I believe that Freidson is underestimating 
the disparity between ideal typical and existent behaviour and – even more important – 
that he is underrating the strength behind market forces unleashed to the empowerment 
of individual fulfilment. Despite being the founding father of the power approach, 
Freidson is ultimately not accepting the conditions many followers of that school are 
observing. Daheim for example argues that an ‘expertocratic’ interpretation of medical 
practice, that allocates a subaltern position to the ‘incompetent patient’, is no longer 
accepted by an increasingly reflexive society. He suggests that patients progressively 
refuse to be treated as lay people. Patients, Daheim states, reject a relationship with 
physicians that is resting on a difference in rationality between science and everyday 
life (Daheim, 1992).   
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In his believe in the social and economic resurge of the medical profession Freidson is 
not alone. Swick, for example, deems the absence of a consistent and clear definition of 
medical professionalism among doctors to be the key reason behind the loss of 
professional authority and influence (Swick, 2000). Swick proposes a catalogue of 
professional norms aimed at winning back society’s lost belief in the profession’s 
collective orientation. In essence the catalogue is covering the ideal typical believes as 
presented by Freidson and Parsons. Despite its regulatory dress-up, Swick’s work 
remains nothing but a plea for ideal behaviour. Swick is neither proposing how to 
implement the norms in practice nor does he suggest what to do in case of non-
compliant behaviour.   
 
In a collective action by several European and US medical associations a ‘Charter of 
Medical Professionalism’ (Sox, 2002) was compiled. This document was meant to 
reemphasis medicine’s key values analogous to the Hippocratic Oath, demonstrating its 
fundamental differences to the growing primacy of marketization of self-interest as 
displayed by capitalism.  However, the charter was neither a binding document nor a 
pledge that physicians are sworn to uphold (Domagalski, 2008). Similar to Swick’s 
catalogue it was mainly a symbolic instrument.   
 
In summary, Freidson’s perspective on the medical profession remains altogether 
positive, supportive and even protective. He began as a virulent critic of a dominant 
medical profession which he observed during the 1960s and 70s. He happily proposed 
measures to destabilize the medical complex to the benefit of transparency, 
accountability and equality. When eventually the forces of a free market economy took 
hold of the profession, forcing it to compete for limited budgets, to justify their 
treatment plans and to hand over inefficiently executed parts of their ‘labour process’, 
it seems that Freidson began to regret that he helped braking up the old structures. In 
his later years Freidson is mainly advocating an ideal picture of medical 
professionalism, almost stubbornly predicting its continuation as an extraordinary as 
well as elevated element in society.  
 
Altogether, the works of Parsons and Freidson indicate that physicians should exercise 
a controlling as well as corrective function against the self-interested world of business. 
Their contributions provide reason why physicians should remain sovereign from the 
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market economy system. Essentially it is to ensure that health and the provision of 
healthcare becomes a generic right to all members of society and that it is not subjected 
to personal interests or market forces. Both Parsons and Freidson demand a strong and 
autonomous position of physicians to the benefit of the collective of patients. In that 
they provide a normative proposal of framing society. Moreover, their ideal depiction 
of the role, status and function of the medical profession is equally a reference with 
regards to the perception and self-conception of physicians still prevailing today.  
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3.2. Non-sustaining theories of medical professionalism 
 
In this part I like to present those perspectives on medical professionalism that predict a 
decrease in physician power and autonomy. Most of these views are not ideological 
motivated but simply interpret environmental pressures (e.g. economic, social, political 
changes) with respect to their projected effects on medical work. However, next to 
substantiating the arguments for professional decline, also new options for medical 
work will be introduced. I will begin with portraying the key theories on professional 
decline.  
 
3.2.1. Deprofessionalization and proletarianization of physicians 
 
While Parsons and Freidson have portrayed physicians as being a central guiding 
element to society, Haug (1973) projected an alternative scenario regarding the future 
of the medical profession. Known for creating the term of ‘deprofessionalization’ 
(Haug, 1973), Haug inspired a school of thought that believed in a gradual alignment of 
medicine to other occupations. In the early 1970s Haug pronounced medicine’s fall 
from professional grace (Haug, 1973, 1988). She was reacting to the prevailing mantra 
of ‘professionalization of everyone’ (taken from Wilensky, 1964), the common 
sociological belief of the 1950s and 60s “that all occupations were becoming 
professionalized, and we were on the verge of a professionalized society” (Haug, 1988, 
p. 48). Haug was building her counter scenario partly on Wilensky’s (1964) disbelief in 
total professionalization and was sympathizing with his prediction that increasingly 
mixed forms of professional labour – combining professional and bureaucratic models 
– were on the rise. Haug’s main argument supporting a counter development was the 
knowledge explosion in science and technology that was to be observed during the 
1970s. She mainly turned to the development of information and communication 
technology as the key reason for change. Already in the mid 1970s, Haug argued that 
computer technology could destroy the monopolization of knowledge and lead to the 
obsolescence of the concept of profession (Haug, 1977).  
 
While from today’s perspective, this was clearly an overstatement, it is true that in the 
present day the internet is providing lay people with all sorts of specialist information 
around disease and treatment of disease. Surveys have found that 50%-75% of people 
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with internet access use it to obtain health information, and that this group of people 
will search such information more than three times a month (Powell & Clark, 2002). 
Adler and Kwon (2008) conclude that the World Wide Web affects the power 
relationship between professionals and those they serve. Together with a large array of 
popular sciences books, articles and TV features, the general public is able to acquire a 
quite good understanding of some or many medical indications and procedures. This 
leads to a questioning attitude towards physicians combined with public demands for 
participation in decision making (Haug & Lavin, 1981). Haug argues that a gradual 
loss in knowledge monopoly is eventually undermining physicians’ authority over 
patients which in turn can be described as deprofessionalization of the occupation. On 
the positive side, Adler, et al. remark that broad dispersion of expert knowledge in turn 
forces physicians to keep up with technical knowledge in their field through continuing 
education. This would lead to an increase in technical expertise and quality of medical 
service, a stance that is rather supportive to the viability and continuation of the 
professional complex.  
 
Based on Haug’s thesis of deprofessionalization Ritzer & Walczak (1988) took to the 
Weberian theory of rationalization and the conflicting concepts of formal and 
substantive rationality, to analyse the changes affecting the medical profession. 
According to Weber “The emphasis in formal rationality is on rationality at the macro 
levels – rules, regulations, laws, bureaucracies, economies – and its impact on the 
conduct of individuals” (Weber, 1921, in Ritzer & Walczak, 1988, p. 3). Substantive 
rationality on the other hand is determined by a coherent set of social values. Ritzer & 
Walczak note that in the ‘golden age of medicine’ (Burnham, 1982) medical 
professionals have been characterized by substantive rationality as they are guided by 
social values to make rational choices of means to ends. They argue, however, that the 
changes in governmental policies as well as in the delivery of medicine “are impelling 
the medical profession away from substantive rationality and in the direction of formal 
rationality. Increasing formal rationality is likely to lead to greater external control over 
physicians and to a decline in the ability of the medical profession to distinguish itself 
from bureaucrats and capitalists. These changes, in turn, are likely to lead to some 
degree of deprofessionalization of physicians” (Ritzer & Walczak, 1988, p. 1). As the 
division between medical doctors and bureaucrats becomes blurred, it is difficult for 
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physicians to claim a distinctive position of profession and to have that claim accepted 
by the public (Ritzer & Walczak, 1988).  
  
Building on Haug’s deprofessionalization thesis (Haug, 1973), some years later 
McKinlay and Arches (1985) predicted an equally deteriorating trend which they 
coined ‘proletarianization’ of physicians. The main idea behind this prediction is the 
medical practitioner’s loss of holistic control over his work to the benefit of a highly 
rationalized division of medical labour. This development is compared to the changes 
that traditional craftsmanship underwent during the process of industrialization. More 
technically put it denotes “the process by which an occupational category is divested of 
control over certain prerogatives relating to the location, content and essentiality of its 
task activities and is thereby subordinated to the broader requirements of production 
under advanced capitalism” (McKinlay & Arches, 1985, p. 161).  It is argued that 
proletarianization is induced by bureaucratization. For a long time, and different from 
other occupations, physicians through a variety of tactics (see Freidson, 1970) have 
been able to postpone or minimize this process. However, during the last quarter of the 
century bureaucratization has finally taken hold of medical practice. According to 
Larson (1972) it is functional efficiency and its ability to handle large-scale issues that 
gives legitimacy to bureaucratization of medical care. McKinlay & Arches, drawing on 
Marglin (1971) and Edwards (1979), alternatively propose that bureaucratization serves 
mainly the function of controlling the professional worker (e.g. physician-employees) 
making him strive towards the capitalist goal of accumulation. In a bureaucratic setting 
the personal objectives become different namely to ascend the managerial hierarchy 
and to advance the organization as a whole. Both objectives, McKinlay & Arches 
argue, are logically intertwined. Furthermore, in a bureaucratized (medical) 
organization the personal element is minimized in order to avoid individualistic 
decision-making. Instead, an approach of deciding via pre-existent set of rules is 
desired.  
 
McKinlay & Arches regard medical specialisation as a key system-inherent driver to 
change. Specialization forces the division of labour, breaking up a formerly holistic 
workflow. It allows codification (e.g. through the system of diagnose related groups 
(DRGs) and automation (e.g. via computer-controlled diagnostic procedures) and 
favours the influx of paramedical workers which happily take over activities from 
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physicians. Additionally, the rise in specialization makes the individual physician 
progressively dependent on knowledge of others.  
 
 
3.2.1.1. Why is it relevant? 
 
Theories of deprofessionalization & proletarianization are essentially reference points 
for assessing situational context. In other words, one needs to have an understanding of 
the occupational situation the physician is arguing from. Although the presented 
models are projections rather than reflections of reality, to me they provide an effective 
orientation on a general level. Thus these theories are relevant when analysing 
physician accounts about their views on commercialisation, their role conception as 
medics as much as their interaction with industry. Importantly, this goes beyond 
relating respondents’ perceptions to existing contributions. It is to take the existing 
frameworks and compare them against the results of knowledge production (interview 
data) in order to come up with interpretations beyond the text value.  
 
 
3.2.2. Economic pressures from the periphery  
 
Since the 1980s researchers (e.g. McKinlay, Hafferty, Light) observed a growing 
pressure on the medical profession from the periphery of medicine. Hafferty & Light 
identified five main groups exercising pressure: (1) government, including local, state 
and federal; (2) corporate purchasers of health care for their employees; (3) corporate 
sellers, such as manufacturers of pharmaceuticals and medical products; (4) consumers, 
as represented by consumer groups and government but also reflected by consumer 
spending on health; and (5) other providers such as nurses, physical therapists etc. 
(Hafferty & Light, 1995). The professional complex is beleaguered by government 
which is aiming to rationalize healthcare delivery to reduce government spending. The 
rise of integrated medical service structures such as HMO (Health Maintenance 
Organisations) in the US is one example for government pushing organizational 
streamlining to cut cost. In Germany, in numerous health reforms throughout the 1990s 
and 2000s, government has imposed strict price and treatment restrictions on medical 
procedures administered to statuary insured patients. In a country where almost 90% of 
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the population are covered by statuary medical insurance, physicians and dentists battle 
for the remaining fraction of privately insured patients (10% of all insured) and for 
those who have add-on private insurance (23% of all insured) (Preusker, 2008). 
Consequently, physicians focus on cost-effective patient management and 
segmentation, giving priority to the treatment of privately insured patients. This has 
lead to the public denouncement of doctors’ providing ‘two-class-medicine’, a 
development which is heavily criticised for breaking with the ideal typical professional 
characteristics of altruism and impartial service to everyone (see Parsons, 1963). 
 
Players in the pharmaceutical industry are heavily competing to acquire a dominant 
position in the medical market place. Progressively, they do this by exerting influence 
on treatment plans. In Germany governmental health reforms have dramatically 
reduced the number of drugs that will be reimbursed by the statuary health insurance 
system. In their battle for the remaining territory drug companies intensify their 
detailing of doctors to gain control over physicians’ prescribing behaviour. Company 
representatives lobby government as well as insurance companies thereby influencing 
treatment and reimbursement plans. Pharmaceutical companies have furthermore 
begun advertising to patients, encouraging patients to demand their product from the 
physician (Adler & Kwon, 2008). All this puts pressure on doctors’ therapeutic 
sovereignty and altogether weakens their professional authority.  
 
On top of this, physicians have come under economic pressure from paramedical 
professions such as nurse practitioners eager to establish a distinctive sphere of work 
and to increase their share of medical service delivery. Domagalski (2008) remarks that 
the granting of licensure by the state to traditional disciplines such as nurse 
practitioners and to speciality areas like nurse anaesthetists, optometrists and 
podiatrists has created healthcare providers who are less expensive and often preferred 
by patients. Hafferty & Light (1995) argue that corporate sellers of medicine like for-
profit-hospitals have welcomed this emancipatory turn and have moved aggressively to 
transfer clinical services down the traditional medical hierarchy.   
 
Hafferty & Light remark that pressure on physicians equally comes from inside the 
profession. The medical knowledge explosion combined with many advances in 
diagnostic technology increased the degree of specialization. Faced with tightening 
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revenue streams, individual specialities compete for control of diagnostic or therapeutic 
modalities. Competitive behaviour is most prominently reflected in the rise of 
physicians’ public advertising, a measure originally prohibited and regarded a taboo. 
This internal battle for revenue is weakening the professional group’s cohesion and 
thwarts a uniform resistance towards external pressures.  
 
 
3.2.3. New options for the medical profession? 
 
McKinlay and Arches (1985) foresee physicians’ gradual development towards 
proletarianization. Haug (1973, 1988) has projected deprofessionalization of medical 
work. Ritzer & Walczak – despite agreeing with much of Haug’s work – nevertheless 
present other possible options regarding the future development of the medical 
profession. The most prominent one is, that new forms of medical professionalism will 
emerge that will combine formal and substantive rationality. These new forms, Ritzer 
& Walczak believe, would still tend to point in the direction of deprofessionalization, 
yet to a lesser degree. This alternative path has been picked up in Hafferty & Light’s 
work on the emergence of new elites within the medical profession (Hafferty & Light, 
1995). 
 
Hafferty & Light (1995) are advocating a re-evaluation of professionalism to better 
organize expert knowledge in the service of public problems. They are questioning the 
pivotal role of professional autonomy and instead propose to put greater emphasis on 
professional accountability. The quest for greater scientific rationality in medical 
practice, the strengthening of effectiveness and quality through e.g. evidence based 
clinical practice guidelines (CPGs) will require a different kind of professional elite. 
This new professional elite must balance accountability for a ‘greatly improved 
product’ (i.e. clinical services) with the concept of discretion and service orientation. 
Individuals in charge of constructing and assessing entire systems of care, including 
their financing and organization, would have to be managers as much as they have to 
be physicians. This evolution will gradually replace traditional physician administrators 
with what Hoff calls physician-managers (Hoff, 1999). While Freidson foresaw “dire 
consequences” (Freidson, 1987, p. 144) for the status and stability of the medical 
profession if physicians enter the managerial ranks, Hafferty and Light introduce a 
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counter-scenario when arguing that “Medicine’s powers and prerogatives are being 
maintained because physicians – not lay persons – are serving in critical decision-
making positions and thus securing medicine’s control over the technical core of its 
work and the organizations in which it is clinically applied” (Hafferty & Light, 1995, p. 
139).  
 
In contrast to this view, Montgomery’s work on ‘individual reprofessionalization’ 
(Montgomery, 1990, 1992) suggests that once physicians move from clinical to 
management ranks they begin to shift their identity and commitments from the medical 
profession to the organization for which they work. Adding to the argument, Freidson 
in his early work on professional dominance (Freidson, 1970) saw the current work 
environment being more influential than education and prior socialization. Weighing 
up the evidence, also Hafferty & Light eventually come to the conclusion that in 
organized or corporate medicine the new physician-executives are not primarily 
representing the points of view of the medical rank and file. As physicians’ time and 
involvement in management duties increase, they are more likely to adopt interests of 
“capital and the state” (Hafferty & Light, 1995, p. 140). Domagalski (2008) finds that 
somewhat intriguing “as those who have examined the developmental experiences of 
professionals such as physicians find that the intensity of the socialization process to 
which they are exposed instils a deeply rooted ideology of social welfare and concern 
for the individual patient at foremost” (Domagalski, 2008, p. 123).  
 
Hoff’s work on the impact of mode of employment (Hoff, 1999, 2003) on physicians’ 
adaptation to a corporate ideology displayed that those who were self-employed are 
more resistant to corporate conduct and structures than salaried doctors in a staff model 
HMO setting. In general, this seems not to be a surprising outcome. However, Hoff’s 
findings stood in contrast to the long-held assumptions that physicians tend to remain 
adversarial or ambivalent toward the organization for which they work. In his later 
work and in contrast to his earlier thinking, Freidson, for example, believed that 
physician-employees due to their professional mindset would resist the highly volatile 
dynamics of a corporate environment (Freidson, 1994). Yet, Hoff’s longitudinal studies 
displayed a dominant impact of the actual working environment over the effects on 
educational or training socialisation. Nevertheless, it must be stressed that according to 
Hoff’s findings exposure time is a critical element to the equation. Hoff argues that the 
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form and substance of individual physician adaptation to organizational life, as 
displayed for example in a HMO setting, is dependent of social exchanges over time 
with the HMO, “making it an emergent, evolutionary process rather than a pre-
determined, static phenomenon” (Hoff, 2003, p. 75).   
 
A prominent sign for a growing embracement of economic principles on part of the 
medical profession is their increased pursuit of advanced degrees in areas such as 
business and law (Domagalski, 2008; Adler and Kwon, 2008). A substantial increase in 
integrated MD-MBA and MD-JD degrees can be observed in US, Canadian but also in 
European universities. In Germany, for example, the private university of Witten-
Herdecke has offered a reformed medical degree including modules of business 
administration and health economics for several years now. While this has been 
received with mixed emotions by many representatives of the professional associations 
it is greatly welcomed by students who could not help to notice – mainly through 
information exchange with their already practicing peers – a great disparity between 
traditional training and actual qualification requirements in the workplace. Domagalski 
(2008) concludes that the pursuit of advanced business degrees is unlikely to be a 
symbolic move by physicians. Instead it is likely to represent the undermining of the 
traditional characteristics connected with the profession and a shift towards the values 
of the business enterprise.   
  
Adler & Kwon (2008) foresee chances for a re-strengthening of the medical 
community arising. Scientific as well as procedural medical knowledge is growing at 
an ever-accelerating rate. The market economy today is heavily relying on knowledge 
production, control and application. A precondition for effective knowledge 
management, as required by the post-modern capitalist system, is community. Adler 
argues that neither market nor hierarchy nor any combination of the two is as effective 
as community in supporting knowledge generation and diffusion (Adler, 2001). By 
developing a new form of community physicians can regain control of the key part in 
modern medical service production. For Robinson (1999) joining of physicians in 
medical groups opens “possibilities for informal consultation, evidence-based 
accountability and a new professional culture of peer review” (Robinson, 1999, p. 234).  
Others declare ‘collaborative interdependence’ to be the new leitmotif of 
professionalism (Silversin & Kornacki, 2000a, 2000b). I believe a centrally geared top- 
  
 54
down organisational approach might be required in order to form a really powerful and 
controllable knowledge alliance within the medical profession. This may be difficult to 
achieve given the various interest groups within the profession. Still, even if a powerful 
alliance is not realized completely, the profession would more than benefit if they were 
“moving away from the insular, elitist model and towards a greater interdependence 
with a broader range of stakeholders” (Adler & Kwon, 2008, p. 160).  
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3.3. Summary 
 
In this chapter I have presented different outlooks on the medical profession. At one 
end there has been the view of Parsons who conceptualises the medical profession as a 
central element of a value system that guides society. In his theory Parsons is stressing 
the altruistic, impartial and expert character of physicians which permits them to take 
the role of moral authorities and norm managers within society. Subsequently, I have 
discussed the critical perspective of Freidson, who in his early works had focussed on 
revealing the self-interestedness, dominance and protectionism that physicians have 
displayed. However, despite criticising the way medicine is actually practiced, 
Freidson ultimately joined Parsons’ in his view that – given their recollection of values 
like altruism and neutrality – physicians should (continue to) have an outstanding 
controlling function in society.  
 
At the other end, I have displayed various positions that predict the decline of the 
medical profession. These views are typically informed by the insight that physicians 
have to give in to economic, social and political changes and pressures. Most 
prominently and influential in this respect are Haug’s theory of ‘deprofessionalization’ 
as well as McKinlay & Arches’ notion of ‘proletarianization’ of the medical 
profession. Both theories predict a continuing decline of medical power and authority 
which eventually will result in medicine becoming an ordinary occupation.  
Responsible causes for this trend are advances of information technology (Haug) and 
ongoing rationalisation processes in neo-liberal societies (McKinlay & Arches). 
 
Last not least, new options for medical work have been portrayed. In this respect, the 
view was presented that physicians could exert greater influence by joining the 
management ranks of medical organisations (e.g. hospitals, HMOs). Together with a 
revision of medical training to include areas like e.g. business administration, new 
types of physician-executives would be able to represent the interests of the medical 
profession. However, several authors (e.g. Montgomery 1992, Hoff 1999, 2003) rather 
point to the shift of commitment, which will ultimately make physician-executives 
pursue corporate interests. 
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4. Evolution and function of drug detailing 
 
While in the previous chapter perspectives on the profession of medicine were 
presented, I will shed light on the drug rep side in this chapter. I will draw attention to 
the historic development of drug detailing, followed by outlining the particular 
situation of drug reps in Germany. In this respect, the difference between formal work 
requirements and actual job expectations will become apparent. I will round off this 
chapter with a comprehensive review of the key perspectives in the literature regarding 
the purpose and impact of detailing. Altogether, I like to point to drug reps’ unique and 
challenging position in between industry and medical profession.    
 
 
4.1. The history of drug detailing 
 
Drug detailing is a relatively young occupation. It gained its distinct profile first in the 
US from where the occupational model was subsequently exported around the world. 
Greene (2004) provides a sketch about the emerging role of the pharmaceutical 
salesman in the growth years of the American post-World War 2 pharmaceutical 
industry. This was a period of intense expansion of the industry – characterized by the 
emergence of entirely new classes of therapeutic compounds – in which many of the 
structural relations between drug companies and medical practice were consolidated. In 
line with this development drug reps began to re-invent themselves as skilled and 
service oriented professionals “apostolic of medical modernity and they set about 
encouraging the dissemination and consumption of newly synthesized pharmaceutical 
compounds with a distinctly moral sense of the value of their work (Greene, 2004, p. 
272). Before that time Greene noted that “the detail man was a not-so-distant relation 
of the travelling patent-medicine peddler: a commercial traveller, familiar with 
roadside motels, the inside of his automobile, and with a wary outsider status” (Greene, 
2004, p. 272). 
 
Sales and marketing managers in the pharmaceutical industry aspired to give drug 
detailing a professional status. In their bid for professionalism of pharmaceutical 
detailing they looked to physicians as ‘model professionals’. This gave rise to a 
growing volume of trade literature, training manuals and guides highlighting the public 
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health responsibilities of drug reps. A prominent apologist of the drug rep’s new 
professional status was management consultant Arthur F. Peterson, who stated in his 
textbook on pharmaceutical selling: “The well informed ‘detail man’ is one of the most 
influential and highly respected individuals in the public health professions… Upon 
him frequently depends the saving of life or relieving of suffering by virtue of his 
timely introduction of a therapeutic product and his intelligent discussion of it with a 
physician. His opportunity to render service of extraordinary value to physicians for the 
benefit of their patients is in itself a source of real satisfaction. He serves humanity 
well.” (Peterson, 1949, p. 2)  
 
Industry’s attempt to provide its drug reps the status of health professionals was met by 
scepticism and outright refusal on part of the medical profession. Greene noted that “as 
much as they might boast about their public health responsibilities, detail men, and 
their sales and marketing managers above them, had little immediate power over 
physicians or ability to bridge the vast differences of social and economic status that 
separated them” (Greene, 2004, p. 275).  This was particular apparent during the 1950s 
and 60s where medical practitioners were almost entirely self-regulated and self-
reliant. Drug reps simply had difficulty inserting themselves (as partners) into the 
medical world.  
 
The pharmaceutical industry soon realised their inability to truly measure up with 
doctors in terms of legitimacy and status. In turn, they began to professionalize aspects 
of the encounter. Much attention was given to “scripting the pitch” (Greene, 2004) in 
order to exert maximum influence onto the physician during the visit. In the first ever 
class devoted entirely to detailing of physicians, Howard H. Jones, a veteran sales man 
turned author and lecturer, told his students at Columbia University: “Webster might 
define detailing as the telling of a story in all its details…but here we will limit the 
scope of the word, as applied to personal calls upon the doctor, to mean acquainting the 
doctor with the important facts about a product or products. Detailing is, in reality, 
sales promotion, and every detail man should keep that fact constantly in mind” (Jones, 
1940, in Greene, 2004, p. 273).  
 
Two fundamental barriers had to be overcome by the industry. One was to handle the 
physician’s sentiment of superiority born out of his functional specific competence and 
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responsibility (see Parsons, 1978). In this respect Jones noted that “nothing antagonizes 
a doctor quite as much as having a detail man attempt to teach him his profession” 
(Jones, 1940, in Greene, 2004, p. 282). The other was to overcome the drug rep’s 
overly respect for the medical profession coupled with feelings of his own illegitimacy. 
These sentiments were responsible for causing what Greene called ‘doctor fright’ 
(Greene, 2004). 
 
Jones (1940) suggested that the drug rep must overcome his fear “through hard work 
and determination” but most of all by “projecting a strong positive mental attitude and 
a thorough knowledge of the subject material” (Greene, 2004, p. 280).  While thorough 
technical knowledge on part of the drug rep was fostered by the industry it was only 
one part of the equation. By mid-century the pharmaceutical companies and their 
management advisors reverted to a detailed set of rhetorical and psychological 
measures to bridge the doctor – drug rep gap. Greene (2004) stated that the trick was 
“to internally visualize the physician as a benign everyman, while externally treating 
him as a sort of scholar-prince” (Greene, 2004, p. 280).  In order to provide that sort of 
manipulative treatment the industry began to carefully train and orchestrate the rep’s 
body-language and motions. The following excerpt of Peterson’s textbook on 
pharmaceutical selling exemplifies this nicely: 
 
When the P.S.P. [pharmaceutical sales rep] prepares to shake hands with the 
physician, he should ‘measure off’ the proper distance between them. He should stop 
in such a manner that the body is naturally erect and relaxed, the right foot about a 
short step in advance of the left. He can then bow very slightly from the waist as a 
full grasp is taken of the physician’s hand.  
 
 (Peterson, 1949, pp. 271-272 in Greene, 2004, p. 281) 
 
With the choreographing of gestures, postures and movements also came along in-
depth rhetorical preparation. To influence prescriptions, drug reps needed to develop a 
powerful voice within the exclusive and elite medical context. Rhetorical training was 
very much directed at leading the physicians by means of suggestion (Greene, 2004). 
The drug rep had to present his case as if it was information already held by the doctor. 
Formulas like ‘I presume you are aware of X’ were part of the rhetorical tool box given 
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to the drug representative. Equally popular was the quoting of statements by fellow 
clinicians, which implied delegating the educational part up the professional latter. 
These were discursive gambits to deal with the doctor’s aversion of being lectured by 
lay people. Greene aptly described it by stating “like a cuckoo hen slyly inserting her 
own egg into another’s nest, the detail man could camouflage company material within 
parcels that physicians might mistake as part of their own knowledge” (Greene, 2004, 
p. 282).  
 
A further lever was placed by categorizing medical professionals in terms of 
psychological and economic typology frameworks. It started out as a training method 
to identify and deal with physicians expected to put up resistance against detailing. 
Drug reps were asked to compile ‘informal bestiaries’ (Greene, 2004) consisting of 
drawings of difficult doctors. Together with those caricatures drug reps created a 
language to label character types and their associated behaviour. Physicians were given 
bold tags like ‘Dr. Snob’ or ‘back-slapper’ but also more precise descriptions like 
‘decided, self-confident type’ were made. While these typologies were informal and 
individual at first, they later formed the basis for a standardized framework of rating 
physicians. In 1949 Peterson proposed a method of placing physicians on two axes, one 
assessing their potential patient volume (ranked A to E), the other classifying their 
attitude to medical innovation (ranked V to Z). Peterson’s scheme was an evolution 
from anecdotal accounts to unbiased data-oriented depictions of doctors. In the course 
of time it allowed to be substantiated by increasingly fine-grained sets of empirical data 
provided by an upcoming market research industry. The founding of the Institute of 
Medical Statistics, short IMS – the world’s largest pharmaceutical marketing data base 
– demonstrates the industry’s aspiration to overcome barriers to communication 
through reading physicians and anticipating their conduct.   
 
In their zeal for information sales and marketing managers increasingly used the drug 
rep as an instrument for data collection. The so called detail-based marketing tactics 
(Greene, 2004) added important feedback about which promotional activities did or did 
not work with which types of doctors. The conjunction of data sources eventually 
enabled the pharmaceutical industry to obtain a clear picture of the practice of 
medicine. The drug rep played a central role in obtaining this action oriented 
knowledge which he subsequently employed to discursively influence physicians’ 
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prescribing behaviour. As such he became the fundamental link between the industry 
and physicians. Yet the drug rep was never a sovereign actor who self-reliantly plans 
and executes the call. To Greene the drug rep represents “the extension of a 
hierarchically structured marketing apparatus – based on rationalized principles of 
management and market analysis – into social spaces previously thought to be 
occupied only by doctors and patients” (Greene, 2004, p. 285). 
 
As indicated in the introductory chapter, today a vast amount of drugs (over 50’000 in 
Germany alone) are on the market of which many are offering no or just marginal 
differences (so called me-too drugs). Except for the manufacturers of generics – which 
are replicas of off-patent drugs sold purely on price – the rule of thumb goes: The less 
innovative a drug is the more refined its marketing has to become in order to make up 
for the product’s technical mediocrity. As per my own work experience, marketing 
managers are more than ever asked to identify those physicians who are most likely fall 
for increasingly feeble product advantages. This results in a highly specific tailoring of 
target segments. A combination of refined qualitative and quantitative research 
techniques allows positioning a drug according to physician’s attitudes and behaviours 
(Bayer Healthcare, 2007). Relevant physician segments are selected by the likelihood 
of their members conforming to a desired (by marketing) behaviour. A typical example 
of a ‘desired behaviour’ would be to submit patients to a new diagnostic test, which, if 
it turns out positive, would indicate the use of the drug in question.  
 
At the end of a complex and lengthy segmentation and positioning process marketing 
managers come up with a plan that outlines precisely which behaviours have to be 
induced at which types of physicians by means of which arguments. On the one hand 
this plan is employed to create drug advertising to physicians (and sometimes also to 
patients) but more importantly it is to brief the sales force on whom to target at which 
intensity with what type of messages. It is through in depth training given by product 
managers, sales managers and outside consultants (e.g. psychologists) that the drug rep 
receives detailed but also ‘chewable’ instructions regarding the content and 
choreography of the detailing talk.   
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4.2. Drug reps in Germany 
 
The German association of drug reps (BDP) (2009) uses the term ‘Pharmaberater’ – 
which roughly translates into pharma-advisor – as occupational title. The same 
designation is used in the wording of the German medicines law emphasising the 
advisory purpose of the job. Approximately 20’000 drug reps are working in Germany 
producing c. 25 million doctor visits per year. At an estimated total cost of 2.5 billion 
Euros (Korzilius & Rieser, 2007), each call accounts for 100 Euros on average. Drug 
reps are out in the field nearly every day of the week, typically visiting between 5-10 
doctors per day. Leading pharmaceutical companies in Germany employ between 500 
and 1’000 drug reps. Increasingly, teams are supplemented with leased sales force 
members, as they allow firms to react more flexibly to changes in demand. 
Approximately 18% of drug reps in Germany have a leased contract status (Sandner & 
Klöpf, 2006).  
 
 
4.2.1. Formal requirements 
 
The occupation is regulated by the medicines law (Arzneimittelgesetz, AMG §§75,76). 
According to this law, a drug representative is to inform the physician about the 
technical aspects of a drug either in person or by phone. Any product samples handed 
over during the encounter the drug rep has to document. He is furthermore required to 
report back in writing all observations by physicians about the presented drug’s side 
effects or any other risks. In order to do this the drug rep has to have ‘knowledge of the 
subject’. Candidates applying for the job must have a university degree either in 
pharmacy, biology, chemistry, medicine or veterinary medicine. They need to have 
worked in a healthcare related field for at least two years. If they do not possess one of 
the above listed academic qualifications they have to attest work experience of at least 
five years plus undergo a certified six months intensive training programme. The 
programme includes modules in pharmacy, pharmacology, biochemistry, anatomy, 
physiology as well as courses in health economics, marketing and law. Applicants then 
have to pass a formal written and oral exam in front of the chamber of commerce to 
obtain the status of a certified pharmaceutical advisor. Given these preparatory 
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requirements one should assume that drug reps are equipped to competently present a 
drug to physicians.   
 
The German medicines law portrays the occupation of a drug rep as rather neutral and 
scientific. This comes naturally as the originators (most and foremost the Ministry of 
Health) have no interest to encourage any e.g. promotional activities towards 
physicians by the industry. Yet to a commercial organization like the pharmaceutical 
company drug reps are more than just data intermediaries. One of the leading providers 
of drug rep curricula in Germany lists the following key job responsibilities for drug 
reps as defined by the pharmaceutical industry:    
 
• Customer selection 
• Target-oriented preparation of physician visits 
• Post processing of customer pitch 
• Launch of new products 
• Placement of post-marketing studies 
• Strategic analysis of sales data 
• Recruiting of new customers 
• Networking 
• Planning, organisation and execution of training events, workshops and 
meetings 
 
Source: Akademie für Pharmaberufe (2009) 
 
The above listed duties indicate that in fact drug detailing goes beyond scientific 
information provision. In the following, I like to take a closer look into the industry’s 
definition of the occupation.    
 
 
4.2.2. Industry’s requirements 
 
Pharmaceutical companies provide very little public information about their 
understanding of the role of the drug rep. Statements found on company websites are 
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mere copies of the medicines law’s definition. However, job adverts for drug reps are 
somewhat indicative of job duties that go beyond scientific information and reporting.  
 
In a job advert issued by Novartis Pharma Germany it reads for example: 
  
Pharmaceutical representative, oncology, for the marketing-oriented consulting of 
office-based doctors and hospitals… 
 
In a drug rep advert by Bayer Germany it states under qualification profile: 
 
In dealing with physicians […] you convince by poise, very good rhetorical skills, 
persistence, initiative, self-motivation… 
  
Ipsen Pharma Germany is listing key job duties for a drug rep in the area of neurology 
and oncology: 
 
Marketing-oriented consulting of physicians […], targeting and target group analysis, 
developing and executing of action plans 
 
Bristol-Myers Squibb Germany is looking for a field trainer who: 
 
…is working closely with sales and our trainings department to identify marketing 
specific training requirements and to develop appropriate training concepts. You run 
marketing specific trainings and coaching sessions with our sales reps and you 
support the induction of new hires. 
 
The above examples show that marketing related skills and profiles are actively looked 
for by leading drug companies. While this is not representative of every firm, I have 
nevertheless found it quite prevalent in job adverts published in Germany. Increasingly, 
drug companies recruit on a similar profile like firms in the consumer-goods industry, 
whereby the promotional aspect takes the centre stage. Furthermore, the task of 
commercial analysis and customer evaluation is strongly demanded in job adverts. This 
corresponds to my own professional experience by which more and more business 
graduates have been searched for as candidates.    
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4.2.3. Physicians’ requirements 
 
Having illustrated the industry’s perspective I equally like to present the physicians’ 
relevant set of expectations. Unfortunately, there were only industry sponsored reports 
and surveys available in Germany that would inform about demands from the physician 
end. According to one industry sponsored study among 743 family doctors and 
specialists in Germany (Gebuhr, 2007), physicians see the role of drug reps as to: 
 
• Inform about new products on the market 
• Inform about drug dosing, side effects, drug interaction, drug combination 
• Provide free drug samples for testing 
• Organise scientific training courses 
• Consult on health politics issues and practise management 
  
As per another survey about family physicians’ working environment, doctors feel 
ambivalent about drug reps. 20% of respondents rate visit by drug reps as informative 
yet only 10% rate them as a pleasant experience. The majority of family doctors regard 
the current form of visits as undesirable (GfK-Healthcare, 2007). In its negative 
appraisal the German study is mirroring the findings of similar studies executed in the 
US (e.g. Poirier, 1994), however, German physicians are altogether more negative in 
their rating. On the other hand, 80% of doctors in the study believe that visits by drug 
reps are indispensable in general. From the distance, these results have to be treated 
with caution because it is not clear (to me) what e.g. stands behind the notion of 
‘undesirable’. Nevertheless, the findings point to large service gap existing in the 
German market.         
 
In summary, demands on drug reps are differing quite strongly between legislator, 
industry and physicians. The biggest discrepancy is to be observed between industry 
and the German medicines law. While the German legislator requires drug reps to 
focus their activities on scientific information provision, pharmaceutical companies 
according to their job adverts seek representatives to be highly marketing-oriented. 
Physicians are interested to obtain scientific information especially about new drugs 
yet they are also concerned to receive free product samples.  
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4.3. Perspectives on drug detailing 
 
In this part of the chapter, I would like to point out key perspectives on the purpose and 
effect of drug detailing. In relation to its economic contribution there is relatively little 
information published regarding drug detailing and the customer service in the 
pharmaceutical industry. Although the pharmaceutical industry is constantly measuring 
the efficacy and efficiency of its sales force the results nevertheless remain well kept 
company secrets. This secrecy indicates the importance that the pharmaceutical 
industry is assigning to its sales forces.  
 
There is no clear agreement in the literature about the key objective of pharmaceutical 
detailing. Sociologists Berger and Offe (1980) view consultation and knowledge 
transfer as the primary objective of the pharmaceutical sales representative. They rate 
pharmaceutical detailing as an “extraordinary” service that is initiated by the 
pharmaceutical industry alone. For Berger and Offe the service is untypical in that the 
doctor has neither requested information about a drug and its properties nor will he be 
paying for the medication in the end. In contrast to a typical sales person who interacts 
with a customer to directly sell his product the medical sales rep indirectly (through 
consultation) tries to induce the doctor to prescribe a certain drug. From this Berger 
and Offe conclude that consultation rather than sales promotion is the primary 
objective of the pharmaceutical detailing (Berger & Offe, 1980).  
 
According to empirical research conducted by Elina Hemminki the pharmaceutical 
industry regards sales promotion (rather than knowledge transfer) as the key objective 
of pharmaceutical detailing (Hemminki, 1977). To Hemminki, success of a drug rep is 
not measured by the degree of knowledge transfer but only in terms of prescriptions 
induced. Today, this can be perfectly tracked and allocated by globally operating 
research institutes, first and foremost by the Institute of Medical Statistics (IMS), 
through script reading at the point of purchase (i.e. pharmacy). Hemminki defines 
activities such as consultation and relationship building to be only instruments in order 
to reach the overall objective of generating scripts.  
 
While there are different positions regarding the ultimate objective of pharmaceutical 
detailing there is agreement about the critical question each representative needs to 
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tackle, namely how to influence the prescription behaviour of the doctor (Rohrbacher, 
1988). Furthermore, there is agreement that preceding to that one must know “how 
does the doctor keep up with what’s new?” (Coleman, et al., 1966). In other words, 
what is the critical source of information that makes the doctor prescribe one drug over 
another? In their review of existing studies on doctors’ source of information, Bauer & 
Wortzel (1966) found that physicians use commercial references both as the first 
source of information about a drug as well as the source that convinces them to 
prescribe the drug.  
 
Further to the findings of Bauer, in an empirical study among doctors Coleman et al. 
found that the drug representative has a key role in creating awareness for a new drug. 
According to Coleman for 57% of doctors the drug rep is their first source of 
information about a new drug. Once the initial information is provided doctors turn to 
other sources of information, preferably literature. Yet according to the Coleman study 
the majority of those who turned to literature as an intermediate or final source chose 
commercially driven literature as a reference (Coleman et al. 1966).  In a similar study 
executed ten years later in the UK, Eaton and Parish found that drug reps are used 
extensively to inform doctors about the existence of a drug preparation, but are relied 
upon much less by doctors in their establishment of a drug’s usefulness (Eaton and 
Parish, 1976).  
 
Avorn et al. (1982) criticised these studies as relying heavily on self-reports as a major 
source of data, thereby introducing a strong potential bias. Introducing a different 
methodology – by which different messages were sent to doctors through a) 
commercial and b) scientific channels – they managed to show the subjective reality 
construction by doctors. The study showed that doctors in fact heavily rely on 
commercial sources but nevertheless claim their influence to be minor. Avorn 
concluded that the nature of drug promotion is such that physicians often deny the 
relative importance of commercial sources in influencing their prescribing, either 
because they are unaware of it or because they are reluctant to admit to being 
influenced by non-scientific sources. While the results of Avorn et al. confirmed the 
importance of commercial sources it introduced the important aspect of subjective 
reality perception. The aspect is crucial because it sheds light on the potential difficulty 
of message and meaning transfer in e.g. drug reps – physician communication. 
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Altogether, it remains unclear why the preceding studies by Coleman et al. and Eaton 
& Parish have produced similar results (to Avorn et al.) yet without controlling for 
subjective reality perception as Avorn did. In other words, how could the self-reports 
by doctors, rate commercial resources favourably while according to Avorn doctors 
“officially” tend to deny their influence? 
 
In any case, the empirically confirmed importance of the drug rep as the key source of 
doctors’ information needs to be viewed critically. One could argue that the importance 
scores measured are in fact a ‘self-fulfilling prophecy’ generated by the pharmaceutical 
industry itself. If doctors name the drug rep as their primary sources of information it is 
most likely due to the fact that drug reps exclusively carry information about a new 
drug. Other relevant channels have no or only restricted access to this information. 
Hence, the physicians’ rating is not surprising. In fact the pharmaceutical industry 
measures a reality that is self constructed. 
 
Contemporary research has further strengthened a critical outlook on drug detailing. 
Several studies in Anglo-American markets have shown that physicians have a rather 
negative and disillusioned attitude towards detailing (e.g. Poirier, et al., 1994). Poirier 
revealed in a study among US physicians that only 24% of the physicians were 
satisfied with the detailing encounter, while almost 50% were dissatisfied. In a survey 
among Canadian general practitioners Strang, et al. (1996) displayed that over 90% of 
the respondents thought that drug detailing is mainly about promotion. Consequently, 
study interest shifted to investigating the quality and consequences of detailing 
contents. A meta-analysis done by Lexchin (1997) revealed that drug reps only 
transmit positive information about their products. Side effects and contraindications 
are rarely mentioned and a lot of data given to physicians is simply inaccurate. Lexchin 
concludes that taking the detailers’ information at face value would not serve the 
interest of the doctors’ patients.  In turn, Lexchin urges the medical community to put 
pressure on the pharmaceutical industry for better monitoring and increased quality of 
detailers’ presentations. Further to that point, recent product specific studies by 
Steinman et al. (2006, 2007) indicated that drug reps frequently promoted non-
approved uses of a drug (in the particular study it was the anticonvulsant drug 
Gabapentin®). The study showed that as a result of these off-label promotions, 
physicians were prepared to increase the use of the drug.  
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In parallel to qualitative assessments, researchers were interested to investigate the 
quantitative impact of detailing on actual prescriptions. In general, most studies found a 
positive significant effect of detailing. Cleary (1992), in a study on the impact of 
detailing on antibiotic prescribing at a US university hospital, found a significant 
correlation between detailing efforts and number of new prescriptions. In another US 
study, Rizzo (1999) discovered that detailing efforts systematically lowers physicians’ 
price sensitivity. In other words, as a result of detailing physicians become less 
reluctant to prescribe high priced drugs to patients. Manchanda & Chintagunta (2004) 
showed a positive relation between detailing frequency and script writing. Altogether, 
considerable evidence has been produced to substantiate the assumption that drug 
detailing has a quantitative impact on physicians’ prescription behaviour. 
Unfortunately, I was unable to identify any quantitative market response study in 
Germany.   
 
Very little research has been done into the causes of physicians’ attitudes towards drug 
reps. Typically, studies have focussed on expressing attitudes but have rarely informed 
about attitude formation. Furthermore, emphasis was placed on negative issues yet 
relatively little is known about what might strengthen the bond between physicians and 
detailers. In a study among US physicians, Lagace, et al. (1992) revealed that if ethical 
behaviour and expertise is shown by drug reps it has a positive effect on physicians’ 
trust and satisfaction with regards to detailing. In another US study, Andaleeb & 
Tallman (1995) further identified factors that affected physicians’ attitudes. They 
discovered that doctors’ were positively influenced by the level of informational and 
educational support they receive from drug reps. At the same time, their study showed 
that manipulative and aggressive selling practices was causing unfavourable attitude 
formation. 
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4.4. Summary 
 
So far, drug detailing has been looked upon either from a physician perspective (e.g. 
Poirier et al., 1994) or from a conceptual angle (e.g. Berger & Offe, 1980). Altogether, 
researchers were focussing their interest on the receiving end of drug detailing, 
measuring effects and reflecting attitudes. In such a research framework drug reps were 
conceived as instruments of sales and marketing but not as individual actors and 
meaning-makers. Studies are missing that investigate the mind-set, role function and 
overall motivations from a drug rep point of view. What stimulates drug reps to engage 
in drug detailing? How do they define their role? What do they think about their 
customers? These and other questions remain unanswered to date. Moreover, no light 
has been shed on the relationship of drug reps to their organisations. Until now, 
researchers have viewed drug reps as tools of management, assuming that the 
pharmaceutical industry is a uniform operational and ideological entity. 
 
I have indicated at the outset that I would like to get a more complete idea about the 
phenomenon of drug detailing. As drug detailing is essentially a discursive process, my 
attention is set on the qualitative assessment of the discursive practices employed in 
detailing. I am interested to learn how discourse is manifested and subsequently how it 
impacts the roles and attitudes of those involved in it. In this respect, I like to shed light 
on the issue from the individual physician, drug rep and manager perspective. 
Especially by investigating the subject from a detailer’s point of view my research 
offers a new approach to research on drug detailing.  
 
Based on the previous discussion on the evolution (section 4.1.) and the purpose 
(section 4.3.) of drug detailing and given my own professional experience, I assume 
that discourse in drug detailing has a strong promotional character. When researching 
this particular type of discourse my focus is thus set on the marketization aspect of it. 
More specifically, I like to understand if marketization of discourse exists, how it is 
constructed, perceived and responded to from a subjective meaning point of view. This 
endeavour requires providing an overview on the notion of language and discourse and 
its capability to inflict cognitive and factual change. Hence, in the following chapter I 
will present the relevant stances with regards to language, discourse and marketization 
of discourse, all this in relation to the issue of drug detailing. 
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5. The power of marketised discourse  
 
This part of the literature review will be dedicated to the role language and discourse 
plays in the marketization process. Attention will be drawn to the notion that 
marketization (or commodification) is to a significant extent a linguistic and discursive 
process (Fairclough, 1994, p. 253). To begin with I will examine perspectives on the 
relationship between language and meaning-making, a bond which I regard as a 
paramount prerequisite to grasping the notion of discursive impact. In turn, I will 
demonstrate how by means of discourse a market ideological perspective was 
disseminated in Western societies. I will round off this chapter by emphasising the 
action-orientation of discourse.  
 
 
5.1. An introduction to language and meaning 
 
The purpose of my work is to investigate the influence of language and discursive 
practices on the reality perception, attitude building and behaviour of drug reps and 
doctors. In this respect, the relation between language and meaning needs to be 
understood. This relationship has been investigated for a long time and has resulted in 
various perspectives. In the early part of the 20th century the logical positivists aimed 
for an ideal language whereby each term has a clearly defined, objective meaning 
which is also verifiable. The verifiability criterion of meaning (verification theory) 
asserts that a statement is meaningful if and only if it is either analytically or 
empirically verifiable. 
 
Wittgenstein – initially a follower of logical positivism – later broke with the 
positivistic view of assigning one specific meaning to each word. For Wittgenstein the 
meaning of a word is its use in language (Wittgenstein, 1984, PU 43). To him linguistic 
meaning only and exclusively evolves out of ‘language-games’ which are considered to 
be simple forms of language, consisting of language and the actions into which it is 
woven. Language-games are forms of language that, for example, a child employs 
when it begins to make use of words. The concept of language-game was intended to 
bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or a 
form of life (Wittgenstein, 1984, PU 23). With this statement Wittgenstein denies the 
  
 71
existence of a ‘semantic hereafter’, a metaphysical space of eternal meaning. To him 
“language must speak for itself” (Wittgenstein, 1974, p. 63). This means that a word or 
a sentence does not have a meaning assigned to it by an independent power. It is not 
possible to conduct a scientific investigation to find out what a word really means. 
Instead Wittgenstein notes that a word has the meaning that someone has given to it 
(Wittgenstein 1984 in Bezzel, 2000, p. 33). This statement implies a dynamic of use 
that allows meaning to be in a process of constant renewal. It also stresses the fact that 
there is not only one meaning (of a word) at any point in time. Instead there can be a 
multitude of meanings existing in parallel assigned by a multitude of “someones” 
existing and experiencing the world. In practice these “someones” are likely to be a 
social group that creates meaning as part of e.g. creating social conventions. With this 
view Wittgenstein fundamentally breaks with the philosophical concept of essentialism 
which acknowledges the existence a finite idealistic form or meaning. 
 
Wittgenstein’s view clearly differs from Chomsky’s linguistic theory of a formal 
grammar generating language. While Chomsky promotes a generative formalism where 
grammar becomes a logical and mechanistic “device” (Chomsky, 1957) of infinite 
creativity, Wittgenstein emphasizes the practical dimension of social interaction. To 
Wittgenstein differences in meaning are not classifiable in a mathematical sense but 
must be evaluated qualitatively. The key difference from Chomsky’s view is that 
Wittgenstein postulates that language fundamentally rests on (pre-linguistic) action, 
which determines thinking rather than is a result of thinking. Wittgenstein puts this 
very simple by stating that at the beginning there was action (Wittgenstein, 1984 in 
Bezzel, 2000, p. 28). In contrast to this, Chomsky postulates that each human being 
possesses a genetically determined mental system of rules and principles to generate 
representations through language (Chomsky, 1986). To Chomsky language is like a 
‘mental organ’ (Chomsky, 1981) and as such part of the human genotype. 
 
The conflicting positions of Wittgenstein and Chomsky display two ways of 
approaching and understanding language: either as a social or as a biological / 
psychological concept. While for Chomsky the knowledge of language is a state of the 
individual mind, for Wittgenstein it is the result of a community of (language) users. I 
prefer to agree with Wittgenstein’s theory of language and meaning whereby meaning 
is the result of dynamic social interaction. His approach is particularly convincing with 
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regards to changes in meaning-making. Following Wittgenstein, it is the flexible 
interplay of social perception, action and language that one is able to understand the 
inherent powers of change. Therefore, a central conclusion of Wittgenstein’s concept is 
that if language-games change, so will the words, and with the words the meaning of 
the words. To put it in another way, if we come to re-experience the world we will 
denote it differently and consequently perceive it differently. 
 
Importantly, this position assumes that discursive practices have a strong impact on the 
meaning-making and action of individuals. Considering the fact that social interaction 
is not so much a random undertaking but frequently is the result of a deliberate move, 
discursive practices are likely to be motivated by particular interests as well. Thus 
constructing and shaping discourse in e.g. institutional encounters like drug rep – 
physician interaction is ultimately a means of exerting power. In the following I like to 
address the formation and impact of a particular discourse with regards to 
disseminating a market ideological perspective in Western society. 
 
 
 
5.2. The marketization of discourse 
 
 
5.2.1. Of becoming dominant 
 
 
I am generally following the idea of discourse as a means of exerting power. From this 
perspective, social life is seen as hegemonic struggle among multiple discourses for 
dominance and survival (e.g. Gramsci, 1971; Fairclough, 1992; Keenoy, et al., 1997). It 
is argued that ‘past-modern’ times (Stones, 1996) are determined by increasingly 
paradoxical, fluid and contradictory accounts of social and organizational realities. The 
‘dialogical’ perspective (Keenoy, et al., 1997) of parallel and competing discourses 
(realities) is convincing if one considers social life as a dynamic blending of 
subsystems. However, in today’s prevailing interpretation of social reality there is a 
monological aspect to be detected. The term monological implies the reading and 
interpreting of social reality “as one story, usually viewed from the perspective of a 
dominant group” (Boje, 1995, p. 1029). In contrast, from a dialogical perspective a 
hierarchical ordering of discourses is not evident. Yet it seems that the interpretation of 
social reality is increasingly done from a market ideological perspective. Keenoy et al. 
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note that “we have all been ensnared by the behemoth of ‘globalization’ and subjected 
to the moral order of an indiscriminate totalizing ‘market’” (Keenoy, et al., 1997, p. 
147). However, if one thinks about discourse in terms of hegemony, it must be stressed 
that this is unlikely to be a stable condition. Fairclough emphasises that “hegemony is a 
more or less partial and temporary achievement, an ‘unstable equilibrium’ which is a 
focus of struggle, open to disarticulation and rearticulation” (Fairclough, 1993, p. 137).  
 
The inherent dynamism of hegemony in discourse can be observed at present. While at 
the outset of my project in 2005 the discourse of marketization seemed to be 
incontestable, the current financial and economic crisis has brought strong rivalling 
discourses to the fore. Facing the chasms of individual and public wealth erosion 
suddenly people throughout the social and occupational spectrum are tuning in to a 
discourse of ‘state control’ and ‘protectionism’. This development is nicely reflected in 
a newspaper article:  
 
The death of neo-liberalism does not mean the death of international capitalism. 
Neither does it mean that workers and the poor will now get the fruits of their labour, 
that economic justice will now reign. What it means is that the ideological hegemony 
of neo-liberalism is finished, that the main thrust of ongoing discussions, regulating 
finance capital and government stimulus plans, run counter to neo-liberalism.            
                                                        (International Herald Tribune, Jan 2 2009, p. 14) 
  
Reviewing the dynamics behind the current economic crisis, Joseph Stiglitz referred to 
the protagonists of neo-liberalism as ‘capitalist fools’ (Stiglitz, 2009). Stiglitz’ counter 
discourse – notably put forward in a magazine traditionally addressing the beneficiaries 
of neo liberalism – is disenchanting the ideology of neo liberalism and free market 
economy. At the end of the article Stiglitz presented the following revelation: 
 
The truth is most of the individual mistakes boil down to just one: a belief that 
markets are self-adjusting and that the role of government should be minimal. 
Looking back at that belief during hearings this fall on Capitol Hill, Alan Greenspan 
said out loud, “I have found a flaw.” Congressman Henry Waxman pushed him, 
responding, “In other words, you found that your view of the world, your ideology, 
was not right; it was not working.” “Absolutely, precisely,” Greenspan said.” The 
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embrace by America—and much of the rest of the world—of this flawed economic 
philosophy made it inevitable that we would eventually arrive at the place we are 
today.                                    (Joseph Stiglitz in Vanity Fair, January 2009) 
 
Time will tell to which degree such counter discourses will flourish and prevail in 
Western societies. With respect to my research undertaking I consider marketization 
and discourse of marketization still to be the ruling phenomena. Looking at the vast 
complexity as well as the cost of today’s disease management and warming to the idea 
of health becoming the leading code of the future (Bauch, 2000), some argue that 
economization and discursive marketization of medical work is likely to continue. It is 
particularly expected to continue in Germany where both buyers and providers of 
healthcare are publicly complaining about lack of information, organizational 
inefficiencies and an impeding sectoral opaqueness. I acknowledge that this statement 
is promotional discourse in its own right.      
 
The hegemonic power of one discourse is questioned by critics like Davies & Harré 
(1990) who claim that different discourses will compete which each other as they 
create distinct and incompatible versions of reality which members of society can 
choose from. They clearly recognize the constitutive force of discourse and discursive 
practices but they also recognize that people are exercising choice in relation to those 
practices. In that they assume that people are exposed to various discourses in parallel 
and are able to compare and weigh off the competing concepts (represented through 
discourse) on offer. 
 
This theory would be convincing if different discourses were equally available 
(dispersed) to people and if all discourses were ‘pure’ in the sense that they are a pure 
combination of speech and writing. However, it is argued by Zizek (1989) and Laclau 
(1990) that discourses should always be understood as a dimension of material 
practices, with material conditions of emergence and effectiveness (DuGay & Salaman, 
1992). DuGay & Salaman underline this in their reaction to critics who doubt people’s 
conscious identification with the aims and objectives of enterprise. They note that those 
who believe in people’s continued attachment to the concept of equality rather than 
excellence simply overlook the fact that “the dominance of that discourse (i.e. 
discourse of enterprise) is not so much inscribed in people’s consciousness as in the 
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practices and technologies to which they are subjected” (DuGay & Salaman, 1992, p. 
630). Surprisingly, with this statement DuGay & Salaman weaken the discursive 
powers of meaning construction and instead strengthen the role of operational 
constraints. Zizek (1989) puts it more bluntly when stating that people “know very well 
how things really are, but still they are doing it as if they did not know” (Zizek, 1989, 
p. 32). In other words, they are still reproducing the discourse (e.g. of the market) 
through their involvement in the everyday practices within which market is inscribed.  
 
This argumentation assumes a situation where the material practices have already 
progressed in one distinct (conceptual) direction and are now producing realities (in the 
sense of facts or constraints) that cannot be ignored. It does not assume a situation of 
pure deliberation where people are given the opportunity to critically compare various 
discourses on offer in order to position themselves. In my opinion, the latter represents 
a rather idealistic point of view that ignores the fact that a) there never is a state of just 
deliberation without practise and b) that various discourses are never equally dispersed 
and neutrally presented by those in power.     
 
Leys (1990 in DuGay & Salaman, 1992) gives yet another spin to the discussion by 
arguing that in order for a discourse to be considered hegemonic it is not necessary for 
it to be loved. Instead, Leys notes, “it is merely necessary that it have no serious rival” 
(Leys, 1990, p. 127). If potential rivals (competing discourses) are kept out by 
powerful gatekeepers in form of politicians, corporate leaders, management gurus, 
scientists etc. a person’s process of positioning is very unilaterally driven. Interestingly, 
this totalitarian attack on diversity and difference (DuGay & Salaman, 1992) is often 
not conceived of or represented as such. The consumer is imagined as an empowered 
human being and portrayed as the moral centre of the enterprising universe. These 
consumers “seeking to maximize the worth of their existence to themselves through 
personal acts of choice…” (DuGay & Salaman, 1992). 
 
Irrespectively of how a personal positioning came about, also Davies & Harré 
acknowledge its binding powers. They realize that once having taken up a particular 
position as one’s own a person inevitably sees the world from the vantage point of that 
position and in terms of the particular images, metaphors, story lines and concepts 
which are made relevant within the particular discursive practice in which they are 
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positioned (Davies & Harré, 1990). As presented earlier, it probably takes drastic 
events or radical system failure to shake people’s ideological position.  
 
 
5.2.2. The patterning of marketised discourse 
 
Habermas (1984) postulates a progressive colonization of the ‘lifeworld’ (Lebenswelt) 
by the economy, leading to a displacement of communicative practices by ‘strategic’ 
practices, which embody a purely instrumental rationality (Fairclough, 1993). 
Following this thought, Fairclough identifies three interconnected developments in 
discursive practices. One is the need to constantly negotiate relationships and identities 
through dialogue. This is necessary because fixed relationships based on authority – 
which have been typical of traditional society – are in decline. Negotiating 
relationships between people and groups means negotiating differences. In context of 
healthcare, it can be argued that the erosion of doctors’ professional autonomy and 
authority is requiring a renegotiation of their relationship with drug representatives. At 
the same time, doctor and drug rep identities are actively constructed and negotiated in 
everyday conversational interaction (Hall, et al., 1999). Any discursive contribution to 
an encounter both responds to what precedes it, and affects what follows. The 
sequential structures in an interaction thus provide the means by which participants 
jointly construct a particular social order and come to a shared interpretation of what is 
going on (Drew & Heritage, 1992). Importantly, it is not only the discourse between 
the two institutional actors that shape the respective identities but also the intra-
institutional exchange, i.e. the discourse held among doctors and among drug reps 
respectively. Fairclough states that the discursive construction of identities is a 
multidimensional process. He further argues that institutional identities cannot be 
separated in an institutional context, but have to be regarded as mutually dependent 
(Fairclough, 1992). For example, it is through the construction of the drug reps’ 
identity that medical work is shaped. 
 
Second, a growing reflexivity within contemporary society is leading to a 
‘technologization’ of discourse (Fairclough, 1992, 1994). Technologization implies the 
strategic construction and rigorous training of discursive practices with the intention to 
exert influence over others. This entails detailed research of existing discursive 
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practices, followed by a redesign of those practices according to the criteria of 
institutional effectiveness (Fairclough, 1993). Fairclough states that “many workers in 
service industries whose labour has an ‘emotional’ character have experienced such 
institutional attempts to dictate how they should interact with members of the public” 
(Fairclough, 1993, p. 141).   
 
Giddens (1991) further suggests that the systematic use of knowledge about social life 
subsequently allows its transformation. This leads to a growing number of experts in 
the field of marketing, communication and social psychology. In pharmaceutical 
companies, sales and marketing management today are enforcing a rigid detailing 
guide on drug reps, specifying product messaging and dramaturgical conduct of each 
visit (see e.g. Oldani, 2004). In addition, all sales force members are regularly 
undergoing discourse training ranging from product presentation to pre-empting the 
physician’s objection. Medical anthropologist Michael Oldani – having worked as a 
drug rep for nine years himself – speaks of the pharmaceutical industry’s mastery in 
‘spin selling’ or ‘spin doctoring’. He notes that every objection by physicians can be 
turned around to become a positive selling point, something to be valued and sold for 
the patient’s benefit (Oldani, 2004). 
 
Third, Fairclough describes contemporary discursive practices as ‘promotional’ in 
kind. To him these are the cultural consequences of marketization and 
‘commodification’ of all facets of social life. Promotion becomes the general 
communicative function (Wernick, 1991) and discourse is “a vehicle for ‘selling’ 
goods, services, organizations, ideas or people” (Fairclough, 1993, p. 141). In a 
knowledge-based economy, Fairclough postulates, knowledge becomes a commodity. 
This commodity comprises of two key elements: knowledge as actual ‘know-how’ and 
knowledge as ‘know-that’ discourse (Fairclough, 2002). A growing emphasis of the 
‘know-that’ element can be observed in the various attempts to converge 
pharmacological know-how in a few key messages. The ultimate ‘know-that’ statement 
today is the brand, which is increasingly determining the economic success of a drug as 
much as the pharmaceutical company behind it (see e.g. Blackett & Harrison, 2001).  
 
Relating it to the world of today’s pharma business, I would argue, that detailing talks 
by drug reps are overtly promotional while the aspect of providing impartial 
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information or service is rather ornamental. This view was previously expressed by 
German health economist Rainer Rohrbacher (1988) who remarked that as long as the 
act of detailing – ideally through a standardized presentation routine – is driven by the 
drug rep and as long as this results in prescriptions the pharmaceutical industry is 
interested to maintain and even strengthen the drug rep - physician relation. However, 
should the doctor determine the content of the consultation instead and should he rather 
reluctantly prescribe the drug, Rohrbacher argues that the interaction becomes 
asymmetrical and as such loses its discursive power to influence the physician. It is not 
two actors any longer who contribute to the successful execution of a service. Rather it 
is a self-service situation by which the active doctor requests information, samples etc. 
on demand. Rohrbacher concludes that a relationship by which the drug rep takes on a 
reactive role is not in the interest of the pharmaceutical industry because it does not 
control the prescription process any longer. As a consequence, Rohrbacher suggests, 
the pharmaceutical company must alter or even discontinue the direct interaction with 
the doctor (Rohrbacher, 1988). 
 
Oldani (2004) argues that drug companies increasingly revert to indirect measures to 
pave the way for dominant promotional discourses at the doctor’s office. Many 
pharmaceutical companies advertise directly to patients to make them request 
information about a particular drug next time they enter their doctor’s office. 
Physicians – feeling pressured to react to patients’ demands – contact the respective 
local drug rep for detailed information. This allows the drug rep to be welcomed into 
the office by allegedly doing the physician a favour. Oldani conveys that this is a 
critical step because the opportunity arises for the drug rep to talk about other products. 
The doctor is compelled to return the favour and listen to the drug rep talk about these 
other products. Oldani accounts that “you were to hold out, if you will, on the 
requested information because you had the upper hand and the physician was forced to 
be a captive audience” (Oldani, 2004, p. 329).  
 
To Fairclough (1999) such promotional discourse has major pathological as well as 
ethical implications. He foresees society’s general distrust in discursive practices 
because of people’s growing inability to recognize authenticity in communication.  
With reference to doctor detailing, physicians are expected to meet drug rep talk with 
cynical scepticism and disbelief. Furthermore, a prevailing promotional discourse is 
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fostering self-promotion making it become an integral part of identity. I believe that 
when medicine is succumbing to market ideology, the professional complex is equally 
seized by the notion of self-promotion.  
 
Change towards marketization is not done by discourse alone. Marketization is not just 
a new discourse which is ideologically motivated and which people – after being 
permanently exposed to it – eventually adopt in practice. Customization, profit 
orientation, flexibility are real features of contemporary economies. In the second half 
of the 20th century, the advances of knowledge, the rise in productivity, the 
accumulation of wealth met with people’s desire to break with a predictable and 
standardized life. This led to a genuine structural change in the economic system, 
namely the move from Fordism to post-Fordism. While this is a fact which is largely 
supported by scientific evidence, discourse has been nevertheless an irreducible part of 
this becoming reality. Fairclough (1999) remarks, that the change from Fordism to 
post-Fordism is unthinkable without the change in economic discourse. To Fairclough 
the changing economy is the place of a struggle between the old and the new, and the 
discourse of e.g. flexibility and profitability is an important symbolic weapon in that 
struggle. Bourdieu (1998 in Fairclough, 1999) denotes this form of coalition a ‘strong 
discourse’, by which he means a discourse that is supported by the strength of the 
economic and social forces (e.g. multinational pharmaceutical companies) which are 
trying to make the new economic structure even more a reality than it already is. In 
pharmaceutical companies the new strong discourse of ‘being a market driven 
organization’ has completely replaced the old ‘being a research driven organization’ 
discourse. The new discourse is dispersed throughout the organization as set down 
ways of acting and interacting affecting all aspects of corporate activity, including for 
example internal communication, brand planning and, in particular, drug rep training. 
The marketised discourse is ultimately becoming part of the organization’s identity. 
Fairclough denotes this process as the weakening of the boundaries between ‘orders of 
discourse’ (Fairclough, 2002), implying that the differences of discursive practices of 
the market and those for example of healthcare are gradually dissolving. The rate, at 
which this is happening, as noted earlier, depends on the vigour and viability of any 
rivalling discourse (see for example Leys, 1990; Keenoy et al., 1997). 
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5.2.3. The wellbeing discourse 
 
There is in fact a rivalling discourse present in the German healthcare system. This 
discourse is strongly based on the medical ethics demand of ‘the wellbeing of the 
patient’ (‘aegroti salus suprema lex’) which frequently culminates in a ‘question of life 
or death’ talk. The ‘wellbeing’ discourse is strongly employed by the professional 
associations in their publicly aired defence against e.g. organisational or budgetary 
changes connected with health care reforms fostering marketization. Public buy-in is 
easily won as nobody would really oppose such a noble plea for life in general. The 
question, however, why ethical objectives like patient wellbeing cannot be pursued 
with the help of the economic principle remains largely unanswered by the medical 
community. This sparks the question whether the underlying motive behind this 
counter discourse is truly ethical.  
 
In this context, Eugen Münch, the former CEO of Germany’s largest private hospital 
group reports that in his interaction with representatives of the medical profession he 
has never even tried to question the ethic principle of patient wellbeing coming first. 
He was therefore perplexed to hear how aggressive and poisonous economization was 
attacked. How it was denied any reason for being, and that it was classified as a 
parasitic instrument of the time that destroys the future of humanity (Münch, 2005, p. 
2). While such a single report may be dramatizing the representatives’ reactions, it 
nevertheless exemplifies that there is a strong rivalling discourse in Germany that I 
believe is slowing down the colonization process of the medical domain by market 
discourses (Fairclough, 1994). For this reason any orchestrated dispersion of 
marketization (‘market driven organisation’) at the pharmaceutical company level 
needs to carefully differentiate between internal and external communication. While 
the inbound discourse is overtly marketised the outbound discourse must watchfully 
consider the popular ‘wellbeing for patient’ argument. I presume that (in Germany) the 
detailer’s actual discourse will differ from the ‘technologised’ discourse he has been 
instructed with. In other words, the detailer is unlikely to discursively transmit his 
company’s marketing & sales strategy. Why is that unlikely? Because the drug rep has 
to react on-site to a powerful counter discourse presented by a powerful counterpart 
that is enjoying high social prestige? Yes, maybe. It surely is a challenging task to spin 
the doctor. Yet with plenty of training and growing experience the detailer should be 
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well equipped to master this task provided that he believes in the marketised discourse 
altogether. It is here where I suspect conflict. As outlined earlier in the document, it is 
the detailer’s year long exposure to representatives of a rivalling discourse that could 
lead to a conflict of identity.      
     
 
5.3. Discourse is action 
 
To me it seems obvious that investigating drug rep – physician encounters 
fundamentally implies the use of analysis of discourse. It is obvious because – and this 
is particularly valid in the area of service work – discourse and action are intertwined 
to the degree that discourse is action and action is discourse (Oswick & Keenoy, 1997). 
However, one regularly comes across a very different perspective that assigns 
discourse a subordinate role.   
 
The ideological dominance of the economy with its focus on promotion, rationalisation 
and profitability has led to a privileged status of action over discourse. Oswick & 
Keenoy (1997) argue that in Western societies the mantra of productivity, the hymn of 
achieving results is predominantly associated with action and not with talk. This is 
indicated for example by commonplace sayings such as ‘talk is cheap’ or ‘actions 
speak louder than words’. According to Oswick & Keenoy discourse is wrongly 
considered to be a “reflexive and passive activity while ‘doing’ is regarded as 
purposive and active action” (Oswick & Keenoy, 1997, p. 5). Furthermore, the 
prevailing belief is that ‘discussing’ and ‘doing’ is happening consecutively rather than 
concurrently. Discourse and action are regarded to be discrete activities that refer to 
clearly delineated domains.  
 
This idea is still surviving in management practice, indisputable a pivotal function in 
the economic complex. Oswick & Keenoy point to the ignorance of discourse in 
traditional management theory, where management was boldly defined as the art of 
getting things done through people (Follett, 1941). With reference to Follett’s 
definition Oswick & Keenoy pose the rhetorical question whether it is possible to get 
things done through people other than discursively. They regard discourse and 
discursive activity as vital elements of organisational life. They claim that discourse 
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and action are mutually implicated and intertwined and exemplify this with knowledge 
work done by e.g. lawyers, sales representatives or lecturers. “Much of the routine 
work and occupational activities undertaken by these actors – defending clients, selling 
products or giving lectures – is comprised of discursive activity; ‘doing means talking’. 
Alternatively, their actions can be construed as ‘discursive events” (Oswick & Keenoy, 
1997, p. 6). As many goods today are services – and as such are dependent on the talk 
of those providing it – language becomes part of the service, part of the goods 
(Fairclough, 1999). Creating a commodity quite obviously implies action. Lyotard 
aptly concludes that when commodities become semioticised, discourse becomes 
commodified (Lyotard, 1986/7 in Fairclough, 1999). 
 
 
5.4. Summary 
 
In this chapter I have presented key perspectives on the relation between language and 
meaning. In particular, I have supported the view – which was initially postulated by 
Wittgenstein – that meaning is constituted by language, which in turn is shaped by 
social interaction. In other words, the way we experience the social world around us is 
determining the way we denote that world in discursive terms. Against this background 
I have argued that self-interested construction of discourse will influence the way 
individuals perceive the world. Thus discourse is a means of exerting power.   
 
Further to that end, the role of discourse in mediating a market ideological perspective 
was discussed. Emphasis was placed on the hegemonic character of such discourse in 
present day Western societies. In turn, key perspectives on the patterning of marketised 
discourse were presented. Important in this respect, was the Faircloughian notion about 
the strategic construction (‘technologization’) and dissemination of discourse with the 
aim to influence others. This was related to practices of modern day drug detailing. 
Last not least the operational dimension of discourse was highlighted, by which 
discourse is regarded the central activity of organisational life (e.g. Oswick & Keenoy, 
1997). 
  
Leading over to the next chapter, I like to highlight the two notions of the term 
discourse in my study. From a research methodology point of view, discourse can be 
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seen as a source of accessing individual meaning making. Thus by e.g. listening to 
accounts (discourse) of drug reps I can obtain insights about their values, feelings and 
motivations. On a second note – in line with Fairclough’s idea of discourse 
technologization – discourse is portrayed as an instrument for power exertion. This 
dual meaning of ‘discourse’ is vital to the concept of my research project which is – 
methodologically speaking – analysing discourse about discourse. In the following 
chapter I will describe my approach to the empirical investigation in detail.      
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6. Methodology 
 
I will begin this chapter with outlining the research context which essentially is a brief 
summary of the previous chapters. In doing so, I will demonstrate how my research 
questions have emerged out of the research context. Subsequently, I will show how the 
overall research concept is grounded in theory before I move on to outline individual 
research methods and their concrete application. The order of presentation is thereby 
following my initial evolution of concept rather than the sequence of its actual 
implementation. In other words, the structure is reflecting the process of how I have 
initially conceptualised the empirical research. This implies, for example, to first 
advance the methods of data collection before concerning oneself with the approach to 
sampling.     
 
 
6.1. Research context 
 
The research project investigates the impact of marketised discourse in drug detailing 
from a physician, drug rep and also management perspective. To prepare for this 
context I have looked into both the medical profession and the pharmaceutical industry. 
Particular emphasis was placed to convey the developments and interpretations on 
medical professionalism in general. I have presented the cultural and sociological 
shaping of the profession which lead to the idealisation and extraordinary positioning 
of physicians in Western society. Yet we have equally learned about the various 
academic critiques on the implementation of medical work in practice. In this respect 
the accusation of self-interestedness on part of physicians was brought to the fore. At 
the same time, the review has displayed key factors responsible for a declining 
influence and autonomy of physicians. Most notable factors were the exponential 
growth of medical knowledge followed by rationalisation and standardisation of 
medical work. Thus I have provided several points of reference to profoundly assess 
the individual attitudes and perceptions conveyed by physicians in the empirical 
research part to come.   
 
Next to introducing various theories on medical professionalism, I have provided 
background on the pharmaceutical industry. It became evident that the industry is 
  
 85
experiencing an innovative slow-down which is manifested by a large number of 
highly similar drugs being on the market. To compensate for its diminishing innovative 
return the industry has largely shifted its activities to the marketing of drugs. In this 
respect, we have learned that the average budget for marketing and sales is 
approximately twice as high as the one for research and development. The key 
marketing instrument is drug detailing, whereby representatives of drug companies are 
visiting physicians in their practices or hospital wards. We have been introduced to the 
origins of drug detailing as well as to the main theoretical stances with regards to the 
purpose and effects of drug detailing. The majority of theories support the view that 
drug detailing is not about informing but about promotion and selling of drugs. This 
view stands in contrast to the official, legally bound, job definition in Germany which 
strictly limits the role of drug detailing to scientific and technical informing.  
  
In the previous chapter, I have presented theories on the role of language and 
discursive practices in shaping attitudes, identities and promoting change. I have 
further introduced ideas about the patterning and power of marketised discourse in 
particular. It was argued that the marketization of life in general and of healthcare 
specifically is to a significant degree a discursive process. Crucially, I have presented 
the notion of technologization of discourse – which entails the self-interested strategic 
construction of discourse – and related it to the promotional discourse practices of 
present day pharmaceutical companies.  
 
Thus by combining existing theories on language and discourse with contextual data 
(e.g. on the pharmaceutical industry) I have shown that discourse is a highly relevant 
and critical research object in the area of drug detailing. This leads to the central aspect 
of my research project, which concerns the manifestation of marketised discourse in 
drug detailing and its impact on the attitude, identity and behaviour of those involved. 
In other words, I am interested to learn if and how marketised discourse is taking 
control of the act of detailing and what kind of responses it brings about. In answering 
these questions I expect to provide a better understanding of the idiosyncrasies of drug 
detailing discourse. Furthermore, I would like to provide a concept of how discourse is 
designed, implemented and received in today’s detailing context. Based on these 
outcomes I hope to contribute to the advancement of quality and productivity in 
modern drug detailing. 
  
 86
 
6.2. Research questions 
 
Following the research context outlined I will try to answer the following specific 
questions through empirical research:   
 
Against the background of drug detailing in Germany 
 
1. Is there discursive construction of marketization in drug detailing? 
2. If there is marketised discourse how does it manifest in discursive terms? 
3. How does such discourse impact the roles and attitudes of drug reps and 
physicians? 
 
The term ‘marketised discourse’ is to be understood in a Faircloughian sense in that it 
is “a vehicle for ‘selling’ goods, services, organizations, ideas or people” (Fairclough, 
1993, p. 141). In a drug detailing setting such discourse could e.g. expose or exaggerate 
certain beneficial product features while concealing others. It could mean to 
oversimplify the product’s mechanism of action or to reduce information in order to 
reflect the drug’s single ‘benefit positioning’ (Kottler, 1997). In short, marketised 
discourse is aimed at promoting commercial interests rather than at transferring 
impartial knowledge. Against the background of low product innovation marketised 
discourse is to advance drug sales more by means of tactical messaging than on the 
grounds of scientific facts. 
 
The term ‘physician’ or ‘doctor’ refers to a medical doctor either working office-based 
or in a hospital setting. In Germany, the majority of office-based doctors are self 
employed although there is a growing trend towards salaried work to be observed 
(Preusker, 2008). Office-based doctors generate approximately 80% of their income 
through the statutory health insurance system. Continuous cost increase in that system 
has led to tight cost control measures induced by the government. These cost 
containment policies indirectly interfere with the therapeutic autonomy of physicians in 
that certain therapies and drugs are not (fully) reimbursed any longer. Office-based 
physicians are regularly visited by drug reps. High prescribing doctors receive up to 
seven visits by detailers per day. 
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Hospital physicians generally work as salaried doctors. By matter of organisational 
setting, hospital doctors are used to division of medical labour as well as to 
departmental orders and procedural guidelines. Their structural work setting thus 
resembles that of industrial organisations. Cost explosion and oversupply in the 
hospital sector have equally led to cost containment programmes. In order to increase 
efficiencies and therapeutic quality, medical work in hospitals today is primarily 
guided by evidence-based treatment policies. Hospital physicians are visited by drug 
reps for two reasons. First, they typically apply a lot of high value (expensive) drugs 
which is attractive to the industry. Second, their medication or prescription behaviour 
has a guiding function for office-based doctors. Thus hospital doctors are important 
leverage points to the industry. Formally, a hospital’s drug portfolio is centrally 
determined by the hospital pharmacy. Yet physicians (head doctors) largely influence 
the listing of drugs in the hospital pharmacy.  
 
The term ‘drug rep’ describes the pharmaceutical sales representative who regularly 
visits office-based doctors and / or hospital physicians to present drugs that require 
doctors’ prescription to patients. Drug reps easily make up 20% of the workforce and 
30-40% of the costs of a company. In Germany, drug reps come from educational 
backgrounds such as the natural sciences, pharmacy or nursing but also can come from 
a business administration environment. As by the German medicines law 
(Arzneimittelgesetz, AMG) drug reps are defined to pass on scientific and technical 
information to the physician and report any adverse effects caused by the drug back to 
the company. However, as by most sources in the literature (e.g. Rohrbacher, 1988; 
Greene, 2004; Oldani, 2004) as well as my own professional experiences, drug reps are 
seen as instruments of marketing that are employed to induce prescriptions. With 5-10 
doctor visits per day drug reps spend a large part of their working lives in a medical 
environment. In fact they have more contact to physicians than they have to their 
managers and colleagues. 
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6.3. Theoretical framework  
 
Having presented the project’s contextual setting, subsequently it is important to relate 
the project to its ontological foundation. In the following I will discuss the theoretical 
framework the actual research is embedded in. This needs to be done in order to 
understand how the researcher approaches the study of social phenomena like drug rep 
– physician encounters. Unveiling the perspective subsequently implies to justify the 
criteria that guided the collection and analysis of data. The reader may altogether refuse 
to see the world through the investigator’s lenses. In that case research findings will be 
ignored regardless of the methodological and argumentative rigour employed to extract 
them. Yet if the reader is able to see things from the researcher’s perspective it largely 
depends to methodological relevance and consistency whether the findings will be 
received or not. At the same time, presenting the theoretical structure means that the 
researcher is conducting a plausibility check to detect and hopefully eradicate 
inconsistencies. 
 
In the next section I will present the ontological base the research project is resting 
upon. Afterwards I will link the ontological base to the research methodologies that 
have been employed. The applied methodologies will be delineated before I turn to 
presenting the actual research process and content.  
 
  
6.3.1. The ontological foundation 
 
The world as we perceive it is our invention. (Heinz von Foerster, 1981) 
 
My research project is based on the belief that social phenomena are socially 
constructed. It implies that social actors like physicians or drug representatives 
generate meaning about what happens in the world through their interpretation of social 
practices.   
 
The interest of a social constructionist researcher is to discover how individuals and 
groups create their perceived reality. Importantly, differing from the radical 
constructivist perspective social constructionism does not believe reality to be an 
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individual construct of an operational closed cognitive system. Social constructionism 
proposes that all meaningful reality is socially constructed.  
 
American literary theorist Stanley Fish illustrates the process of construction by 
emphasizing that all objects are made rather than found. In his view, they are made by 
institutions which ‘precede us’ and in which ‘we are already embedded’ and ‘it is only 
by inhabiting them, or being inhabited by them, that we have access to the public and 
conventional senses they make’ (Fish, 1990, p. 186 in Crotty, 2003, pp. 52-53). 
 
Anthropologist Clifford Geertz further specifies Fish’s description by simply applying 
it to culture. Geertz in turn defines culture as ‘a system of significant symbols’ and 
regards the meaningful symbols that constitute culture as an indispensable guide to 
human behaviour. Without it we would be ‘unworkable monstrosities’ (Geertz, 1973). 
Geertz underpins his view by stating that without culture human beings could not 
function. He argues that we depend on culture to direct our behaviour and organise our 
experience. Importantly, Geertz does not see culture as the result of behaviour patterns 
like customs, usages, traditions etc. Instead, he suggests that culture is best seen as the 
source rather than the result of human thought and behaviour (Geertz, 1973). 
 
Social constructionism emphasises the hold our culture has on us: it shapes the way we 
see things and gives us a quite definite view of the world. Crucially, this shaping of our 
minds by culture is also seen critically. According to Crotty we tend to take ‘the sense 
we make of things’ to be ‘the way things are’. This way, Crotty proposes, we become 
‘victims of the tyranny of the familiar’ (Crotty, 2003). He further suggests that by 
stacking layers upon layers of interpretation ‘we become further and further removed 
from those realities, our sedimented cultural meanings serving as a barrier between us 
and them’ (Crotty, 2003, p. 59). 
 
Social constructionism is fed from three main sources: sociology, post-modern 
philosophy and psychology, the latter primarily from the work of psychologist Kenneth 
Gergen. 
 
In sociology the initial impulses were given by the work of Berger & Luckmann (1966) 
as well as by the school of symbolic interactionism. Interactionists focus on the 
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subjective aspects of social life, rather than on objective, macro-structural aspects of 
social systems. One reason for this focus is that interactionists base their theoretical 
perspective on their image of humans, rather than on their image of society. For 
interactionists, humans are pragmatic actors who must continually adjust their 
behaviour to the actions of other actors. Importantly, they can only adjust to them 
because they are able to interpret them, i.e., to denote them symbolically and treat the 
actions and those who perform them as symbolic objects. For interactionists  
 
Society, conceptualized as a web of symbolic interaction, creates the person; but it is 
persons who through interaction create society. Thus society and person are 
reciprocally related in a most fundamental way: They presuppose one another in that 
neither exists except in relation to the other.           (Stryker & Statham, 1985, p. 314) 
 
From post-modern philosophy (e.g. Foucault, Derrida) social constructionism has 
borrowed the refusal to accept the existence of an ultimate truth and that the world can 
be understood with the help of a few great theories (‘grand narratives’). According to 
post-modernism the purpose of science is not about finding ‘true’ and rejecting ‘false’ 
theories but to portray the complexity of the world from different perspectives and 
allow different theories to co-exist.  
 
The work of psychologist Kenneth Gergen was largely focussed on the role language 
plays in the reality construction of the individual. According to Gergen (1999, 2001) 
communal discourse is essential to reality construction of the individual. Communal 
discourse creates scripts for behaviour and thinking (inferring) based on which the 
individual plans, experiences and reconstructs social interactions. These communally 
produced scripts determine a person’s role-specific behaviour. Gergen regards the 
linkage between communal discourse and the individual as the main focus of social 
constructionist research. Hence, he proposes analysis of discourse to be the key 
instrument for investigating this connection. 
 
In summary, for the social constructionist the world does not present itself objectively 
to the observer, but is known through human experience which is essentially influenced 
by language (Burr, 1995). Language, in turn, emerges from social interaction within a 
group of people and as such reflects all the past experiences of that group.   
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The search for meaning in social action implies investigating its language. That is 
because, as Fairclough proposes ‘language is a form of social practice’ (Fairclough, 
1989). This linguistically based practice can also be referred to as discourse. In other 
words, discourse is a way of constituting a particular form of social reality. By 
analysing discourse we can obtain an understanding of the world of meaning of social 
actors like physicians or drug reps. 
 
 
6.4. Applied methodology 
6.4.1. Introducing discourse analysis 
 
Language and language use is ever more recognised in social and organisational 
research. According to Oswick, et al. (2000) the study of discourse has become one of 
the most important means of analysing complex organizational phenomena. Since the 
late 1980s there has been sharp increase in discursively based studies of organisations 
(e.g. Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Fairclough 1993, 1995; van Dijk, 1997; Grant, et al., 
1998). Acknowledging that organisational events are discursively constructed has 
considerably strengthened the value of discourse studies. This development is aided by 
the fact that language is highly accessible for empirical investigation and that 
altogether social research is increasingly regarded as an empirical activity. By means of 
interviews or observations the social researcher can get access to a rich array of 
linguistic (inter)actions thereby learning how people use language as much as how 
language shapes people (Alvesson, 2000). Appreciating the significance and 
accessibility of language in that way has added to the growing interest in discourse. 
 
Discourse analysis is grounded in a constructionist epistemology that sees language as 
constitutive and constructive rather than reflective and representative (Wood & Kroger, 
2000). Parker defines discourse as an interrelated set of texts, and the practices of their 
production, dissemination, and reception, which brings an object into being (Parker, 
1992 in Westwood & Clegg, 2003). In other words, social reality is produced and made 
real through discourses. The key task for the discourse analyst is to explore the 
relationship between discourse and reality. Discourses are embodied and enacted in a 
variety of texts which may take a variety of forms, including written texts, spoken 
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words, pictures, symbols, artefacts etc. However, “texts are not meaningful 
individually; it is only through their interconnections with other texts, the different 
discourses on which they draw, and the nature of their production, dissemination, and 
consumption that they are made meaningful” (Phillips & Hardy, 2002, p. 4). Discourse 
analysis is interested in the ways texts are made meaningful through these processes 
and also how they contribute to the constitution of social reality by making meaning 
(Phillips & Brown, 1993). The connection between discourses and the social reality 
they constitute makes discourse analysis a powerful method for studying social 
phenomena. That is, discourse analysis emphasizes the way versions of the world, of 
society, events and inner psychological worlds are produced in discourse. 
 
Discourse analysis as a methodology had to gradually win through in the social 
sciences. Its assertion in the field was aided by a growing trend towards subjectivity in 
the post-war period. Since the 1960s the linguistic revolution had ultimately reached 
the social sciences. The term ‘linguistic turn’ – created by Bergmann (1953) and 
popularized by Rorty (1967) – described a new approach that broke with the traditional 
notion of language’s representational character. Originating from the work of linguistic 
philosophers such as the later Wittgenstein (1953) and Austin (1962) the idea that 
language is constitutive of social reality became increasingly accepted. Their 
preparatory work strongly influenced sociologists Berger & Luckmann (1966) and 
anthropologists such as Geertz (1973), whose ideas in turn formed the foundation of a 
constructionist view of social phenomena. Subsequently, researchers in organization 
and management theory began to see language as important to their field. The idea, for 
example, that organisations are socially constructed and exist primarily in language 
was becoming increasingly accepted within the organisational research community.  
 
 
6.4.2. What is meant by ‘discourse’? 
 
Discussing types of discourse analysis must be preceded by clarifying what is exactly 
meant by the term ‘discourse’. This connects to the previous discussion on discourse in 
chapter five. However, in context of applied methodology the debate to follow has a 
clear definitional objective. In this section, I am essentially defining the unit of 
research analysis both in technical as well as qualitative terms.  
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The traditional outlook on discourse sees it as being a form of spoken dialogue 
standing in contrast to written text (Sinclair & Coulthard, 1975 in Oswick, et al., 2000). 
A decade later the definition was broadened by referring to discourse as a combination 
of spoken as well as written text (Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984; Potter & Wetherell, 1987). 
According to Oswick, et al. (2000) the outlining can be even further extended to 
include cultural artefacts such as music, art or fashion. All these definitions have in 
common that they are defining discourse by means of its carrying devices. Such a 
framework is helpful to identify and justify the technical unit of analysis. With regards 
to interviewing drug reps, it helps me to define whether to analyse just spoken words or 
also e.g. marketing brochure texts referred to during the interview. I could even go as 
far as analysing the interviewee’s dress because – following Hodge & Kress (1988) – it 
is discourse in a broad sense as well.  
 
Since the ‘linguistic turn’ discourse has basically become an ontological category by 
being regarded constitutive to social reality (e.g. Berger & Luckmann, 1966). 
Habermas (1988) for example vividly embraced the linguistic turn when stating: 
“Today the problem of language has taken the place of the traditional problem of 
consciousness” (Habermas 1988, p. 117). Coming from a critical theory perspective, 
Habermas assigns discourse a politically motivated character. He is carefully 
differentiating discourse from uncritical communicative action that takes place in 
everyday life. Discourse in the Habermasian sense describes a rather unusual form of 
communication in which individuals subject themselves to the force of the better 
argument (Crotty, 2003). Ideally, discourse is meant to achieve a universally valid 
normative system, constituting the basis of a more just society. From a critical 
perspective, discourse is seen as a vehicle for oppression – a condition in turn to be 
revealed by the critical inquirer – as much as a means to overcome oppressive 
structures through acts of untwisted communication. As such discourse is related to 
power.   
 
Power is the guiding force also behind Foucault’s interpretation of discourse. 
Discourse, according to Foucault, arranges and naturalizes the social world in a 
particular way, creating social practices. In turn these practices constitute particular 
forms of subjectivity in which individuals are managed and shaped (Foucault, 1976, 
1980 in Alvesson & Karreman, 2000). Essential to Foucault’s position is that practices 
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are systematically shaped through discourse by those in power. To Foucault, power is 
the ultimate principle of social reality and individuals are constituted by power 
relations (Sarup, 1993). Discourse is hence situated within societal relationships. 
Simply put, Foucault believes that power is producing reality through discourse. 
 
I prefer to define discourse as less controlling and more in line with the reading of 
Phillips & Hardy (1997), drawing on Fairclough (1992) and Parker (1992), namely as 
concepts “through which we understand the world and relate to one another” (Phillips 
& Hardy 1997, p. 167 in Oswick et al., 2000). I clearly admit to the power element 
behind discourse. However, I feel that its effect on subjectivity is overrated by the 
Foucauldian school of thought. Here I am close to Alvesson & Karreman (2000) who 
state that reproducing a certain discourse is not automatically indicative of a specific 
cognition. “People may produce politically correct opinions in interviews or 
conversations without any particular feelings or convictions being involved (Alvesson 
& Karreman, 2000, p. 1132). From this perspective, discourse and meaning can be 
separated or only loosely coupled. Individuals must not automatically become victims 
of power discourses but can stay resistant. Or as Alvesson & Karreman put it: “The 
ways in which subjects relate to discourse may be Teflon-like; the language they are 
exposed to or use may not ‘stick’” (2000, p. 1132). Individuals’ opposition may come 
in various forms. Some resist openly by e.g. displaying a militant counter discourse. 
Others may revert to feigned adaptation practicing hypocritical talk. In any case, 
subjects are not always fragile and naively accessible by hegemonic discourse. Seeing 
them this way may ascribe too much power to discourse (Newton, 1998).  
 
With respect to the technical unit of analysis (carrying device), in my study I like to 
concentrate on the spoken word as uttered during the course of qualitative interviews. 
This does not imply a disbelief in other vehicles presented (e.g. written text, artefacts) 
but simply is done to ensure operational focus.    
 
 
6.4.3. Types of discourse analysis 
 
There are various forms of discourse analysis differing primarily by theoretical 
assumptions that underpin the empirical work and that produce different styles of 
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research. Phillips and Ravasi (1998) have developed a framework (Figure 3) which 
provides a tool for understanding the diversity of theoretical approaches. The 
framework categorizes these differences according to two key dimensions: the degree 
to which the emphasis lies on individual texts or on the surrounding context and the 
degree to which the research focuses on power and ideology as opposed to processes of 
social construction (Phillips & Hardy, 2002).  
 
The vertical axis in Figure 3 below shows the continuum between text and context. The 
text – or proximate context as Schegloff (1992) calls it – refers to the immediate 
features of an interaction like the sort of occasion or the capacities in which people 
speak. The context – or distal context (Schegloff) – includes things like social class, 
ethnic composition of participants or institutions or sites where discourse occurs. The 
horizontal axis of Figure 3 reflects the choice between constructivist approaches that 
produce detailed explorations of the way in which a particular social reality has been 
constructed, and critical approaches which focus more explicitly on the dynamics of 
power, knowledge and ideology that surround discursive processes. 
 
         Phillips & Ravasi (1998) 
 
Figure 3:   Different approaches to discourse analysis 
 
Constructivist 
Context
Critical 
Text
Interpretive 
Structuralism 
Social Linguistic 
Analysis 
Critical Discourse 
Analysis 
Critical Linguistic 
Analysis 
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Which type of discourse analysis is most applicable to address the actual research 
questions? To recapitulate: I wish to understand how presumably ‘marketised’ 
discursive practices during the detailing encounter are perceived by each party and how 
this perception (meaning construction) impacts role conceptions and attitudes. 
Therefore I am looking at discourse as social context rather than focusing on the text 
per se, which would imply treating the material as if existing in a contextual vacuum 
(Keenoy, et al., 1997). Conceptually this means analysing discourse about discourse. In 
doing so, I spark and interpret subjects’ reflexive thinking on social systems, in line 
with Luhmann’s prominent notion of ‘communication about communication’ 
(Luhmann, 1995, p. 450).   
 
My central research task is to investigate how the context of marketization, both as a 
factual development and as discursive practice, is cognitively translated and reacted to 
by drug reps and physicians. Hence, the type of analysis is primarily interpretive in 
kind because it is concerned with interpreting how context is interpreted. In using the 
term ‘interpreting’ instead of e.g. ‘extracting’ I acknowledge the fact that from a social 
constructionist perspective the notion of objectivity in respect to reading accounts does 
not exist.  
 
In chapter five the phenomenon of marketization of discourse was frequently looked at 
from a critical discourse perspective (e.g. Fairclough). By highlighting the power-laden 
aspect of such discourse I have set the scene for the actual research project. Clearly, I 
am of the opinion that marketised or promotional discourse is about one group trying to 
exert influence over another. At the same time I have made the point that although 
power interests are discursively spread they do not necessarily have to win through. In 
that sense I am following the critical perspective only to the extent to which it keeps 
acknowledging subjects’ capacity for resilience. I am not prepared to view discourse 
simply through the lenses of latent oppression. My analysis of discourse therefore is 
equally about interpreting respondents’ world views as it is about deciphering power 
games or revealing acts of oppression. With reference to the framework given by 
Phillips & Ravasi (Figure 3, p. 95), I would position my approach to discourse analysis 
as being contextual, interpretive and critical. As such my approach is overarching in 
kind and is not analysing discourse by means of a single specific method (e.g. via 
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critical discourse analysis). Hence, I prefer to call my method ‘analysis of discourse’ 
instead of ‘discourse analysis’. 
 
The matrix by Phillips & Ravasi is just one way of looking at types of discourse 
analysis. Aggregated at the level of methodology, I would argue that it is mainly 
helpful as a means of general positioning one’s approach. It is not able to display, for 
example, the various relational options existing between discourses and meaning. It 
also does not sufficiently account for the distance the analysis is done from. Is 
discourse understood as being highly local or rather seen as an overarching grand 
story? All this can not be explained using the matrix of Phillips & Ravasi.  
 
A more precise and augmented proposal for pinpointing one’s analytic approach is 
presented by Alvesson & Karreman (2000). Their matrix (Figure 4) allows us to set the 
adhesive strength between discourse and meaning as well as the focal distance of 
analytic relevance.  
 
  
        Alvesson & Karreman (2000) 
  
Figure 4:   Matrix for the analysis of discourse studies 
Discourse 
Determination 
MUSCULAR 
(discourse/meaning 
collapsed) 
Close-range interest 
(local-situational context) 
MYOPIC
Discourse autonomy 
TRANSIENT 
(discourse/meaning 
unrelated) 
GRANDIOSE 
Long-range interest 
(macro-system context) 
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On the horizontal axis the association between discourse and meaning is defined. The 
relationship between discourse and meaning can be viewed as inseparable or strictly 
overlapping. It can be thought of as coupling, ranging from tight to loose, or it can be 
understood as nearly uncoupled. The various options refer to the degree by which one 
imagines discourse has an impact on a subject’s meaning constitution. If the researcher 
is expecting discourse to significantly drive subjectivity (feelings, thoughts, 
orientations) he will assign his study a ‘muscular’ character. However, he could equally 
assume that the discourse under investigation will have a rather weak cognitive impact. 
Consequently, he would assign his study a ‘transient’ note. This relates to my earlier 
point of power-laden discourse being resisted to by some individuals. Should I adhere 
to an ‘a priori’ belief that promotional discourse is significantly manipulating 
physicians’ subjectivity (e.g. their conception of a particular drug or treatment), I 
would, according to Alvesson & Karreman’s model, follow a strong ‘muscular’ 
approach to analysis of discourse. Now that I prefer to assume that promotional 
discourse will not necessarily ‘stick’ with every physician, my approach will rest on a 
more loosely conceived coupling of discourse and meaning. 
 
The second dimension determines the formative range a particular discourse and its 
analysis will have. At one end stands the analysis at the micro level. Emphasis is 
placed on local and situational context. Discourse in this context is regarded to have a 
very specific, almost unique character. From a methodological point of view the degree 
of transferability to other contexts is rated low. Due to the highly specific nature of the 
discourse, its predictability with respect to the interpretive outcome is likely to be low 
as well. Narrow range approaches thus tend to be less ‘a priori’ and more ‘emergent’ in 
style. Detailed analysis of discourse at a particular practice in connection with a patient 
specific event (e.g. mistreatment) would be exemplary for the ‘myopic’ type of 
analysis. The close range investigator would be interested to carve out the details of the 
particular situation but would not primarily assume the discursive event to be typical.  
 
At the other end, discourse is assumed to have a broad, almost universal relevance. The 
same or similar discourse is expected to appear at many incidents and sites, thus being 
common in type. Empirical material will be treated in a standardized way, looking for 
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similarities rather than differences. Researchers analysing discourse from this 
perspective aim to link the variations at the local levels, assembling them under an 
over-arching theme. According to Alvesson & Karreman (2000) followers of this 
approach tend to start from a well established ‘a priori’ understanding of the 
phenomenon in question. I would assume that promotional talk is widely spread across 
practices & clinics. Subsequently, I expect the underlying concept of marketization to 
be conceived in a similar manner by the respondents. Having a macro-system interest, I 
would locate my analytic approach more towards the ‘grandiose’ pole of the scale.   
 
Following a broad-range analytical approach has certain drawbacks. When entering the 
research with firm conceptions one risks to prematurely allocating the empirical 
material to one or the other grand discourse. Feeling almost relieved when recognizing 
one’s ‘a priori’ patterning in the material, one sometimes fails to look more precisely. 
Gross categorization thus threats a variant interpretation of discourses. Let me illustrate 
this using an example borrowed from Fournier’s (1998, in Alevesson & Karreman, 
2000) study of career discourse, now translated to drug detailing: seeing drug reps’ 
accounts about marketization only through the dichotomous patterning of e.g. 
affectedness vs. unaffectedness may suppress other motives. A drug rep may present 
himself as being morally righteous by adhering to scientific objectivity in his detailing 
talks. While this can be read as resilience to immoral power interests, on closer 
examination it could be interpreted as the respondent’s frustration for not having 
advanced to the management ranks. Alternatively, it could be seen as simply currying 
favour with the interviewer. In Fournier’s study, for example, one respondent was 
suspected of having been critical of management’s immoral conduct, simply because 
he wanted to support the interviewer’s presumably anti-managerial position.  
 
All this is not saying that discourse analysis should be done by constantly changing the 
scope of investigation (e.g. iteratively moving between broad and situational level) in 
an attempt not to miss any interpretative variations. No, because such flexible approach 
would probably miss the analytical objectives & benefits of either school. It rather is a 
reminder to the long-range analyst to occasionally keep a watchful eye on the local or 
situational context.  
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Alvesson & Karreman’s matrix to me is a methodological compass as much as an 
invitation for discourse analytical precision. In particular it is reminding the macro-
level researcher to remain sensitive to language. Importantly, the authors point to the 
risk of ‘jumping over’ language in the course of making broad statements about 
discourse. Therefore, any researcher’s attempt to impose a discursive framework 
should be checked against not running counter to the very idea of discourse studies. 
Alvesson & Karreman’s warning is not about theoretical purity but about conceptual 
applicability and thus about effectiveness. Hence, the authors conclude:  
 
In many cases, employing this label (discourse) does not add anything 
new and simply brings confusion to the study of topics that can be 
addressed through the use of other, although perhaps less fashionable, 
concepts like, for example, ideology. 
      (Alvesson & Karreman, 2000, p. 1145) 
 
 
6.5. Data collection 
 
The term data collection may sound like a technical and plain exercise that either 
precedes or follows the critical process of conceptualisation and evaluation. While this 
might be true for some projects, it does not apply in my research case. In a qualitative 
study like mine which philosophically rests on a constructionist perspective data 
collection is a central task. In contrast to counting events or measuring objects, data in 
constructionist qualitative research is hardly sizeable in a positivistic reading. This is 
because relevant data is seen as being individually constructed, none being objective or 
absolutely or truly generalizable (Crotty, 2003). From this perspective, how does one 
seize something for which no agreed measure exists? It requires to say goodbye to the 
notion of measuring and instead to embrace the concept of ascertaining meaning. Thus 
collecting data in a constructionist fashion necessitates provoking representations of 
individual meaning-making. In bringing about traces of personal sense making the 
researcher tries to burst through cognitive shells of habituation, fear, vein or cultural 
scripting. Sometimes the armour cannot be overcome, sometimes the shell is found to 
be empty. Yet even in these cases, the resulting data can still provide valuable 
knowledge to the constructionist inquirer. However, if such data is simply the product 
  
 101
of poor ‘collecting’ skills, its research value immediately drops to zero. Data collection 
is therefore a crucial part of my project which needs extensive preparatory dealing.  
 
My empirical research is concerned with accessing individual meaning-making about 
discursive practices in drug detailing. In that I wish to understand how physicians, drug 
reps and managers perceive, value and respond to the discourse that they are 
experiencing. Based on the existing literature as well as my own work experience, I 
assume that discourse is heavily marketised which means that it is strategically shaped 
– in line with Fairclough’s notion of technologization of discourse – to serve the 
commercial interest of the industry. With my research I like to obtain the protagonists’ 
views with regards to that assumption of mine. Further to that point, I wish to get their 
perceptions on the idiosyncrasies of marketised discourse. Central to my research 
endeavour, I wish to understand how this discourse is impacting their role perceptions 
and attitudes. In order to do that I need to learn how they make sense of their worlds in 
discursive terms. As such I am interested to analyse discourse about marketised 
discourse. In the previous part I have already provided my project specific definition of 
discourse, namely the traditional outlook on discourse as ‘spoken dialogue’. Given that 
definition I regard qualitative interviewing as a suitable method for data collection. In 
the following, I will present and discuss this method. Subsequently, I will address the 
crucial matter of sampling, introducing the chosen methodology as much as its specific 
application in the research. I begin with outlining the method of qualitative 
interviewing. 
 
      
6.5.1. Qualitative interviewing 
 
The interviewer wanders along with the local inhabitants, asks questions 
that lead the subject to tell their own stories of the lived world, and 
converses with him in the original Latin meaning of conversation as 
‘wandering together with’.  
(Kvale, 1996, p. 4)  
 
On a general note, in qualitative interviewing the researcher wants rich, detailed 
answers and is highly interested in the interviewee’s point of view. He wants to obtain 
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insights into what the interviewee sees as relevant and important. As a result qualitative 
interviewing tends to be flexible, responding to the direction in which respondents take 
the interview and perhaps even adjusting the emphasis in the research as a result of 
significant issues that emerge in the course of the interviews. In contrast, interviewing 
in quantitative research is highly structured to maximize reliability and validity of 
measurement of key concepts (Bryman, 2004). A set of clearly defined questions is put 
to the respondents because the investigator wants to test a pre-conceived theory or 
seeks objective explanation for a particular occurrence. Structured interviewing is a 
method reflecting a positivistic position. 
 
In qualitative interviewing the respondents are seen as active meaning-makers and not 
as reactive sources from which investigators can retrieve information. The aim of 
qualitative interviewing is to gain interpretations – but not to discover facts or laws – 
from respondents’ talk. It is all about understanding the meaning of respondents’ 
experiences and life worlds (Warren, 2002). Likely to come from a social 
constructionist stance the qualitative interviewer expects to obtain a broad spectrum of 
perspectives. To Warren broadness of perspectives is not only looked for across the 
total set of participants but also within a single interview. He exemplifies his point by 
noting that “during an interview, the perspective of the respondent may shift from one 
standpoint in her experience to another, as she speaks, say, as a former child, then as 
mother, as a care-giver, then as an employee, or even as one that watches the local 
news” (Warren, 2002, p. 84). I have equally found this kind of multiplicity in my 
interviews with drug reps and physicians. Office-based doctors, for example, never just 
argued as medical experts but also, for example, as employers or as tax payers. Drug 
reps sometimes spoke as fellow-scientists, as employees, as patients or as friends of the 
doctor.     
 
The qualitative researcher’s acknowledgement of what Luff (1999) called ‘fractured 
subjectivities’ must be further extended to his own person. Warren (2002) basing his 
argument on Luff’s notion remarks that both researchers and respondents do not speak 
from stable and coherent positions but from varied perspectives. Reflecting on my role 
during interviewing I remember that my own position frequently changed during the 
interview. I conducted the interview partly as a social researcher, then again as a 
patient and at other times as a former industry manager.  
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Qualitative interviewing needs to be differentiated from ethnographic fieldwork like 
observation in that it provides a different angle of looking at the world. Warren (2002) 
comments that ethnography’s lens of looking at the world is that of ‘lived experiences’ 
that are set in an ‘eternal present’. Warren  sets it apart from qualitative interviewing by 
stating: ”The lens of the intensive interview is verbal – what people say and mean – but 
its temporal range is biographical extending into the past and the future” (Warren, 
2002, p. 85).   
 
Once qualitative interviewing has been selected as the method, the actual course of 
action according to Kvale (1996) is a systematic process that encompasses seven 
stages: thematising, designing, interviewing, transcribing, analysing, verifying and 
reporting. I will address the first four stages within the scope of this section.  
 
Thematising implies narrowing down on the topic of interest and checking if 
interviewing as a method is appropriate with respect to research objectives. In my 
study, for example, I wish to understand how physicians, drug reps and managers make 
meaning of their working environments. Crucially, I like to get their readings of the 
phenomenon of promotional discourse and gain perspectives on how this discursive 
practice impacts their role conceptions. Given the sense-provoking properties of the 
qualitative interview method, these research objectives are most likely to be met. 
 
Warren (2002) remarks, that the qualitative researcher resting on a constructionist 
position naturally is sceptical of rigid design structures. In this context I like to point 
out the difference between completely unstructured and semi-structured approaches to 
interviewing. Burgess (1984) compared unstructured interviewing to a conversation 
where the interviewer poses a single question or prompt and lets the respondent answer 
freely, with the interviewer only following up on topics of relevance. Bryman adds that 
unstructured interviewing is preferred by researchers who embark from a rather general 
research idea.  
 
Investigators, who already have a fairly clear focus in mind, choose to conduct their 
interviews along a semi-structured framework of questions and prompts (Bryman, 
2004). Right from the outset I had a reasonably clear conception of the 
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phenomenological arena I wanted to investigate. Given that I was able to articulate key 
themes rather precisely, a semi-structured design became most suitable to my project. 
Further to defining research focus, comes the aspect of comparability. Bryman (2004) 
notes that those researchers who, like myself, are doing multiple-case study research 
will prefer to have some structure in order to ensure cross-case comparability.  
 
Last not least the notion of interview design also applies to quite practical concerns like 
the time available to finish the study, access to respondents and the associated financial 
cost (Rubin & Rubin, 1995). With altogether one year, the time available for empirical 
work has been sufficient to allow for some considerable number and variety in cases. 
Having worked in the pharmaceutical industry in Germany for some years has helped 
me to gain access to doctors, drug reps and managers. Access was won through 
existing contacts, recommendation and word of mouth. My current status as an 
independent consultant has helped to avoid any conflict of interest as it sometimes 
happens when researchers study their own organisations. Financial aspects did not 
discriminate the research design as interviewing resulted only in minor expenses for 
travel as well as purchasing professional recording equipment. No gratifications were 
demanded by or given to respondents.  
 
The actual interviewing provides a social context in its own right that the qualitative 
researcher needs to make use of (Warren, 2002). Generally speaking, if subjects have 
agreed to be interviewed it is to be expected that they are willing to give insights about 
their views and experiences. Rubin & Rubin remarked that “people like to talk about 
themselves: they enjoy the sociability of a long discussion and are pleased that people 
are interested in them…” (Rubin & Rubin, 1995, p. 103).  Yet Warren (2002) explains 
that respondents are always situated in the present moment with anticipatory notions 
what an interview might entail. The respondent’s reaction to the actual social context of 
the interview may at times be surprising the interviewer. The qualitative interviewer, 
Warren argues, “must treat the unfolding social contexts of the interview as data, not as 
something that, under ideal conditions, can be eliminated from the interview process” 
(Warren, 2002, p. 91).  
 
Audio or video recording of the interview will affect the respondent to a certain degree. 
Bryman notes that recording may disturb respondents, who become too self conscious 
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or alarmed at the prospect of their words being preserved (Bryman, 2004, p. 330). 
Warren reports about respondents continuing to speak once the recorder has been 
switched off. Interviewees apparently do this either because they wish to speak about a 
topic of their own interest or because they do not want to address a subject ‘on the 
record’ that they rate to be potentially harmful to them (Warren, 2002). During my 
field work all but one interview had been audio taped. One respondent cited 
confidentiality as a reason for not wanting to be audio-taped. At several occasions 
respondents continued to reveal insights relevant to the topic after the recording device 
was turned off. On one occasion, from the very moment the recorder was switched off 
the respondent switched to a personal accounts mode while before he had reported 
from a rather distant general perspective typical of ‘cultural scripting’ (Alvesson, 
2003).  
 
 
6.5.2. A critical outlook on interviewing 
 
Interviews and the process of interviewing are commonly looked at from a rather 
technical perspective. The very notion of interviews being a useful empirical method is 
seldom questioned. According to Alvesson (2003) this is symptomatic of a traditional 
belief that knowledge can be produced from interviewing. This conception is not 
restricted to a particular school of thought. From a positivistic stance, for example, 
researchers expect interviews to generate facts about a particular situation or object 
being ‘out there’. Contrary to this, social constructionists, rejecting the notion of an 
objective truth, aim to uncover the individual’s inner world of meaning-making. 
Despite their fundamental differences, representatives of both ontological schools 
believe that access to respondents’ knowledge – whether perceived as being ‘objective’ 
or ‘subjective’ in kind – is essentially a question of procedural rigour or adaptive 
refinement. By means of e.g. standardized questions, repeated interviewing or 
alternating inquirers, positivists try to minimize researcher influence and other sources 
of bias. The social constructionist researcher on the other hand, wants to establish an 
atmosphere of trust between him and the interviewee, getting as close to a ‘natural’ 
conversation as possible. In pursuit of this goal it is suggested (e.g. by Fontana & Frey, 
1994) to strip the interview situation of any asymmetric features, for example, by 
encouraging the interviewer to voice his personal opinion. This way the respondents 
  
 106
are thought to convey their emotions more freely, contributing to the richness and 
authenticity of the interview data. Altogether, interviews are seen as a productive 
source of empirical research.  
 
This position is challenged by a stance that conceptualises interviewing simply as an 
empirical situation in its own right. Interviews are not regarded to be any different from 
other local, situational events like serving customers or talking to the neighbour. In his 
paper on interviews in organizational research, Alvesson (2003) has termed this 
outlook on interviews ‘localism’. Key to this perspective is the belief that an interview 
can be studied as an empirical event, yet it should not be treated as a tool for collecting 
data on something existing outside this particular event (Alvesson, 2003, p. 16). From a 
localist point of view, respondents are doubted to reveal their inner worlds because in a 
compulsive desire to give morally adequate accounts they are bound to a culturally pre-
patterned discourse. The interviewee is thus preoccupied to establish a functioning 
micro-order rather than providing the researcher with productive accounts. Negatively 
phrased, localists see respondents as fragile and opportunistic subjects. On a more 
favourable note, one could argue that the interplay between researcher and respondent, 
potentially affected by complex issues like gender, age, professional background or 
appearances, is believed to put heavy imprints on the accounts. So to avoid that a 
culturally charged situation like this will gloss over any traces of subjective reality, 
localists prefer to draw on naturally occurring interaction for their empirical studies 
(Alvesson, 2003). Altogether, I rate this outlook on interviews as one-sided and over-
critical because it disqualifies respondents from having any independent judgement and 
moral rectitude. 
 
Partly in response to the radical view of the localist school, Alvesson (2003) is 
suggesting an alternative way of dealing with interview data. Although being less 
confident about the knowledge production qualities of interviews, Alvesson does not 
wish to discard the method altogether. Instead, he is advocating a multifarious 
challenge based on cross-checking accounts with interview context. This concept 
termed ‘reflexive approach’ shall be briefly outlined as it is an impetus for more 
thoroughly contemplating on interview data. To directly connect the model to my 
research context, I will illustrate it using key observations made during the interviews.  
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According to Alvesson’s model the investigator using interviews should be aware of 
eight types of perturbations (e.g. disturbances to a system; see Varela (1974) 
potentially affecting the knowledge-producing interview ‘system’. The first disturbance 
concerns the issue of complex interpersonal relations (interviewer vs. interviewee) 
leading to staged behaviour on part of the respondent. To give an example with 
reference to the actual research project: my professional background as a consultant 
had one respondent mistake me for a management spy. Although the issue could be 
solved during the event, clearly for a while it had reduced his willingness to offer 
criticism.  
 
A second type of irritation relates to the problem of misinterpretation. People may 
simply assume the research to have a different objective, subsequently addressing 
themes in line with that objective. For example, one respondent kept presenting the 
technical details of various marketing plans without referring to the topic of language 
use. My direct questions regarding the mode of discursive presentation were just used 
as plugs for further elaboration on the programme’s technical structure. Obviously, the 
key word ‘marketization’ or ‘commercialisation’ has led the subject to conclude that 
the study is about improving drug marketing skills.    
 
The third type relates to the previously presented point by Warren (2002) regarding the 
multiplicity of identities displayed during the interview. In line with Warren, Alvesson 
highlights the need to account for participants changing their identities, hence arguing 
from different perspectives in the same interview. In my study, I observed that e.g. 
doctors were arguing from changing perspectives such as physicians, tax payers or 
employers. 
 
Interferences caused by ‘cultural scripting’ is a further issue to watch out for. Cultural 
scripts are strong discourses prevailing in a particular social system like an organisation 
or a professional group. According to Alvesson there is normative pressure on 
individuals to reproduce stories that have been institutionalized within the system. The 
‘physicians earn little money’ story is symptomatic of a cultural script that is 
relentlessly reproduced by physicians although there is plenty of evidence (e.g. 
Destatis, 2009) that it is not in line with their actual income situation. ‘Moral 
storytelling’ is equally a perturbation to the knowledge-producing interview system. It 
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occurs because interviewees like to give a good impression of themselves. What makes 
a good impression, of course, is a highly relative matter. In organisational context, 
Alvesson points to the key virtues of rationality (efficiency) and morality. Let us stay 
with ‘morality’ and translate it to the simplistic claim of ‘being honest’. Related to 
Goffman’s (1959) concept of impression management, in social interaction it is not so 
much about being honest but rather about presenting oneself as honest. Drug reps’ 
accounts about their striving to inform the physician objectively should thus not enter 
my findings without scrutiny.  
 
Another disturbance may be inflicted on the interview because interviewees are acting 
politically. It entails that subjects are following a certain agenda when confiding 
themselves to the interviewer. For example, accounts may be given with the intent to 
communicate certain issues to management (Parker, 2000). Managers, who by nature 
of their task have to balance a large array of different interests, will almost habitually 
revert to a discourse characterized by political manoeuvring (Jackall, 1988 in Alvesson, 
2003). In my study this effect was indicated by one respondent in management 
function, who (at times) was giving an ostentatiously balanced account of drug 
promotion.  
 
In the process of linguistically constructing an account the respondent risks glossing 
over relevant knowledge. That is because according to some (e.g. Potter & Wetherell, 
1987) language has a forward-oriented purpose. In crafting discourse people want to 
achieve something. However, purpose-orientation has already been covered in terms of 
interviewees ‘acting politically’ and ‘making impressions’. Thus I like to give it a 
different spin, by arguing that at the very least respondents wish to produce 
comprehensible and credible accounts. This is easier said than done, in particular when 
subjects have embarked to deliberate on rather complex matters. Eventually, the 
crafting of a story will be driven by the desire to sound coherent rather than to transfer 
content. Thus in an attempt to ‘bring home’ the story people may cut corners by e.g. 
reverting to catchphrases and scripts.  
 
Last not least, influences may come from the forming powers of discourse. It 
essentially relates to the Foucauldian critical theory perspective which sees discourse 
constituting subjects. From this perspective the respondent is shaped by the situational 
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discourse permeating him. Alvesson states: “It is not the knowing subject but language 
that takes the upper hand” (Alvesson, 2003, p. 23). In other words, during the 
interview, strong discourses are working on the subject to influence his conception of a 
particular theme in an unforeseen way. 
 
Many of the perturbations introduced are somewhat sparked by the presence and 
discursive actions of the interviewer. Alvesson is addressing the concerns of the 
localist perspective but with a different conclusion: to use the cognitions about 
potential perturbations as a means to improve the interviewing as well as the analysis 
of data. Quite practically, it is suggested that the investigator should immediately 
challenge any irritations he notices during the interview. In case of cultural scripting, 
for example, the interviewer may ask the respondent to elaborate on the topic in other 
words, thus forcing him to leave the beaten path. Should this not lead an immediate 
improvement, the interviewer could re-address the issue at a later stage, preferably 
using a different entry-point.  
 
In terms of data analysis, the investigator should be prepared to evaluate material more 
carefully, looking e.g. for situational clues during other parts of the interviews. In my 
view, particular scrutiny should be demanded with those findings that seem to perfectly 
match the researcher ‘a priori’ beliefs. In some cases, re-evaluation of the research 
findings may even trigger a revised approach to the research topic. Thematically, this 
could imply a re-phrasing of the research questions. Methodological, this could mean 
shifting some empirical focus away from the interviews and towards other forms of 
empirical inquiry. Observations, for example, would relieve the field work of its heavy 
relational burden.  
 
 
6.5.3. The interview guide 
 
Building on the discussion in the previous sections I now like to examine the interview 
guide. The interview guide is meant to gently escort the respondents along the lines 
defined by the overall research question. It can be a brief list of memory prompts or – 
like in the actual research case – a more structured list of questions to be asked in 
qualitative interviewing (Bryman 2004). I felt that a pre-set form of guidance is very 
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helpful to deal with e.g. lethargic candidates who provided too little cues for the 
interviewer to proceed from. It was equally helpful to lead back those respondents who 
have wandered way beyond the scope of the research subject. In any case, the interview 
guide has been an organisational but also a psychological support in sometimes odd or 
stressful interview situations. The reassurance provided by the guide also helped to 
flexibly incorporate new routes of stories the respondents went along.   
 
The type of questions asked during the interview largely reflect the typology of 
Charmaz (2002) that distinguishes between initial open-ended questions (e.g. ‘what has 
changed in your working environment?’), intermediate (e.g. ‘how would you describe 
typical drug rep talk?’) and ending questions (e.g. ‘what would you change to improve 
communication with doctors?’).  The three types of questions have appeared across the 
thematic sections of the interview whereby the intermediate type has been employed 
most frequently. Altogether questions were posed to derive different types of data in 
line with Kvale’s (1996) typology namely about values, beliefs, behaviours, roles, 
relationships, places, emotions, encounters, stories.     
 
The interviews were all conducted in German language roughly following a cohort-
specific interview guide (see Appendix 1-3, pp. 231-236). All interviews were 
thematically structured to cover the following areas: 
 
A) Situational background  
The key element of this section is to gain access to respondents’ experiences and 
attitudes regarding their working environment. This introductory part is concerned with 
gaining situational insights before the backdrop of key developments discussed in the 
literature. At one end, it entails reflecting on the notion of physicians’ power and 
autonomy loss. At the other end, it evaluates the strong emphasis on marketing within 
the pharmaceutical industry.  
 
B) Detailing visit 
The second part focuses on the actual drug detailing encounter. Attention is placed on 
obtaining respondents’ views regarding process and contents of the visit as well as on 
the changes experienced over time. This is to gain an understanding of the specific 
situational context of drug detailing in Germany. Crucially, respondents are asked to 
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comment on their motivations, roles and on any role shifts observed over time. Thus 
accounts can be related to existing perspectives on purpose and effects of drug 
detailing as presented in the literature review.  
 
C) Detailing discourse 
In this central section of the interview, subjects are to reflect specifically on the 
discursive practices employed during the detailing encounter, which includes the 
description and evaluation of discourse. This part informs about the construction and 
perception of detailing talk before the background of theories on marketization and 
technologization of discourse presented earlier.  
   
D) Responses to detailing discourse 
The final part of the interview is concerned with the subjects’ behavioural responses to 
the discourse they are experiencing. Factually and dramaturgically this section is 
intertwined with the previous one. It is to gain insight about how drug reps and 
physicians react on presumably marketised discourse, given the negative reactions (by 
physicians) towards detailing confirmed by existing studies. Importantly, this and all 
other sections are to shed light on drug reps’ attitudes and behaviour which have not 
been investigated before. 
 
The interview typically ends with an invitation to bring forward any suggestions for 
communicative improvement in drug detailing. 
 
Table 3 on the next page illustrates how research questions, interview questions and 
themes previously discussed in the literature review are corresponding. For the purpose 
of clarity, the interview questions listed in the table exemplify only core questions 
asked during the interviews. As a matter of course, the open and flexible character of 
qualitative interviewing allowed for a variable set of associated questions that are not 
included in the table. For an overview of additional interview questions put to drug 
reps, physicians and managers please see the respective interview guides in Appendix 
1-3 (pp. 231-236). 
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Table 3:  Integration of research questions, interview questions & literature 
 
Research question 1: Is marketised discourse really happening during drug rep 
vs. physician interaction? 
Interview questions (examples) Corresponding themes discussed in 
literature review 
What have been key changes in your 
work environment over the past 10-20 
years? 
Medical profession to counterbalance 
market economy (e.g. Parsons, 1951; 
Freidson 1994, 2001) 
 
Loss of professional power (e.g. Haug, 
1973; Mc Kinlay & Arches, 1985; Hoff, 
2001, 2003) 
How has the detailing visit changed 
over time? 
Focus on marketing and promotion in 
detailing (e.g. Strang, et al., 1996; Lexchin, 
1997; Greene, 2004; Oldani, 2004) 
Have you noticed any changes in the 
detailing discourse employed? 
Marketization of discourse (e.g. DuGay & 
Salaman, 1992; Fairclough, 1993, 1999, 
2002; Keenoy, et al., 1997) 
Research question 2: If there is marketised discourse, how does it manifest in 
discursive terms? 
Interview questions (examples) Corresponding themes discussed in 
literature review 
How would you describe the discourse 
of drug reps today? 
 
Could you name any typical features of 
that discourse? 
 
 
Technologization of discourse (Fairclough, 
1992, 1994) 
 
Promotion is the general communicative 
function (e.g. Wernick, 1991; Fairclough, 
1993; Oldani, 2004) 
 
Action-orientation of discourse (e.g. 
Oswick & Keenoy, 1997) 
Research question 3: How does such discourse impact the roles and attitudes of 
drug reps and physicians? 
Interview questions (examples) Corresponding themes discussed in 
literature review 
How do you rate this kind of 
discourse? 
 
How do you judge the role of drug 
reps? 
 
Manipulation of physicians (e.g. 
Hemminki, 1977; Avorn, et al., 1982; 
Rohrbacher, 1988; Cleary, 1992; Strang, et 
al., 1996; Steinman, et al., 2006, 2007)  
How is your reaction to these 
discursive practices? 
Distrust in (detailing) discourse (e.g. 
Lagace, et al., 1992; Poirier, 1994; Lexchin, 
1997  Fairclough, 1999) 
 
 
 
 
  
 113
6.5.4. Transcribing the interview data 
 
Transcribing the interviews is not only providing the actual base for analysis but 
equally brings along the chance for a first in-depth analysis. Despite being a tedious, 
lengthy and at times monotonous endeavour it gave me the opportunity to screen the 
data at the single word level. This means paying attention to language as proposed by 
Alvesson & Karreman (2000) in the previous discussion on discourse analysis (see 
section 6.4.3., p. 94). I like to compare the task of transcribing to cleaning a house or a 
car whereby cleaning is always coupled with inspection. Particular attention must be 
paid to avoid transcribing errors which can significantly alter meaning (see Poland, 
1995). Caution does not only refer to a word changing its meaning due to its 
misspelling. Words may also be wrongly referenced to, particularly during lengthy 
expert accounts where the speaker patently assumes the auditor’s equal understanding 
of the subject. For example, at one point I have referenced the term ‘they’ to drug reps 
when later I discovered it could only have meant ‘patients’. It is a borderline case 
though, because it relates to the issue of individual meaning-making. That is not what I 
like to address here. I am not referring to interpretational differences caused by 
differences in meaning construction. Instead I am pointing to the risk of inaccurately 
translating data due to informational shortage. 
 
In terms of when to transcribe I am following Lofland & Lofland (1995) who 
recommend to transcribe at an ongoing basis and not to wait until all interviews have 
been completed. While Lofland & Lofland see it primarily from a motivational aspect, 
Bryman (2004) argues that ongoing transcribing allows the investigator to incorporate 
emerging themes into later interviews. I took advantage of that by including e.g. the 
emerging topic of ‘drug reps’ solidarity with physician’ into the interviews. Likewise, I 
took emphasis away from such themes that showed to be little relevant to the 
respondents. After about 20 interviews I was progressively approaching theoretical 
saturation (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). In this context, theoretical saturation describes the 
point were no new concept or themes emerge from the data. Consequently, in the last 
phase I reverted to transcribing only those parts of the accounts that provided new 
insights to the matter.  
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6.5.5. Sampling of physicians, drug reps and managers 
 
As previously presented, data has been obtained via qualitative interviewing. To begin 
with, I like to illustrate how the interviewees were selected. At the start of each 
sampling process stands the definition of the target population (Wilmot, 2005). In the 
actual case the initial target population have been physicians and drug representatives 
working in Germany. To proceed from the target population to the sample population 
the researcher needs to define what characteristics will have to be reflected in the 
sample to properly address the research question. For the doctor and drug rep 
interviews respondents were recruited to fulfil the aim of the study, namely to obtain 
doctors’ and drug reps’ perspectives on drug detailing. Furthermore, to get doctors’ and 
drug reps’ perception regarding the impact of marketised discursive practices on their 
attitudes, roles and behaviours.  
 
The criteria for sample selection were specified the following way: 
 
Drug Reps: 
• Detailing prescription drugs (ethical drugs) 
• Visiting office-based or hospital physicians in Germany for at least ten years 
 
Physicians: 
• Office-based or hospital physicians in Germany of any speciality 
• Receiving drug reps on a regular basis for at least five years  
 
The above stated sample selection criteria were chosen to recruit doctors and drug reps 
with substantial detailing experience which allowed them to account for contextual 
variety and change. Drug reps must detail prescription drugs and have been exposed to 
marketing-driven strategies in order to be able to reflect on the contrast between 
scientific information and sales promotion as outlined in the literature review.  In other 
words, drug reps have to experience a marketised environment in order to react to it. 
This sample validity test was applied ‘post selection’, namely during the interview 
itself. All candidates showed to have had exposure to marketing-driven strategies. 
Office-based as well as hospital doctors were recruited to ensure contextual variety 
knowing that both types are strongly interacting with drug reps. Given the different 
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work settings of hospital and office-based doctors I presumed the two physician types 
to display different attitudes with regards to drug detailing. Physicians’ previous 
exposure to marketing-driven business conduct was guaranteed by the many different 
drug reps (companies) they were receiving.  
 
Based on the selection criteria I conducted ‘purposive sampling’ (Bryman, 2004). 
Bryman denotes purposive sampling as strategic in kind which has the aim to establish 
maximum correspondence between research questions and sampling. In other words, 
the investigator selects those respondents who are relevant to the research question. 
Purposive sampling stands in contrast to ‘random sampling’, where the selection of 
respondents – from a pre-defined target population – occurs completely by chance 
(Bryman, 2004). The aim of random sampling is to produce a probability sample (one 
that is free from personal bias) from which the investigator can then make inferences 
about the population. A probability sample allows generalizing the findings of the 
research to the population from which the sample was taken.  
 
However, statistical inference is not of concern to the qualitative researcher. The 
qualitative researcher operates inductively in that he aims to generate theories rather 
then to test if an already existing theory can be applied to a certain population. The 
qualitative investigator wants to obtain in-depth understanding of the world as seen 
through the eyes of the people he is studying (Wilmot, 2005). In my research I want to 
derive patterns of meaning-making – i.e. ways in which doctors and drug reps interpret 
commercialization and marketised discourse – out of which I am eventually shaping a 
theory. Whether this theory is representative of e.g. all cardiologists in Germany or all 
drug reps from East Germany is not relevant to the actual research project. However, it 
could very well be subject to a quantitative follow-up study. 
 
Although obtaining representative findings is not the aim of qualitative work, 
researchers nevertheless wish to cover as much variety as possible. Cloke, et al. (2004) 
remark that the qualitative investigator likes to talk to people who are representing a 
wider social group. Importantly, respondents do not ‘represent’ a certain population in 
the statistical sense but “spreading interviews across axes of differences” (Cloke, et al., 
2004, p. 156) allows the researcher to get a broad range of meaning-making right from 
the beginning. Still, Cloke, et al. point out that the investigator must be cautious not to 
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expect respondents to ‘represent’ their category. In chapter section 6.5.6. (p. 117) I will 
present the key features of each sample group, indicating if and how they relate to the 
actual social group characteristics.  
 
In order to obtain a purposive sample the investigator needs a recruiting strategy. In my 
research I reverted to a combination ‘convenience sampling’ (Ferber, 1977; Burns & 
Bush, 2002) and ‘snowball sampling’ (Becker, 1963; Bryman, 2004) to recruit 
respondents. Convenience sampling entails that recruiting of respondents is driven by 
their availability to the investigator. In snowball sampling, according to Bryman, the 
researcher makes initial contact with a few people relevant to the research question and 
then uses these to establish contacts with others (Bryman, 2004, p. 544).  
 
One particularity of my sampling operation was that ‘managers’ only later emerged as 
a target group for empirical investigation. At the outset of the project my focus was set 
on drug reps and physicians alone because I was – wrongly – reducing the phenomenon 
of drug detailing to its immediate actors. With this end in mind, I had recruited four 
pharma managers solely with respect to their former role as drug reps. However, during 
the interviews it became clear that the respondents were mainly answering from a 
management position rather than from a drug rep perspective. This was manifested by a 
strong attitudinal divergence compared to the actual drug reps in the group. In their 
accounts managers were e.g. sketching a very different picture about the role of the 
drug rep. They furthermore proved to have a rather contrasting perception about 
discourse and its employment in detailing. When realising this I chose to expand the 
research scope to include managers’ as a separate group for investigation. I regard this 
step as a significant improvement to empirical quality and theory generation. Yet due 
to managers’ ex post inclusion, active sampling of managers did not really take place 
and consequently there is no sampling strategy to present in this regard. The 
‘managers’ sample is essentially a by-product that turned out to be highly suitable for 
the modified research agenda. However, I would argue that its appropriateness is 
driven by my existing network contacts to relevant managers in the pharmaceutical 
industry. Thus the sample is a by-product yet not a random creation.  
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6.5.6. Interviewee sample characteristics 
 
Empirical data has been collected through conduct of semi-structured interviews with 
ten physicians, ten drug reps and four managers between June 2008 and July 2009. 
Doctors were coming from two hospitals as well as five medical practices in Germany. 
Drug reps and managers interviewed came from three different German pharmaceutical 
companies, two of which are internationally active, while one mid-sized player is 
mainly focussed on the German market. All respondents interviewed had been working 
in the German market for many years. Interviews took place at several locations in 
Germany. The interviews lasted between 18 and 101 minutes with a mean value of 48 
minutes. Interviews with physicians and drug reps had almost equal length (mean value 
of 44 and 45 minutes) while talks with managers lasted significantly longer (63 
minutes). Tables 4, 5 and 6 on the following pages display the key characteristics of the 
respondents. 
 
Physicians 
 
Table 4:  Characteristics of physicians interviewed 
Individual Characteristics Physicians (n=10) 
Male 4 Gender 
Female 6 
30 – 39 3 
40 – 49 6 
50 – 59 0 
Age range 
60+ 1 
Office-based 5 Work Setting 
Hospital 5 
Anaesthesiologist 1 
Dermatologist 1 
Internist 6 
Ophthalmologist 1 
Medical Speciality 
Orthopaedist 1 
Years practicing (mean value)  17.1 
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My physician sample is skewed towards female doctors (60%), which is not correctly 
reflecting the situation in the German market. In Germany only 40% of physicians are 
female. To my reading, the ‘untypical’ gender composition is mainly due to the 
‘snowball’ technique employed for sampling, whereby female doctors proved to be 
more responsive towards invitations to engage in qualitative interviewing. My sample 
is mirroring the actual mean age values in Germany (hospital physicians = 41.0 years; 
office-base physicians = 51.1 years) quite well. In three interview situations, however, I 
found it inappropriate to ask the respondents for their age. In these cases, I had to make 
an educated guess based on the number of years the respondents had reported to have 
spent in medical practice. The even split between hospital and office-based doctors in 
my sample is reflecting the situation in Germany quite precisely. In terms of speciality 
distribution, the sample approximately mirrors the actual balance between the five 
speciality types covered. However, it is slightly skewed towards internists and it is 
understating the share of anaesthesiologists in Germany. Given that my research 
approach does not require samples to be representative, methodologically speaking the 
above mentioned skews are not important. 
 
Drug reps 
 
Table 5:  Characteristics of drug reps interviewed 
Individual Characteristics Drug reps (n=10) 
Male 3 Gender 
Female 7 
30 – 39 1 
40 – 49 3 
50 – 59 6 
Age range 
60+ 0 
Mass Market 3 Target market 
Specialist Market 7 
Company turnover (Euro) 0-99 million  3 
 100-999 million 4 
 1’000+ million 3 
Years experience (mean value)  18.7 
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At approximately 50 years on average (the age of two respondents was estimated) my 
drug rep sample is older than the average drug rep in Germany (45 years). The reason 
for this variance is that by means of purposive sampling I was recruiting candidates 
with long time experience in detailing. This was done to ensure that the candidates 
were able to reflect on the changes in the industry. Acting as a second point of 
reference, the majority of physicians in my study reported that most drug reps visiting 
them are between 40-55 years of age.  In terms of size (turnover) of employing 
company my sample is roughly mirroring the market situation, whereby in absolute 
terms drug rep employment is quite evenly distributed over company sizes. This 
balance is achieved by the fact that a few big companies (Top 10 companies account 
for 35% of market turnover) employ a large number of drug reps. 
 
Managers 
 
Table 6:  Characteristics of mangers interviewed 
Individual Characteristics Managers (n=4) 
Male 4 Gender 
Female 0 
30 – 39 0 
40 – 49 2 
50 – 59 1 
Age range 
60+ 1 
General Manager 1 
National Sales Director 2 
Management function 
Regional Sales Mgr.  1 
Years experience (mean value)  23.5 
 
Managers in my sample showed the highest mean value of work experience of all three 
respondent groups. This is not surprising considering the fact that – in a traditional 
branch like the pharmaceutical industry – experience and long term proof of 
operational success is (still) a critical measure for becoming a senior manager. The 
apparent shortcoming that no female manager was included in the study is strongly due 
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to the fact that with 17.5% the share of female managers in Germany is very low 
(Hoppenstedt, 2008). As such, an all male sample group (given a sample size of just 
four people) it is almost representative again. Unfortunately, no dedicated marketing 
manager could be found to take part in the study. To make up for this weakness, I have 
supplemented the findings in patches with my own experiences as a former national 
and international marketing manager.  
 
 
6.5.7. Respondent coding 
 
All respondents were anonymised to ensure confidentiality. Each respondent was 
assigned a code. The list below (Table 7) is matching code with respondent type on a 
category level only. Further specification of the respondents was avoided to warrant 
anonymity especially for those candidates belonging to the same organisation.  
 
Table 7: Respondent coding 
 
Code Respondent Type Code Respondent Type 
P1 – P5 Hospital physicians D1 – D10 Drug reps 
P6 – P10 Office based physicians 
 
M1 – M4 Managers 
 
  
6.6. Data analysis 
6.6.1. Template analysis 
 
Analysing the data obtained via qualitative interviewing I have decided to employ 
template analysis because this method allows to structure the outcome of individual 
meaning-making in a highly flexible manner. In the following the key facets of 
template analysis will illustrated. 
  
In template analysis, also referred to as thematic coding, the researcher is producing a 
list of codes called the ‘template’ that represent themes that have been identified in 
textual data (King, 2004). A code can be descriptive like ‘standardisation of detailing’ 
or interpretive in nature such as ‘triviality of discourse’. Given the underlying 
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interpretive character that fosters the use of template analysis the majority of codes 
tend to be interpretive (King, 1998). Template analysis is a flexible technique in which 
the researcher is not limited by a precise modus operandi. In that, template analysis can 
be made to measure the researcher’s individual demands. Analysis of text will 
frequently start based on a few ‘a priori’ codes but they will be added to and modified 
during a continuous process of reading and interpreting. It is an iterative process that 
eventually leads to a final construct. I have experienced and realised this conduct 
likewise in my actual data analysis. Based on my ingoing assumptions I initially looked 
for accounts both confirming and describing promotional talk. I was furthermore 
screening the data for signs of physicians’ rejection and frustration with promotional 
discourse practices. Here I found a considerable amount of empirical evidence to carry 
my ‘a priori’ beliefs. Yet at the same time, new themes emerged. I was surprised to 
learn how negative drug reps rate promotional talk. I was amazed to discover that drug 
reps circumvent management’s instructions for promotional talk in order to serve the 
physician according to their own ideas of detailing. I was astonished about the degree 
of empathy and solidarity drug reps showed to have with their physicians. All these 
discoveries lead to new or modified codes which gradually transformed the initial 
template into the final template. 
 
Template analysis has both an analysing but also an organising dimension. The 
template is ultimately to present the themes in a way so that their relationships become 
clear. In most cases the final template will comprise of two or more hierarchical levels. 
A few rather general top level codes are rebased by lower level codes representing a 
finer analytical granulation of the accounts. King notes that most templates fall into the 
two to four level range and warns that “too many levels can be counter-productive to 
the goal of attaining clarity in organizing and interpreting the data” (King, 1998, p. 
120).  
 
Surprisingly, King regards template analysis to be hardly suitable for a discourse 
analyst. He argues that attaching of codes to segments would limit the discourse analyst 
to fully explore the diversities and ambiguities of meaning constructed through 
language (King, 2004). To King template analysis is not producing enough detail to 
meet the requirements of a discourse analytical approach. In my view, King reads 
discourse analysis too narrowly here and I am contesting his position both on 
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conceptual and on operational grounds. From a conceptual point of view, discourse 
analysis can be highly interpretive in kind given that the investigator is focussing on 
context (Phillips & Ravasi, 1998) and his study has a long-range focus (Alvesson & 
Karreman, 2000). These interpretive types of discourse analysis have been presented 
and discussed earlier in section 6.4.3. (p. 94). Against this background and given the 
fact that I am following an interpretative approach I consider template analysis to be an 
appropriate method in my case. This is essentially confirmed by King (1998) when he 
states that template analysis is quite suitable for the interpretative researcher. From an 
operational perspective and my own research experience I like to add that segments to 
which codes are referring to are hardly ever linguistic monoliths. In most cases they are 
a rich source of text and it is up to the researcher whether to make use of it or not.  
 
Template analysis is typically used in qualitative research where the epistemological 
position is interpretative. Yet it can also be applied in a qualitative research endeavours 
that are based on a realist position. In such cases the researcher assumes an objective 
position and aims to ‘discover’ the underlying cause of a particular social action. In 
contrast to that the contextual constructivist looks to understand a particular 
phenomenon but accepts that there are multiple interpretations to be made depending 
on individual perspective and research context (King, 2004). 
 
Altogether, King notes, that template analysis is placed somewhere between content 
analysis and grounded theory. The former is operating with pre-determined codes of 
which their distribution in text can be statistically analysed later. Grounded theory on 
the other hand completely relies on evolution of theory during analysis. The spectrum 
of use of template analysis allows some degree of leeway depending on the 
researcher’s position. To me template analysis is the most suitable method for 
examining my interview data. Using it I can follow a structuring research framework 
without losing interpretative flexibility. In my study, the notion of ‘marketization of 
discourse’ joins up a large array of themes (meanings, feelings, opinions, experiences). 
Reflecting this notion with three very different groups of subjects has produced 
additional variety and altogether a lot of data. Over 300 pages of single spaced text 
have been produced transcribing the audio data. The strong organising properties (i.e. 
level coding) of template analysis made it possible to handle these large amounts of 
interview data and themes in a consolidated yet undistorted manner. By 
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conceptualising and re-arranging the codes and coding system I was given 
interpretative freedom and flexibility. The combination of ‘a priori’ and ‘emerging’ 
codes – e.g. the emerging perspective of managers – allowed me to recognise, find and 
transform themes. Thus it aids to the need for reflexivity in analysis (Alvesson, 2003) 
as discussed earlier in the chapter. 
 
 
6.6.2. ‘A priori’ codes 
 
‘A priori codes’ (King, 2004) are codes or themes that have been developed before the 
data was analysed. These codes essentially go back to the original idea that sparked the 
research project altogether. The view that qualitative research is mainly about 
generating theory and not about testing existing theory does not imply the absence of a 
foundational belief or various assumptions on part of the qualitative investigator. 
Phillips & Pugh (2003) state that all scientific work, be it of experimental or 
exploratory nature, starts with some expectations about the outcome. Given a growing 
marketization of the pharmaceutical industry, I assumed that marketised discourse 
would occur extensively during drug rep vs. physician interaction. Furthermore, I 
believed that promotional discourse practices would lead to a growing communicative 
friction as physicians would ideologically oppose such promotional behaviour. Based 
on these assumptions I approached the data analysis with the following ‘a priori’ codes: 
 
• Marketization of detailing discourse 
• Marketization of medicine 
• Selling 
• Role of physician 
• Role of drug rep  
• Asymmetrical communication between doctors and drug reps  
 
Reading through the transcripts I looked for accounts that matched the above stated 
themes. The a priori codes helped to focus during the initial analysing process, where 
otherwise I would have been overwhelmed by the sheer quantity and diversity of data. 
Soon after the initial data structuring was done the base template became subject to 
modifications. With every re-reading of the interview data and with every new 
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transcript entering the analysis new themes emerged and structural focus changed. The 
template construction particularly changed when amidst the empirical stage I decided 
to include managers’ accounts into the study. After half a dozen revisions the final 
template was crafted. 
 
 
6.6.3. The template  
 
Based on the ‘a priori’ codes I have developed a template over many stages of 
structuring, coding and recoding. Upon detailed inspection the reader will notice that 
most of my ‘a priori’ codes – in an adapted format – have entered the ultimate edition. 
The template (Table 8) displayed on the next page is representing the final version 
emerging from the process of analysing the data. The various level codes shown in the 
template translate into specific concepts, overarching themes and aggregated dimension 
that will be presented and analysed in chapter 7 to follow.  
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Table 8:  Template for analysis 
 
1. Situational Background 
 1. Physicians’ perception of marketization of medical work 
  1. Loss of professional power and autonomy 
   1. Cost control 
   2. Yielding responsibility to non-physicians 
 2. Drug reps’ perception of marketization of drug detailing 
  1. Shifting focus to selling 
  2. Standardisation of detailing 
   
2. Motivations for Drug Detailing 
 1. Driving Sales 
  1. Managers meeting market expectation 
  2. Managers controlling outcomes 
 2. Serving Physicians 
  1. Drug reps providing scientific information 
  2. Drug reps empathising with physicians 
 3. Seeking impartial information 
  1. Physicians seeking impartial information 
    
3. Marketised Discourse 
 1. Management’s instruction 
  1. Simplification of discourse 
  2. Leading the physician 
 2. Drug reps’ translation 
  1. Triviality of discourse 
  2. Embarrassment 
 3. Physicians’ reception 
  1. Value of contribution 
  2. Manipulation 
  3. Being sold to 
  
4. Response to Marketised Discourse  
 1. Drug reps’ transforming marketised discourse 
  1. Sabotaging marketised discourse 
  2. Constructing new discourse 
 2. Physicians avoiding marketised discourse 
  1. Inhibiting marketised discourse 
  2. Escaping from marketised discourse 
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6.7. Summary 
 
In this chapter I have demonstrated that my study rests on a social constructionist 
position which argues that individual meaning-making is constructed through social 
interaction. Language in turn emerges from social interaction or – as Fairclough (1989) 
has put it – language is a form of social practice. I have argued that this linguistically 
based practice can also be referred to as discourse. In other words, discourse is a way 
of constituting social reality. Consequently, by analysing discourse one can obtain 
access to the world of meaning of social actors like drug reps, physicians and 
managers. Further to that end, I have confirmed that my research is about analysing 
discourse about marketised discourse in drug detailing. Against this background I have 
discussed various approaches to analysis of discourse, indicating that the approach I 
have adopted is contextual, interpretative and critical in nature.  
 
Subsequently, I have introduced and discussed qualitative interviewing as my selected 
method of data collection. With regards to interviewing, I have highlighted various 
kinds of disturbances like misinterpretation, cultural scripting or moral storytelling that 
can potentially obstruct the interviewing process. In addition, I have indicated how 
some of these disturbances have affected my interviewing process in reality.  
 
In turn, I have put forward my purposive approach to sampling, displaying the key 
characteristics of the respective samples of drug reps, physicians and managers. I have 
then discussed my approach to analysing the data, demonstrating that template analysis 
is an appropriate method to be employed in my case. It is particularly suitable because 
it combines operational flexibility with firm data structuring properties. I have ended 
this chapter with presenting the final template that has emerged out of several rounds of 
analysing, transforming and structuring the data. The final template will play a key role 
in informing the overall theory model as well as structuring the presentation of findings 
in the results chapter to come.     
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7. Results 
7.1. Introduction 
 
In this part I will report on the findings of my qualitative study examining the impact of 
marketised discourse on drug rep vs. physician interaction. It provides answers to how 
drug reps, their managers and physicians make meaning of the phenomenon of 
discourse in drug detailing. It sheds light on how the protagonists conceptualise 
developments in the healthcare field as much as it shows their attitudes and responses 
to the central issue of marketised discourse. Bringing all this together a model is 
emerging that reflects the impact of marketised discourse in today’s drug detailing in 
Germany. The model explains how marketised discourse produces tension between the 
actors. Centrally, it displays the tensions drug reps are experiencing and producing 
when trying to balance the world of business with the world of medicine. Importantly, I 
have decided to present the model at the beginning of this chapter (p. 128) to provide 
the reader with a crucial point of reference with regards to the detailed findings that 
will follow in turn.   
 
At this stage I also like to revert once more to the different connotation of the term 
‘discourse’ employed in my work. In chapter five I have outlined that I use of 
respondents’ accounts (i.e. discourse) as source for accessing their worlds of meaning. 
Thus discourse as ‘source’ is one connotation of ‘discourse’ in my research work. In a 
second sense, I refer to discourse as an ‘instrument’ employed in drug detailing. In that 
sense, discourse is the way drug reps’ detailing talk is performed, received or 
instructed. Referring to ‘marketised discourse’ or ‘promotional talk’ implies reading 
discourse as an ‘instrument’ of drug detailing. 
 
As indicated I will start this section with the end product in mind, namely with 
presenting the overall framework model (Figure 5, p. 128). Subsequent to this, I will 
decompose the model, laying out the various themes and sub-themes. I will 
demonstrate how and why initial concepts emerging from the empirical data were 
gathered into higher order themes responsible for driving the overall model. 
Ultimately, the various themes will be discussed using illustrative quotes to 
substantiate the argument. As a point of orientation to the reader, I will draw on a key 
data table (Table 9, p. 133) in which my findings have been structured for order and 
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comprehension. Altogether, the mode of presenting and discussing my results has been 
very much inspired by the approach of Corley & Gioia (2004) in their study on identity 
ambiguity.  
  
 
7.2. Conceptualising the impact of marketised discourse – A theory model 
 
To illustrate how marketization of discourse is influencing the drug detailing encounter 
in present day Germany I have compiled a model which is displayed below (Figure 5). 
The model is showing the process of discourse production in detailing in a consolidated 
manner. However, it goes beyond pure process description in that it is presenting new 
findings regarding the impact of discursive practices. 
 
 
 
 
               = Tension / Discrepancy 
 
 
Figure 5:       Discourse in drug detailing model 
 
Instruction Translation Reception 
Management Drug Rep Physician 
Marketise 
discourse 
Transform 
marketised 
discourse 
Avoid 
marketised 
discourse 
Discourse in drug detailing 
Process step 
Actor 
Motivation 
Activation 
Driving sales Serving 
physicians 
Obtaining 
impartial info 
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In the following paragraph I like to briefly explain the model as well as the main 
research outcomes that it reflects: 
  
Discourse in drug detailing is shaped by three actors, namely pharmaceutical company 
management, drug reps and physicians. From a management perspective, the three 
parties are linked together the following way: management, which comes in form of 
marketing, sales and general management, is strategically and tactically determining 
how drugs are marketed versus physicians. This involves deciding which products are 
presented to which doctors with which kind of messages. Management considers drug 
reps to act as transmitters of management’s marketing ideas to physicians. Out in the 
field, drug reps are visiting physicians in order to discursively disseminate the 
marketing brief. Physicians are the key arbiter between pharmaceutical companies and 
the patients. Physicians use pharmaceutical drugs as a key component of medical 
therapy. They therefore need to be informed about the properties of the drugs they are 
prescribing to patients. Physicians turn to representatives of drug companies to obtain 
the relevant information.   
 
The above description illustrates an ideal interaction between the three parties coming 
from a management perspective. Yet my research conveys that the three actors have 
quite distinct motivations with regards to the act of detailing. Management, standing 
for the viability of an economic system in form of a pharmaceutical company, 
ultimately aims to enhance sales and profits. Physicians, on the other hand, enter the 
detailing talks with the aim of receiving impartial information about drugs. Being low 
on time and faced with large amounts of data, physicians value this channel of 
information mainly for its practicality and convenience. Physicians’ interest to engage 
is hence rather pragmatic. According to my findings drug reps primarily see themselves 
as agents to the physician by acting as scientific consultants. Their motivation is to 
serve the informational needs of their doctors.  Their serving ambition has three main 
causes: (1) the traditional role conception of drug reps is still affecting holders of the 
occupation today. In the post war decades, which were characterised by economic 
prosperity, pharmaceutical innovation and national bound economies (in contrast to the 
global economy of today), the role of drug representatives was conceived as being 
scientific consultants to the physician. Pressure to sell hardly existed because direct 
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market competition was relatively low. (2) Predominantly well-trained drug reps seek 
to engage in stimulating and meaningful tasks. As such drug detailing must address the 
intrinsic need of self-actualisation at work. (3) Drug reps’ all day exposure to 
physicians make them highly receptive for doctors’ needs. Altogether, the protagonists 
have dissimilar motives for engaging, whereby drug reps and physicians are clearly 
showing greater commonalities.  
 
The model shows that when activating their distinct motivations by means of 
instruction (management), translation (drug reps) and reception (physicians) the actors 
ultimately arrive at a stage of conflict. Management instructs drug reps to engage in a 
discourse aimed at boosting prescriptions. Such discourse is characterised by letting the 
particular drug stand out positively against competitive products primarily on the 
grounds of informational disfigurement. The primary intention is not to present an 
objective account about the drug’s advantages and disadvantages but to construct a 
convincing argument for doctors to recommend the drug to their patients. By 
strategically employing discourse in this manner, management is urging drug reps to 
use a marketization discourse to spin the physician. Drug reps are trained accordingly 
and provided with prefabricated blocks of promotional talk (catchphrases, key words 
etc.) to use with their physicians.  
 
Management’s instructions run counter to drug reps’ motivation to serve the 
informational interests of physicians. Thus drug reps in my study are facing a conflict 
of interest between their employers’ demands and their customers’ concerns. 
Furthermore, drug reps perceive the rather trivial character of marketised discourse as a 
devaluation of their ideal role as consultants. In their response to this situation drug 
reps are changing and even sabotaging management’s instructions. In the very context 
of detailing, drug reps are not translating discursive targets as directed. They revert to 
selectively employing promotional discourse or reducing it to a bare minimum. They 
said to preferably voice their personal judgment with their customers instead of any 
prefabricated talk. Respondents further revealed that occasionally they would unmask 
or ridicule directions for promotional discourse in front of physicians. Justifying their 
destructive practices drug reps typically pointed to the need of protecting physicians 
from any misinformation.   
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Surprisingly, drug reps’ attempts to protect their customers from marketised discourse 
is hardly recognised and appreciated by physicians in my study. On the contrary, many 
physicians are rather critical of drug rep work stating that it culminates in quite 
superficial and decrying information about drugs. Many pointed to the promotional 
character of the talk which they rate as easy-to-see-through attempts of manipulation. 
The majority of physicians in my study thus see drug reps adding little value to their 
work as medics. Many physicians stated to realise that drug reps are subjected to their 
management’s policy and instructions. This is largely provoking a pitiful disrespect for 
drug reps on part of physicians. It ultimately results in physicians increasingly rejecting 
to engage in detailing encounters.  
 
Drug reps’ behaviour is thus producing a paradoxical outcome. Drug reps disrupt the 
transmission of management’s strategy with the intention to serve physicians yet 
without meeting the requirements of physicians. While detailers in my research vividly 
pointed to the strain of being ‘stuck in between’ they were not aware that their efforts 
towards physicians are not met with appreciation. Overwhelmingly, drug reps are of 
the opinion that their interaction with physicians is symmetrical in that it is largely 
addressing what the physician really wants. So we have a situation where management 
is fostering a discourse that is neither appreciated by drug reps nor by physicians. We 
have drug reps covertly altering this discourse apparently without improving the 
outcome for the physician. What is essentially left is that all three actors fail to achieve 
their objective respectively. Management spends vast resources to develop and mediate 
communicative strategies which are not implemented by drug reps. Instead, drug reps 
are eagerly trying to cushion the marketised discourse they are instructed to employ yet 
nevertheless fail to satisfy physicians’ objective of obtaining relevant and impartial 
information. While drug reps claim not to notice they still pay a high price by 
experiencing a conflict of interests: they constantly have to balance between 
organisational objectives and customer needs. Altogether, the model reflects a 
condition of incompatibility resulting in unproductive action. Marketised discourse as 
devised by management is thus not fostering collaboration between industry and 
profession.     
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7.3. Generating findings 
 
My marketised discourse theory model (Figure 5, p. 128) is summarising the research 
findings on a highly consolidated level. It was placed at the beginning of this chapter to 
brief the reader early on in the process and provide a point of orientation with regards 
to the detailed presentation and discussion to come. The model has made use of key 
themes, each of which have been fed by several underlying concepts emerging from the 
interviews. I will explore these first order concepts explaining why I think they are 
relevant in the first place and why I chose to link them with certain other concepts to 
form overarching themes. In this respect, I will embrace two further themes that have 
not been used in the model due to demands for simplicity and comprehension. These 
themes are concerning the actors’ perceptions of marketization with regards to their 
own professional sphere. As such they represent vital background conditions shaping 
the protagonists’ attitudes with respect to their role in drug detailing. To facilitate my 
presentation and discussion of concepts and themes I have created a data organising 
structure which is shown in Table 9 on the next page. The structure is reflecting the 
final template (Table 8, p. 125) which emerged out of my data analysis. Thus final 
template, theory model, and data presentation structure are related the following way: 
The structure and content of the final template is feeding my theory model. 
Subsequently, the template’s architecture is used to structure my data presentation. As 
such my data presentation strategy is theory driven. Following Chenail (1995) I will lay 
out the data in a way which allows me to progress from one concept to another just as a 
narrator arranges details in order to best relate the particulars of the story. Each concept 
will be supported by one or more illustrative quotes. Adhering to the strategies of 
theory guidance and storytelling, the presentation of findings is always revolving 
around the central research question of ‘What is the impact of marketised discourse on 
drug detailing’.  
 
configurates 
Final Template 
Data Presentation Theory Model  
informs 
drives 
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Table 9:  Data structure 
 
1st Order Concepts 2nd Order Themes Aggregate Dimensions 
• Cost control 
• Doctors yielding 
responsibility to non-
physicians 
Loss of professional power 
& autonomy 
 
  
• Shifting focus to 
selling 
• Standardisation of 
detailing 
Marketization of detailing 
Situational background 
   
• Managers meeting 
market expectations 
• Managers controlling 
outcomes 
Driving sales 
  
• Drug reps providing 
information 
• Drug reps 
empathising with 
physicians 
Serving physicians 
  
• Doctors seeking 
impartial information Seeking impartial 
information 
Motivations 
   
• Simplification 
• Leading the 
physician 
 
Management’s instruction 
  
• Triviality 
• Embarrassment 
 
Drug reps’ translation 
  
• Contribution 
• Manipulation 
• Being sold to 
Physicians’ reception 
 
Marketised discourse 
   
• Sabotaging 
• Constructing new 
discourse 
 
Drug reps transforming 
marketised discourse 
  
• Inhibiting 
• Escaping 
Physicians avoiding 
marketised discourse 
Response to marketised 
discourse 
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7.4. Findings 
7.4.1. Situational background 
 
I begin with participants’ accounts on how they perceive their actual occupational 
sphere. As previously highlighted, the aggregated dimension ‘situational background’ 
was not built into the theory model purely for reasons of model simplification. I like to 
point out that during the interviews respondents were initially asked to comment on 
their actual situation with regards to key changes they have noticed. If the issue of 
marketization was not dealt with, respondents were directly asked if and how 
marketization / commercialisation have influenced their area of work. I will start with 
presenting physicians’ key associations followed by those of drug reps.  
 
 
7.4.1.1. Loss of professional power & autonomy 
 
Loss of professional power & autonomy is an overarching theme that was fed by two 
emerging concepts: ‘cost control’ and ‘yielding responsibility to non-physicians’. ‘Cost 
control’ is the dominant and more widespread concept of the two. The frequency of 
storylines fitting to the matter of cost control altogether indicated its high relevance to 
physicians. As we will see there are different readings of this notion across the sample 
spectrum, namely between office-based and hospital physicians. Still, both subgroups’ 
accounts strongly revolve around this topic. The second concept, ‘yielding 
responsibility to non-physicians’, is of relevance only to office-based physicians. Yet 
within this subgroup it has played such an important role that it could not be 
overlooked.  Each of the two concepts has a connotative dimension of its own. The 
notion of cost control is dealing largely with operational constraints to medical work 
while ‘yielding responsibility to non-physicians’ is interpreted rather emotionally, 
namely as an assault to social order and status. At the same time, both notions are 
intertwined in that cost containment is attributed to bureaucratic measures issued by 
non-physicians. This link is making the two first order concepts to support the higher 
order theme of ‘loss of professional power & autonomy’. Let us now take a closer look 
at the two concepts, starting with the notion of cost control.    
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Cost control 
 
When asked about key changes in medical work subjects first of all pointed to 
increases in cost containment measures. Cost containment in medical work is 
experienced differently by doctors, depending on whether they work in an office-based 
or a hospital setting. I first like to address the perspectives brought forward by office-
based physicians in my study. All but one office-based physician stated that cost 
containment measures are impairing their work as medics. Four out of five office-based 
respondents said that budget controls on medical therapies are reducing the time they 
can afford to spend with the patient. Furthermore, that budget restrictions on drugs are 
producing conflict of interests as the quota must be balanced among the whole set of 
patients without too much compromising the quality of care. One office-based 
physician remarked: 
 
Resources are getting low. We increasingly become administrators of shortages. Yes, 
that is actually the key factor. More and more of my working time or my spare time is 
absorbed with trying to squeak through without too much compromising my own 
demands as a physician.     (P6, Office-based physician) 
 
On first reading I rated this statement as the physician’s inability to deal with 
healthcare provision in a utilitarian fashion. In other words, his struggling to balance 
the normative ideal of unconditional healthcare, associated with an altruistic and 
collectively oriented professional ethos (Parsons 1951, 1963), with the economic 
realities of limited financial resources. However, in the course of the interviews other 
motives came to the fore. Office-based physicians are afraid to lose income or to work 
much harder for the same level of income. Most evidently, however, was their panic to 
be held financially liable for exceeding their individual drug budget. In Germany, the 
efficiency of drug prescription in the system of statutory health insurance is monitored 
by boards of inquiry. A doctor may be liable if the total amount of money spent on 
drugs he prescribed exceeds the cost guidelines. The issue of financial regress is thus a 
rather prominent theme among self-employed physicians. As one physician put it: 
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You really like to do it to the best of your ability and knowledge but you are scared 
away because you fear that you are held liable with your personal assets.   
        (P10, Office-based physician) 
  
This statement brings attention to the fact that office-based doctors essentially are small 
business owners who have to generate income. In Germany, the vast majority of office-
based doctors are relying on the statutory insurance system for income generation. As 
presented in the introductory chapter, approximately 80% of their earnings are 
generated through the system by which the individual physician is balancing accounts 
directly with the Association of Statutory Health Insurance Physicians. For each 
quarter of the year physicians are assigned an individual budget calculated by 
combining average treatment cost rates per professional speciality with the physician’s 
individual treatment and prescription profile of the previous year period. This method 
was issued to increase overall efficiency and to stop physicians to enhance income 
through applying expensive procedures to their patients. Against this background, 
office-based physicians are highly susceptible to any budget decreases as well as to 
sanctioning threats coming from the board of inquiry.  
 
It must be mentioned that these cost control policies also have a legal conflict 
dimension. As by the German social security treatment contract, physicians belonging 
to the statutory insurance system are obliged to apply state of the art medicine to their 
patients. Cost control measures as outlined above can eventually compromise this 
obligation. However, in my study arguments of morale or contractual service 
obligation have been clearly displaced by signs of economic self protection.   
     
Office-based physicians’ attitudes reflect the critique by Freidson (1970, 1986) who 
argued that members of the profession have compromised their collective calling by 
being primarily concerned with securing their own living. This is not to say that 
respondents in my study like to subject their patients’ interest to their personal interest 
of maximising income. None of my subjects gave evidence in this direction. To my 
interpretation physicians rather like to retain a status quo ante in which remuneration 
via the statutory system came generously and largely without any efficiency audit. This 
is referring to a time and condition that previous generations of physicians have 
experienced and that is now progressively vanishing. Yet physicians, either by personal 
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experiences or collective memory, cannot resist orientating themselves at the 
benchmarks of the past thereby sensing a loss in professional standing. This is how the 
issue of cost containment is feeding the overarching theme of loss of professional 
power and autonomy.    
 
Hospital physicians in my study have a different access to the issue of cost 
containment. Before I present their perceptions I like to mention that four out of five 
respondents came from a very large, state-of-the art university hospital. Being one of 
the leading hospitals in Germany it assembles many of the best doctors in the country. 
For years this hospital has been undergoing restructuring programmes to boost 
efficiency and quality.  
 
Five out of five respondents said that they understand the necessity of tighter cost 
controls to the benefit of greater operational efficiencies. They were generally 
supportive of their employers’ position that non-evidence based procedures shall be 
dropped and measures that are just nice to have are to be reduced. In terms of resource 
management two out of five physicians spoke about their obligation to the whole body 
of the insured. In that they clearly took a utilitarian position which I like to reflect by 
the following statement of one physician: 
 
As a physician I am also committed to the general public. If you talk resources you 
must ensure that there is enough left for the treatment of every potential patient. You 
cannot say one particular patient gets everything that is possible without knowing if 
this is financially feasible. I think you have to keep a close eye on this.  
         (P3, Hospital physician) 
 
The respondent further revealed that he developed this perspective along with the 
establishment of a large controlling department in his hospital. Efficiency measures, a 
key element of economisation, thus did not have a deterring effect on the physician. On 
the contrary, it helped to develop a new perspective on the issue of funding healthcare.  
Hospital physicians’ general openness to critical economic evaluation can be explained 
with their ongoing exposure to organisational management. As Hoff found in his study 
with HMO physicians, being part of a large bureaucratic organisation, which is e.g. 
promoting cost efficient patient management to its members, increases the doctor’s 
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likelihood to conform to the organisation’s objectives (Hoff, 2003). A second argument 
is that hospital physicians feel a greater deal of economic protection. Different from 
their self-employed colleagues in private office, they do not bear the commercial 
responsibility of the operation. Instead, hospital physicians are integrated in a system of 
hierarchical control but do not have to worry about making a living. Hence they appear 
to be less threatened by efficiency audits and cost containment measures. This 
interpretation again relates to what Hoff (2001, 2003) found. Hoff discovered that 
physician-employees felt at ease with their situation because they viewed their 
organisation (in Hoff’s 2003 study it was a large HMO organisation) as insulating them 
from the business pressures of the marketplace rather than controlling or deskilling 
them.  
        
Hospital physicians are nevertheless concerned about the potential effects cost control 
may have on patient care. Four out of five respondents explicitly mentioned this issue. 
Different from their office-based colleagues they shed light on the issue from a 
patient’s perspective. That is to say, they did not employ the topic of patient wellbeing 
as a means drawing attention to their own - apparently miserable - position in the 
German healthcare system.  Instead, they seem to have an intuitive interest in what cost 
control could ultimately lead to with regards to their patients. Yet I could not refrain 
from noticing that despite all their voicing of concern the issue was dealt with on a 
rather theoretical level. Respondents talked about critical compromises to patient care 
more in terms of an eventuality in the distant future rather than as an immediate threat. 
Storylines like ‘we have to mind the cost but if it is really needed we do everything’ 
(P4, Hospital physician) were typical of their rather unagitated approach to the issue. 
To my reading, this perspective is clearly influenced by the structural particularities of 
the hospital four out of five of my respondents were coming from. The very hospital is 
a leading institution which is sufficiently supported to operate at the highest standard. 
Compromises to patient care are probably not occurring at any significant level.   
 
In summary, hospital doctors in my study experience cost control as a necessary step 
which they do not believe is putting their patients at any immediate risk. Furthermore, 
none of my respondents indicated that cost containment measures would deprive them 
of their professional autonomy and power. At first glance this is a surprising outcome. 
Yet on closer inspection it seems a quite understandable reaction. All hospital 
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physicians in my study have spent their careers in a large organisational setting. As a 
matter of size and function, hospitals operate by means of rationalised division of 
medical labour. No single physician holds or has ever held holistic control over his 
work. Pointing to the theory of McKinlay and Arches (1985) hospital work is 
essentially organised in an industrial fashion. As with large industrial organisations the 
personal element is minimised to avoid individualistic – at times esoteric – decision-
making. Preferably, decision-making happens via pre-existent set of rules. Physicians 
who grew up in a hospital environment naturally take less issue with rules and 
procedures influencing their medical work. This is how I make sense of my hospital 
physicians’ laid-back reaction to cost control measures. 
 
To summarise the key findings with regards to cost control: cost control is a major 
topic for all physicians in my research. While it is of great relevance to all of them, it is 
judged very differently between office-based doctors and those working in a hospital. 
Office-based doctors conceive cost control primarily as a threat to their economic 
fundament which in turn is seen to impair their power and autonomy as physicians. 
Hence, office-based physicians in my study are very critical of efficiency audits and 
cost containment measures. By contrast hospital doctors generally approve of cost 
reduction programmes to the benefit of a more efficient and more just allocation of 
resources. Hospital doctors are more concerned that cost containment could eventually 
compromise their patients’ health, yet they see it as a rather distant threat.                 
 
 
Yielding responsibility to non-physicians 
 
‘Yielding responsibility to non-physicians’ is the other strong concept that emerged out 
of the data. As mentioned at the beginning, this concept is limited to the subgroup of 
office-based physicians. Within this group, however, it has a very emotional character, 
that is to say it is not rational grounded but is largely dealt with on the emotional level.  
 
All five office-based physicians in my study were self-employed and did not have to 
subject themselves to a supervisor or managed care organisation. All five subjects 
nevertheless felt non-autonomous in their work as medics. Four out of five physicians 
were agitated about the fact that they are patronised by non-physicians. Thematically it 
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is about politicians and representatives of health insurances increasingly determining 
their treatment and prescription schedule. I have discussed the issue with regards to 
cost control in the previous paragraph. However, I have found that the question of 
autonomy has just another context to it. Office-based physicians in my study were 
particularly disturbed by the fact that control was exercised by people coming from 
outside the medical profession. Typically these people were referred to as ‘bureaucrats’ 
or ‘economists’. Interestingly, physicians in their critique only marginally addressed 
the actual policies these people are responsible for. Instead doctors were simply vexed 
about being ordered certain terms by a non-physician. In their reaction physicians 
showed a high degree of sulkiness:         
 
Then let these paper pushers prescribe drugs to the people…this is not my idea of 
being a physician. As a doctor I decide what is good for you. And I prescribe the 
drug for you. […]. And now they are telling me what I should prescribe. This cannot 
be. For a doctor this is hardly acceptable.        (P8, Office-based physician) 
 
This relates to the findings of Warren et al. (1998) who suggested that the strongest 
challenges to physician satisfaction came from doctors having to yield their clinical 
judgement to non-physicians. Furthermore, sentiments of resistance to outside control 
are mostly strong among self-employed physicians as presented in Hoff’s study on 
physician adaptation (Hoff, 2003). These findings appear plausible particularly if the 
office-based physician has been working in a self-employed setting over many years. 
In my study aversion to outside control was remarkably stronger among those three 
subjects who had been in own office for a long period of time. The other two 
respondents, who had been self-employed for less than ten years showed a lesser 
degree of cynicism with regards to outside control by non-physicians.  
 
Three office-based physicians painted a very gloomy picture with regards to their 
professional autonomy. One subject was expressing her fears that control by non-
physicians will further increase in the future. She predicted that eventually the 
physician in his own private practice will vanish completely. Instead, physicians will 
be forced into large interdisciplinary constructs run and controlled by non-physician 
managers. The topic of interdisciplinary work settings was assessed rather 
contradictory by the respondent. At one point during the interview the physician spoke 
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very positively about the effects an interdisciplinary setting would have on patient care. 
She also emphasised the benefits of sharing expensive medical equipment among many 
doctors. Yet, at a different stage she criticised the same model quite heavily simply on 
grounds that control would rest with non-physician managers: 
 
The way this is organised…and politically intended…namely to set up some sort of 
ambulatory healthcare centres, not run by physicians, where we simply are 
instruments... to me is no alternative to professional freelancing. Although there is 
already little professional freedom left I would still not let me force into that. Only if 
there is no other way forward.           (P6, Office-based physician)  
 
To my interpretation this statement is indicative of a deeply rooted, ideological 
motivated, resistance to subject oneself to the primacy of capital represented by 
business management. In that the respondent’s stance is essentially mirroring the 
analysis of Freidson (1994). Freidson argued that despite all changes in physicians’ 
work environment the physician remains the authoritative spokesman of his body of 
knowledge and skill. Furthermore, the medical profession must keep an administrative 
or supervisory monopoly over the operational conduct of medicine. Non-physicians, 
according to Freidson, aid to this process through e.g. developing and operating 
instruments of information management. However, they are not controlling the medical 
work itself. Physicians in my study are clearly adhering to this ideal position, maybe 
only because they are experiencing a rather different scenario in reality. This would 
explain why their reactions are highly defensive and emotionally charged, showing 
comparably limited rational critique. 
 
 
7.4.1.2. Marketization of detailing 
 
In terms of situational developments at the company end the outstanding theme was 
‘marketization of detailing’. This overarching theme was carried by two first order 
concepts of ‘shifting focus to selling’ as well as ‘standardisation’. Storylines feeding 
these two concepts were numerously produced in every interview of drug reps. As with 
physicians’ assessment of their occupational situation, each of the two base concepts 
has a connotative dimension of its own yet the two notions are also interlinked. In 
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short, marketization of detailing is understood as moving from scientific consulting to 
upfront selling by means of regimenting the act of detailing. I will begin with 
presenting drug reps’ perceptions on the notion of a shifting focus to selling. 
 
 
Shifting focus to selling 
 
When asked about the main changes in drug rep work all drug reps in my study pointed 
to the strong emphasis on selling in drug detailing. Interviewees expressed that over the 
past 10 to 15 years their work as drug reps has fundamentally changed. Previously, 
drug detailing was mainly about providing scientific product details to the doctor. 
Today, respondents report that detailing is largely about openly selling the product. 
This does not mean that before drug reps had not been aware of their companies 
ultimately wanting them to promote drugs. However, as one respondent described it, 
the approach taken in the old days was rather indirect, namely by inducing scripts 
through scientific consultation. Relationships with doctors were gradually developed 
and cultivated over many years. In most detailing talks the topic of promotion was 
never even touched but only implied. If the encounter went well it was a tacit consent 
that the physician would ‘do something’ for the drug rep in terms of prescribing or 
recommending his products. Yet the physician’s support remained tentative altogether. 
Respondents explained that in the past doctors have been infuriated by any attempts to 
pressure them into prescribing. Three drug reps reported about being severely 
reprimanded by their physicians when putting only the slightest promotional pressure 
on them. Doctors’ harsh rejection, one respondent conveyed, was cushioned by the fact 
that management was exerting comparatively little pressure in terms of sales targets. 
Against this background, drug reps could lose themselves in the role of a technical 
advisor carefully nursing his customer. Reflecting the situation of 10 to 15 years ago, 
eight out of ten respondents said that they conceived themselves as ‘consultants’ rather 
than ‘salesmen’.  Yet the same respondents admitted that today this self-conception is 
no longer sustainable.  
 
I think the biggest change has been that when I started the drug rep’s self-
conception was such that he was there to inform the doctor. The selling aspect, in the 
sense that I also try to convince the doctor to prescribe my product, was almost seen 
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a little sleazy and disreputable. For this reason one’s self-conception was more like: 
it is my job to inform the doctor about our product. And in the course of time it 
changed more and more towards sales and volume generation. The change was 
manifested when the field force was beginning to receive special trainings in selling 
and sales psychology […]. If before you had the sense of being a scientific advisor to 
the doctor and then suddenly the selling aspect took over…to many of us that was 
embarrassing.     (D1, Drug rep) 
 
In their reflections about the underlying causes of this development drug reps vary 
considerably in quality. Four out of ten respondents remained at a very general level, 
pointing to phenomena like ‘growing commerce’ or ‘changes in the market’. 
Essentially this group was treating the underlying reasons as a black box, broadly 
labelling it ‘marketization’. Preferably, they were criticising the effects of 
marketization rather than penetrating the grounds for it. The most common criticism in 
this respect was that of having to subject service to sales pressure. To my 
interpretation, respondents’ superficiality is not rooted in their inability to grasp the 
issue but in their unwillingness to deal with a matter which they actually despise. These 
respondents see themselves as casualties of the business world rather than as 
protagonists in it. The other drug reps in the group were pointing to selective events 
and developments for causes. While none of the respondents produced a coherent 
explanation of why focus has shifted to selling this group after all displayed a much 
greater willingness to explore the underlying causes. Typical explanations given were 
growing market competition, low product innovation, and rising shareholder 
expectations. 
 
Regardless of their level of adherence to the notion of commerce, all drug reps in my 
study disapproved of the strong shift towards selling. All respondents said that growing 
sales focus makes it impossible for them to competently serve the physician. The topic 
of serving the physician will be intensively discussed at a later stage as it appeared to 
be the key motivator for drug reps engaging in detailing. I will now present the second 
concept carrying marketization in the drug reps’ mind, namely standardisation of 
detailing. 
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Standardisation of detailing 
 
The majority (7) of respondents mentioned that strong focus on selling is accompanied 
by standardisation of drug rep work. The concept of standardisation is interpreted as 
uniformity in terms of content delivery as well as loss of operational freedom. This 
situational account confirms Greene’s (2004) disbelief in the notion of the drug rep 
being a sovereign actor. However, six out of ten drug reps emphasised that previously 
they were given considerable freedom to manage their own set of customers. All of 
them were largely left to decide which doctors to visit at which frequency. One 
respondent spoke about drug reps being granted the status of ‘small entrepreneurs’ 
within the organisation. As such they were able to adjust to the individual needs of the 
single doctor. The respondent affirmed that this was not only aiding the quality of 
service but altogether putting the drug rep in a position of controlling his own work 
process. Three subjects voiced that freedom to operate had been a prerequisite for them 
choosing a sales job in the first place. In that they pointed to the high salience of this 
condition within the set of needs of drug reps in general. Today, respondents said to 
experience a situation where customer management is centrally geared, resulting in 
firm instructions given by sales and marketing management regarding customer 
targeting and call frequency. 
 
While interviewees expressed their frustration about losing control over tour planning, 
they were even more agitated about another kind of imposition. Drug reps in my study 
were particularly stirred up by the forced standardisation of their discourse with the 
physician. Many confirmed that they are no longer left to decide how to converse with 
the individual physician. During the interviews seven out of ten respondents 
emphasised that they are always given firm instructions by marketing to bring across 
mostly brand related catchphrases and storylines. Two respondents explained that the 
typical script is essentially following the brand’s marketing positioning statement 
which includes key product advantage, target indication and preferred patient group. 
Furthermore, that this statement is required to be repeated over many visits until it is 
firmly embedded in the physicians’ long-term memory. These discursive provisions are 
met with particular frustration on part of drug reps and are provoking rather cynical 
responses. The following quote is a characteristic account:        
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Actually the drug rep has moved away from individual consulting to becoming an 
accessory to marketing management. I once said it is like being marketing’s talking 
parrot. […]You have firm instructions by marketing and you have to get them across 
– accident-free – via ten memorised catchphrases.     (D8, Drug rep)  
 
Aims by management to regulate and standardise talk is judged as jeopardizing the 
drug rep’s personal relationship with the doctor. One respondent remarked that entering 
the talk in a totally designated manner would not only offend the physician but also 
impair the drug rep’s ability to pick up critical signals sent by his customer. In this 
respect all drug reps were of the opinion that success in drug detailing is essentially 
dependent on the personal relationship with the physician. In that all respondents 
showed to adhere to the traditional approach of detailing whereby scripts were induced 
indirectly. We have already learned in the previous paragraph when drug reps spoke 
about the focus on selling that this position is no longer supported by management. As 
we will see in the process of this presentation, this is to become the key conflict issue. 
 
Already during the early parts of the interviews it became clear that drug reps are very 
critical of the developments affecting their occupation. Standardisation of detailing 
again is a key cause for this critique. Respondents are irritated by the fact that their 
work is subjected to extreme scrutiny and homogenisation. According to my 
observation, this is devaluating the occupation in the drug rep’s perception. Equally 
important, however, becomes the fact that drug reps fear the loss of what they regard as 
the critical success factor of detailing, namely relationship-building with the doctor.     
 
 
7.4.2. Motivations 
 
My research shows that discourse in drug detailing is carried by different motivations. 
The three players involved – namely management, drug reps and physicians – engage 
in discourse to achieve quite distinct goals. Their ideas and perceptions have been 
collected under the aggregate dimension of ‘motivations’. Motivations are critically 
stimulating the discursive process in drug detailing. Sometimes, as in the case of drug 
reps, motivations stand in contradiction to the assigned function. In the following 
section, I will present how the three groups conceptualise their respective ambitions 
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with regards to discourse in drug detailing. Storylines picked up from the respondents 
have been assembled to form three main themes. I have found the key theme for 
managers to be ‘driving sales’. Among the group of drug rep respondents the 
overarching theme of ‘serving the physician’ emerged. At the other end, accounts by 
physicians led to the collective theme of ‘obtaining impartial information’. The fact 
that I have structured motivations by type of actor is once more showing that my data 
presentation is theory guided. Based on my findings I have built a model (Figure 5, p. 
128) that reflects how I believe discourse is impacted by the diverging motivations of 
the three actors. According to my theory motivations differ by actor. Naturally, 
motivations are never homogenously represented among a social cohort and I am fully 
aware of it. For example, drug reps in my study have also shown to be motivated by the 
prospect of augmenting sales. However, amongst my group of respondents this feeling 
was clearly overlaid by their wish to be of service to the physician. A reliable measure 
in this respect was the frequency and intensity of respondents dealing with a particular 
theme or concept. While assigning a set of motivations to a particular group is probably 
a simplification it is nevertheless for the most part reflecting the attitudes and feelings 
of that group.  I will begin with presenting the overriding theme of ‘driving sales’. 
 
 
7.4.2.1. Driving sales 
 
Accounts supporting the theme ‘driving sales’ came from a small group of four pharma 
managers. The sample consisted of one general manager, two national sales directors 
and one regional sales manager. I took the decision to include direct accounts by these 
managers rather late during the field work. Initially, I had planned to focus on drugs 
reps and physicians alone as they are the immediate actors involved in drug detailing. 
Therefore, I had recruited the four managers solely with respect to their former role as 
drug reps. During the interviews, however, it became clear that the respondents were 
mainly answering from a management position rather than from a drug rep perspective. 
In essence, they were reading drug detailing as sales promotion in line with 
Hemminki’s (1977) notion of the task. When realizing this I chose to expand the 
research scope to include managers’ perspectives instead of just relying on drug reps’ 
interpretations of management’s attitude and behaviour. I regard this step as a 
significant improvement to empirical quality and theory generation. The reader might 
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still have doubts to whether a former drug rep can credibly represent management 
because the respondent might be clinging to his drug rep perspective. I may dissipate 
these doubts by arguing – based on personal experiences and industry HR sources – 
that many managers in pharmaceutical firms started out as drug reps. Especially for 
those in senior marketing and sales management roles this is a typical and 
institutionally wished-for career start. To my conclusion, having a drug rep biography 
can thus be regarded as characteristic of pharma managers in Germany.  
 
The overriding theme ‘driving sales’ is supported by two concepts that emerged out of 
the interview data.  One concept is ‘meeting market expectations’ the other is 
‘controlling’. Clearly, the two concepts are interlinked in that expectations are met 
through controlling and optimising the resources available.  Yet both concepts also 
possess an individual subtext. ‘Meeting market expectations’ is outside driven and as 
such largely dealt with in a reactive mode. ‘Controlling’, on the other hand, is more 
referring to an intrinsic need, namely the fascination to have power over processes and 
people. In terms of drug detailing it entails the attraction to optimise the sales call and 
lead the physician. I will start with presenting managers’ views regarding the concept 
‘meeting market expectations’. 
 
 
Meeting market expectations 
 
Three out of four managers emphasised that the pharmaceutical industry is used to 
earning profit margins way above those of other industries. This fact by itself seemed 
to fill the respondents with pride. At the same time, all three interviewed regarded the 
industry’s high achievements of the past as a major burden. Two managers spoke about 
their immense difficulties to hold the standards before the background of empty 
product pipelines, generic competition and reimbursement restrictions. To their 
perception the business has become much more finance driven and rigorous. Yet 
respondents made it clear that there is no way out of this other than finding new options 
for growth and efficiency gains.  
 
Due to its high profits over the past 40 years the industry faces new challenges to 
meet these margin expectations in the future. And that is why every cog in the wheel 
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- in the area of sales and marketing - that is able to hold or enhance profits and 
efficiencies is put in motion.     (M2, National Sales Director) 
 
From the seriousness and determination by which they presented their cases I got the 
impression that they were actually pleased by being given such a challenge. While this 
might be a misconception or exaggeration on my part, it was obvious that these 
managers perceived their task as a high-end venture. Interviewees used the term ‘high 
pressure’ very often when describing their challenges. One respondent pointed to the 
international capital markets causing these high pressures by raising expectations 
which they as managers have to meet. He thereby conveyed the impression that global 
market expectations are rather motivating him.  Claims by respondents to accept and to 
withstand the market pressures, to a large degree are caused by cultural scripting. As by 
my own experience as a pharma manager, portraying the market forces as ‘inevitable’ 
is typical for keeping managers in line, motivating them to do the extra effort. Simply 
put, the discourse is suggesting that the global market economy is demanding 
permanent growth, total flexibility and self-reliance to which one can either adapt to or 
otherwise one will be marginalised. This discourse is not only coming from top 
management in the pharmaceutical industry but is produced and reproduced 
everywhere within the business community. As per DuGay (1991) it has even spread to 
the whole of Western societies paving the way for the self-interested ideology of neo 
liberalism. It seems impossible that managers who are permanently exposed to this 
cultural script do not pattern themselves on it. This was clearly the case with my 
respondents who prima facie were embracing the notion of marketization. While 
acknowledging that there are many hardships on the way – for example one manager 
conveyed that certain drug reps are not able to stand the pressure and (have to) leave – 
respondents still claim to support the overall idea.  
 
Yet in the course of the interview two managers said that from their ‘private’ point of 
view they would have a different opinion on the subject. One manager revealed:      
 
I believe the basic idea of wanting to combine medicine with business is conceptually 
wrong. Because the temptations and opportunities that the system offers to those who 
are clever ultimately reduces the patient to a commercialised object.  
        (M2, National Sales Director) 
  
 149
 
This statement signifies that managers’ stories about marketization are largely inspired 
by cultural scripting. The very fact that two respondents in my study said to have a 
professional as well as a private stance on the issue is further indicative of this. Yet in 
terms of the leverage managers have on discourse it is only relevant what stimulates 
respondents in their role as professionals. In my study respondents were clear that they 
would transmit the expectations of sales and profit growth for the benefit of 
organisational viability. As such they were motivated by the growth beliefs of the 
market economy.  
 
 
Controlling       
 
The concept of ‘controlling’ reflects interviewees’ interest to direct processes, contents 
and people with the aim to augment commercial performance. While controlling is a 
prerequisite for meeting growth expectations, it was also conceived as fascinating in its 
own right. Therefore, discursive strategies could be equally driven by managers’ 
immersion to control and optimise the detailing encounter. Supporting this position, 
one manager explained that they try to reduce the intangible part in the detailing 
encounter as much as possible. He thereby referred to those drug reps who manage 
their physicians by means of individual esoteric skill, i.e. purely on the relationship 
level. Although this approach may bring commercial success it is nevertheless 
unwanted because it is neither replicable nor predictable on a large scale. By contrast, 
if a drug is marketed on the message level – whereby contents are highly standardised 
– it gives the company much greater control over the process of generating 
prescriptions. Ideally, the respondent explained, the drug rep should act on the 
physician strictly within the framework of preset messages. Individual relationship 
skills shall only be employed to get the physician’s attention in the first place. 
 
Another manager spoke a lot about professionalizing the detailing, which to him meant 
developing processes for further efficiency enhancement, quantification and 
benchmarking. He conveyed that he himself is rigorously measured by the rate of 
process innovation, implementation and yield. While this to him is tough and 
demanding he nevertheless is fascinated by pushing things further. 
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I see myself as a sales professional and I enjoy professionalizing things…focussing 
things, enhancing efficiencies...that’s really for me. I love these processes. I am 
mainly paid for controlling these things.   (M2, National Sales Director)  
  
This statement reveals how relevant it has become for drug companies to closely steer 
and monitor their marketing and sales efforts. Control is particularly relevant for 
companies with large institutional investors behind them. Based on my personal 
experience of working in pharma corporations, predictability of results has become as 
important as the result itself. If the company achieves its sales and profit targets 
precisely in line with the forecast it is demonstrating to its investors that it is in control 
of the business. Failing to do so – even in the case of exceeding targets – will raise 
doubts whether management is in control of things. This brings along another type of 
manager who is increasingly rewarded and thus motivated by the level of sales control 
he provides the organisation with. Unsurprisingly, managers’ growing focus on control 
will affect the way drug detailing is imagined to be executed. As detailing is largely a 
discursive event it will impact the way discourse is practised on part of the drug rep.    
      
 
7.4.2.2. Serving the physician 
 
In terms of motivation, serving the physician is the overarching theme from the drug 
reps’ perspective. The theme is fed by two underlying concepts that emerged out of the 
interview data. One concept is assembling all storylines about ‘providing information’ 
to physicians. This is mainly about being a technical or scientific advisor to the doctor. 
The second concept gathers all accounts dealing with ‘empathising with physicians’. It 
includes drug reps’ notion of understanding and identifying with physicians and their 
current situation. Furthermore, it refers to stories dealing with advocating physicians 
interests’. It contains drug reps’ ideas about how and why the physician needs to be 
backed, in particular with respect to defending him against certain company interests. I 
begin with presenting drug reps’ views regarding ‘providing information’. 
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Providing information 
 
Ten out of ten drug reps in my study said that informing the physician is to them the 
key reason for drug detailing. Informing is mainly understood as providing technical 
and scientific information about the drug and its associated clinical indication. In recent 
years, technical information about health economic issues such as drug reimbursement 
policies has been added. For the majority of respondents, information supply is ideally 
determined by doctor’s knowledge demands. Six out of ten drug reps’ see themselves 
as responding to what is really needed. Only if they have ‘something new’ or ‘value 
adding’ to offer they like to switch into an inserting mode. The subsequent quote is 
illustrative of a number of identical comments. 
 
I see myself as a service provider to the physician, one that brings the essential 
information to him…as fast as possible. […] To do whatever makes life easier for 
him, that’s how I see my role as a drug rep…to make life easier for the physician. 
But not trying to enlighten him with banalities.    (D3, Drug rep) 
 
The statement is signifying the respondent’s somewhat agenda-free service attitude. 
This approach to detailing stands in contrast to many perspectives voiced in the 
literature. By not leading the talk and not actively promoting his products the drug rep 
is essentially foregoing the central objective of drug detailing (Hemminki, 1977; 
Rohrbacher, 1988; Greene, 2004; Oldani, 2004). Agenda-free service behaviour thus 
runs counter to the ultimate organisational goal of working the doctor in order to drive 
prescriptions. 
 
Respondents in my study are not ignorant of the sales promotional effect of drug 
detailing. Yet they all see it as a consequence not as the purpose of detailing. Many 
drug reps conceived drug sales essentially as a by-product of advising the physician. 
Informing and serving the physician is regarded to be the actual purpose of detailing. 
Further to that end, three respondents pointed to the high level informational demands 
on part of physicians that in turn would require a sophisticated address on part of the 
drug rep. Providing scientific information on a high level was thus conceived as an 
indicator of occupational importance. During the interviews the three respondents used 
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the argument of providing scientific information to differentiate themselves from a 
salesman. One of the respondents defiantly ascertained:        
 
I am a consultant…not a salesman…a consultant! I pass on scientific information.  
          (D2, Drug rep) 
 
However, despite such poignant illustration of defending one’s occupational territory, 
the majority of respondents conceded that the actual situation in the field is not 
reflecting their conception of drug detailing. In this respect, interviewees pointed to 
trivial informational contents that they are supposed to pass on to the physician. 
Furthermore, they said that they were obliged to press and lead the physician rather 
than respond to him. These issues will be discussed in context of ‘marketised 
discourse’ later on in the document. From a motivational perspective, drug reps in my 
study were interpreting detailing as a customer driven informational service. Advising 
and informing were thereby seen as a key source of occupational inspiration. In that, 
drug reps in my study were consciously idealising their occupation against the harsh 
realities characterised by increasingly uniform and self-interested demands on drug 
selling. 
 
 
Empathising with physicians 
 
At first glance, the concept ‘empathising with physicians’ seems to be rather a 
description of an emotional condition rather than supporting the overarching 
motivational theme of ‘serving the physician’. Yet drug reps’ stories about how much 
they feel for physicians entail the desire to do something for physicians. As such their 
stories have a motivational dimension and are also inducing accounts regarding 
advocating physicians’ interests. 
 
Nine out of ten drug reps interviewed expressed their empathy for the difficult situation 
the physician is in. Difficulties were perceived to come from two directions, namely 
government induced bureaucratic cost control and discursive manipulation by the drug 
industry. Regarding the first cause, respondents saw physicians unduly curtailed by 
governmental cost containment and efficiency programmes. Four out of ten detailers 
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interviewed pointed to office-based physicians facing near bankruptcy or gave similar 
accounts of doctors who are experiencing financial hardship. One respondent expressed 
such a high degree of empathy with her physicians that she reported to have advised 
one of her doctors to act against the maxim of treating patients equally: 
 
Drug rep: Then I said: Start cancelling out statutory insured patients…move them to 
the back! You have to do it! What’s it good to your patients if you are not around any 
more…because you are financially broke in the end. 
 
Interviewer: So you are promoting in fact a two class medicine? 
  
Drug rep: (Speaking in an agitated voice)…well, but the patient also has to 
understand that the physician is in a quandary and that it’s also no good to the 
patient if his beloved doctor is not around any more. It’s no good to him either. You 
see, they (physicians) have to pay their staff; they have to pay off their 
practices…and all the running cost…electricity and so on. In fact, they cannot do it 
any more!          (D7, Drug rep) 
     
The emotional involvement and support by respondents is striking, in particular 
because drug reps’ stories and empathy levels do not reflect physicians’ actual income 
situation. According to the German Federal Bureau of Statistics (Destatis, 2009b) the 
average income of office-based physicians (self-employed) was Euro 142’000 per year 
in 2007. This is three and a half times the average income in Germany and two and a 
half times the average gross salary of detailers. Against this background, voicing 
empathy with physicians’ economic situation is indicative of drug reps’ high 
identification and somewhat naive solidarity with the medical profession. 
 
To explain this behaviour one has to turn to the discursive strategies of the medical 
profession’s representatives. For many years talk about low physician remuneration or 
tales about financial bankruptcy are symptomatic of strategic discourse disseminated 
through the German media by representatives of the professional associations. 
Subsequently the talk has been taken over by a large share of practicing physicians. 
According to Lauterbach (2009), one of the leading health economists in Germany, this 
discourse has been constructed and dispersed to strengthen the representatives’ 
  
 154
bargaining position versus government in their demand for higher budgets. As shown 
beforehand the grim picture painted by lobbyists is not at all reflecting the actual 
income levels of physicians in Germany. Nevertheless, as shown by the interview data, 
this discourse has been successfully adopted by detailers. Following Alvesson & 
Karreman’s (2000) theory this particular discourse has a ‘muscular’ character. To my 
interpretation this is indicative of drug reps’ emotional and ideological proximity to 
physicians and their worlds of meaning. This is likely to be caused by detailers’ 
ongoing exposure to the world of medicine. The quotation below is characteristic of the 
respondents’ sentiments expressed during the interviews. 
 
 We love our physicians. They are our family. We spend the majority of our lives with 
them…          (D1, Drug rep) 
 
With respect to restructuring studies on physicians becoming managers (Freidson, 
1994; Hoff 2001, 2003) exposure time was found to be a critical factor for individuals’ 
ideological adaptation to a contrastive work context. Although the particular studies 
were investigating a cognitive move in the opposite direction (i.e. from the world of 
medicine to the world of business) the findings can nevertheless be used to interpret the 
phenomenon of detailers’ closeness to physicians. 
 
The other cause of empathy with doctors’ is concerning the discursive manipulation of 
physicians by the industry. Eight out of ten drug reps pity physicians for being exposed 
to promotional discourse which places them in a position of informational uncertainty. 
Respondents pointed to the fact that in their drug treatment decisions physicians are 
largely dependent on outside information. Yet according to one interviewee, doctors 
cannot be certain that the information they are getting is objective and correct. Further 
to that end, the respondent stressed that even at medical congresses physicians cannot 
be sure to receive an honest evaluation of drugs because most speakers are industry 
sponsored. On a different note, six respondents were very critical of the high pressures 
that are exerted on physicians by drug companies. Drug reps spoke mostly from a long 
range perspective, referring to the ‘industry’ rather than to themselves as 
representatives. Still, interviewees were not denying their personal share in the matter. 
As one drug rep stated: 
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I often really feel sorry for them. I think they sometimes just don’t know where they 
actually stand and they just don’t have the time to thoroughly inform themselves. 
Actually, we should be partners who are informing them…but they cannot always 
rely on us anymore. […] You have to win them over, you have to convince them of 
your product…and often they just have enough of it. I sympathise with them. That’s 
how it is.          (D5, Drug rep) 
 
While the above account is illustrating drug reps’ empathy with doctors it is equally 
signifying that drug reps are not able to stick to their ideal role as disinterested advisors 
any longer. Yet by employing terms like ‘you have to’ they are indicating that this is 
happening against their conviction.  
 
Altogether, I found the concept of ‘empathising with physicians’ to be a major 
determinant of drug reps engagement in detailing. It is partly because interviewees 
have so much attachment with doctors that they brace themselves against the act of 
discursive manipulation. Thereby it becomes less relevant how successful they really 
are in trying to keep a promotional discourse at bay. The important point is that they 
conceive serving the physician not only as a technical exercise but equally as defending 
a professional idea they feel emotionally bonded to.          
     
 
7.4.2.3. Seeking impartial information 
 
‘Seeking impartial information’ is both an emerging first order concept and an 
overarching theme. Despite searching for another data structural increment, ‘seeking 
impartial information’ proved to be the determinant concept / theme on each level. 
Storylines supporting the concept / theme were produced by office-based and hospital 
physicians in my study. All ten physicians interviewed said that they enter the talks 
with drug reps with the aim to receive scientific and technical product information. 
Scientific consulting is wished to be the key purpose of drug detailing. In that, 
physicians’ understanding of the detailing encounter is perfectly mirroring the ideal 
conception of drug reps. This is not a surprising outcome. In chapter five I have already 
introduced the notion that – following Hall, et al. (1999) – doctor and drug rep 
identities are actively constructed and negotiated in everyday conversational 
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interaction. Furthermore, according to Drew & Heritage (1992), the sequential 
structures in that interaction provide the means by which participants jointly construct a 
particular social order and come to a shared understanding what is going on. Thus drug 
reps’ frequent exchange with physicians has most likely aided to the identity-
conceptual concordance that I have observed. While respondents from both sides report 
to have matching motivations, it remains to be seen whether there is also perceptual 
consensus in terms of activation.      
 
Within the group of physicians, there has been a difference in informational detail 
required which is essentially driven by occupational setting. Four out of five hospital 
physicians mentioned that they wish to go into technical details with the drug rep. 
Overall, hospital physicians expressed a greater aspiration to know the scientific 
minutiae compared to their office-based colleagues in the study. One hospital physician 
described her expectations the following way: 
 
The drug rep should inform me about new drugs on the market and about the 
advantages of his drug compared to other drugs. He should also precisely 
demonstrate why me of all people should actually use this new drug…for which 
indications. That should come across very precisely. […] Actually, I am always 
interested in the pathomechanisms. How does it originate and how does the 
particular drug act? What kind of interactions do I have to pay attention to? When 
can I apply it? I am also interested in doses, how to apply it, how long to apply it…do 
I have to reduce the dose or adjust the dose?    (P4, Hospital physician) 
 
This illustrative quote is demonstrating the informational scope and detail requested by 
hospital physicians. However, to my interpretation this quote was equally a 
demonstration of professional conceit. I got to this impression because the account 
came from a young physician who at many other occasions during the interview spoke 
about the importance of his/her task while belittling the contributions of non-
physicians. The physician was simply not showing serenity and superior ease and 
hence his/her account may be a slight exaggeration. Still, by their statements hospital 
physicians in my study overall show they are very demanding in terms of scientific and 
technical information.  
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Unsurprisingly, all office-based doctors in the interviews expressed a greater need for 
application-oriented information. Nevertheless they all expected to receive 
scientifically sound updates. Yet, as by my respondents’ accounts, the information has 
to be constructed and displayed to reflect the diversities and turnover rate of a busy 
doctoral practice. One respondent, who after spending the first part of his career as a 
hospital doctor had set up his own practice, aptly summarised the demands of 
practicing by saying:     
 
I have done intensive care for ten years and now I am doing everything ranging from 
pulling rusty nails out of people’s toes to treating heart attacks. Everything! And I 
have to come up with an idea for everything within five minutes.  
        (P6, Office-based physician) 
  
Dealing with a broad diversity of cases is of course typical of family practitioners like 
the one quoted above. Nonetheless, the other four office-based respondents who all had 
a specialist area equally talked about high time pressure and huge variety of cases. 
They all pointed to the need of receiving technical and impartial information yet with a 
high practical relevance.  
 
Differences in informational demand between hospital and office-base physicians can 
be explained by their differing work settings. Hospital physicians typically are 
specialists working in an organisational structure characterised by high labour division 
(McKinlay & Arches, 1985). Consequently, they count on detailed data to feed their 
work as specialists. The fact that they are surrounded by other specialists who rely on 
their input equally drives the level of informational sophistication. This is different 
with office-based physicians who largely communicate to lay-people. Office-based 
doctors altogether operate on a more holistic or broader clinical basis, much more in 
line with Parsons’ concept of medical practice (Parsons, 1951). Naturally, their 
information needs are more general and practical oriented and in turn probably easier to 
meet by drug reps. 
 
Why in their search for impartial information do physicians turn to drug companies? 
Are physicians unaware that drug companies are following a sales promotional 
agenda? None of the respondents in my study were unaware of that. I will present their 
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perceptions in detail at a later stage in the document. Yet at this point now I like to 
report my interviewees’ motivation to engage with drug reps. The majority of 
respondents first of all pointed to the high convenience and low cost when receiving 
representatives of drug companies at their own work place. In the same breath, 
however, some of them remarked that their main source of information would be 
medical congresses and professional publications. This statement is typical and 
indicative of two things: first, subjects are contesting the disinterestedness of drug 
detailing, and second, they nevertheless believe they are in control with regards to the 
integrity of their informational supply. Yet research by Avorn, et al. (1982) pointed to 
the opposite fact. His study showed that doctors in fact heavily rely on commercial 
sources for information but nevertheless claim their influence to be minor. Irrespective 
of this, two young hospital physicians in my sample revealed that opportunities for 
them to visit relevant medical congresses are often few and far between, so that they 
sometimes turn to drug companies as an alternative source of information. On a 
different note, three office-based doctors remarked that in the solitude of their single 
practice mode they sometimes feel rather insulated from the rest of the medical 
community. Therefore, to them drug reps were a source of information yet also a point 
contact to other physicians in the network. When investigating the motives for 
physicians engaging with drug reps one major fact must not be overlooked: all 
physicians in my sample said that drug reps are often visiting them without notice, 
sometimes literally imposing themselves on them.    
 
In summary, physicians in my study are primarily entering drug detailing talks with the 
desire to receive scientific and technical information about a drug and its application.  
Hospital physicians are demanding a high level of technical detail while office-based 
doctors wish for data to be very applicable. They all expect this information to be 
comprehensive and unbiased yet claim to know that this is not matching reality. 
Irrespective of this, the majority of respondents pointed to the convenience and low 
cost as a convincing reason for receiving drug reps. 
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7.4.3. Marketised discourse 
 
As displayed in Table 9 on page 133, marketised discourse is the third of four 
aggregated dimensions describing the phenomenon of discourse in detailing. 
Marketised discourse is referring to how the protagonists conceive the act of detailing, 
always in reference of course to their underlying motivations. The whole component 
rests on three main themes, namely ‘management instructions’, ‘drug reps’ 
translations’ and ‘physicians’ receptions’. These themes are assembling stories about 
how discourse is perceived to be instructed, how these instructions are interpreted and 
how the actual implementation of discourse is received. Different from the previous 
section on protagonists’ motivations, accounts feeding the respective themes do not 
necessarily come from just one group of actors. I will begin with presenting 
respondents’ views on the overarching theme of ‘management’s instructions’. 
 
 
7.4.3.1. Management’s instructions    
 
The theme ‘management’s instructions’ has emerged to reflect the input variables of 
marketised discourse. The theme is semantically carried by two first order concepts: 
‘simplification’ and ‘leading the physician’. Accounts gathered behind the concept of 
‘simplification’ are dealing with the shortening, abridging or condensing of discourse. 
Furthermore the concept includes stories about repeating and memorising discourse 
because to my view it is sustaining the notion of simplification. The concept ‘leading 
the physician’ collects stories about the strategic character of discourse in detailing. It 
is referring to particularistic interests behind discursive practices. Simplifying 
discourse and leading physicians are strongly intertwined. By condensing discourse, for 
example, physicians can be directed in their prescription behaviour. I commence with 
displaying respondents’ perceptions regarding the concept of ‘simplification’. 
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Simplification 
 
From a management’s perspective discourse in detailing must be trenchant, 
concentrated and constantly repeated to have an effect on the physician. According to 
one senior manager the desired effect is that the physician takes in key messages and 
associates them with the drug’s brand name. Presentations of technical and scientific 
details are missing the point because, although physicians may prefer them, physicians 
are unable to memorise the data or relate it to practice. The respondent further pointed 
to the risk of selective message intake on part of physicians which is potentially 
counter productive to the drug company. By that he referred to doctors remembering 
just one aspect of a large array of data and subsequently associating it exclusively with 
the brand. For example, if presented with a drug’s full range of indications the 
physician in the end may only connect one rather economically unattractive indication 
with the brand. This according to the interviewee would be harmful to the company 
and must be avoided by focussing talk on productive indications only. This is a prime 
example for simplification of discourse becoming strategic.  
 
Yet in my study simplifying discourse was typically sold as a benefit. Three out of four 
managers said that because physicians are flooded with information discourse in 
detailing must be simplified in order to be handled and retained by the physician. One 
senior manager phrased it the following way: 
 
 You always think, Wow! Physicians are such intelligent people […] you can 
communicate with them on a very high intellectual level. Yes, you can. But they 
don’t retain it. That’s why I have to keep simplifying my detailing address to the 
doctor. […] Many drug reps are just too proud to express things in simple terms. 
Actually, physicians are just as everybody else and communicating with physicians is 
just like communicating with any other person.    (M1, General Manager)   
 
The manager is treating simplified discourse as something helpful and – by referring to 
‘everybody else’ – implies that it is common practice. This quote is interesting because 
it points to the fine line between agenda-free discourse consolidation – which is 
principally helpful – and promotional discourse. While impartial discourse 
consolidation aims to strip discourse of informational ballast to the benefit of clarity, 
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promotional discourse aims to disfigure information to the advantage of particularistic 
interests. To my interpretation those in management function, deliberately or not, 
disguise promotional discourse as an act of message consolidation which is supposedly 
helpful to the busy doctor. However, if one looks to the technique of product 
positioning, as taught in every marketing textbook, it is all about competitive 
differentiation (e.g. Kotler, 1997). Simply put it means to carve out only those relevant 
product features that are either superior to or unmet by competitors. It is not about 
providing a comprehensive overview – neither detailed nor compressed – of product 
specifications and actions. On the contrary, the target audience is meant to receive just 
a unidirectional brief which stresses the relative advantages and cushions potential 
weaknesses. Experts in the field of advertising interpret positioning therefore rather 
defiantly as something that is done to the mind of the prospect (Ries & Trout, 1982).  
 
I like to indicate however that if – as happened in my study – managers argue for 
simplified communication vis-à-vis physicians it does not automatically imply that they 
follow a hidden agenda. I am convinced that some truly believe promotional discourse 
is aiding to the process of informational clarity. I like to relate this optimistic 
interpretation of mine to what Angell (2004) called the effect of compartmentalization. 
Angell noted towards the end of her critical report The Truth about the Drug 
Companies: “In fact, it is my impression that most pharmaceutical employees, even at 
the highest levels, accept their own public relations. […] That is a testament to the 
effects of compartmentalization in big corporations; very few people know the full 
dimensions of the business. And it is also a testament to human nature. People want to 
be proud of their work” (Angell, 2004, p. 238). 
 
As with simplification of discourse also constant repetition of talk is argued from the 
‘benefit to the physician’ perspective. Due to physicians’ busy schedules and vast 
information intake, messages have to be constantly reproduced. One respondent 
remarked that presenting the same talk just two or three times a year would be a waste 
of time. He conveyed that talk must be replicated at least eight times a year in order to 
be remembered by the physician. Assuming an average call frequency of four to six 
weeks (rate based on personal experience) the manager essentially requires the same 
talk to be presented all year round. As per the respondent’s accounts, resistance to this 
practice is mainly coming from drug reps – not physicians – who long for presenting 
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new data to their customers. Drug reps’ complaining and sensing of monotony is 
thereby seen as a typical reaction caused by what the interviewee called ‘subjective 
perception’. The drug rep is under the delusion that because he is monotonously 
producing the same discourse his customer would be equally sick of listening to it. The 
respondent thought that this is just a misconception as from his own experience the 
very same message often is new to the physician time and again. Further to that end, 
the respondent was referring to insights stemming from ‘modern communications 
science’ that would substantiate his position. Unfortunately, at this stage I missed to 
press him further regarding the underlying scientific evidence he was suggesting.  
 
Indeed, literature on communications (e.g. Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) is supporting the 
view that – initially – repeated exposure to a particular message is increasing the 
recipient’s chances to remember it and to develop a particular attitude. Yet these 
insights have been viewed – and to my opinion must be viewed – in the context of 
persuading not informing. In my opinion, strategic repetition of discourse is not 
employed with the intention to enlighten someone but to promote a self-interested plan. 
My position connects to the critical stances of Wernick (1991) to whom promotion has 
become the general communicative function which has altogether led to a ‘promotional 
culture’, as well as to Fairclough to whom promotional discourse is “a vehicle for 
‘selling’ goods, services, organizations, ideas or people” (Fairclough, 1993, p. 141). In 
the context of detailing, message repetition is thus sought to ‘brand’ a particular 
discourse in the doctor’s mind. To my reading, by referring to insights of 
‘communication science’ the respondent is only trying to legitimise his discursive plans 
and practices.  
 
In summary, representatives of management in my study adhere to the notion of 
discourse simplification and message repetition in detailing. Respondents admit to the 
strategic character of this practice by providing examples of selective information 
supply aimed at maximising income. At the same time, they try to convey the image 
that these discursive provisions are aiding to informational clarity which in turn is 
meant to be beneficial to the busy physician.  
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Leading the physician 
 
The concept ‘leading the physician’ has emerged from numerous accounts about 
discursively directing the physician instead of being led by him during the detailing 
encounter. It is different from the ‘simplification’ concept in that it concerns not the 
specific contents but the strategic conduct of discourse. All of the managers and also 
several drug reps reported that detailing talks are often scripted and that techniques to 
carry these scripts are regularly trained. Both, managers and drug reps referred to 
trainings in objection-management, conversation management, sales psychology and 
self-presentation. This by itself is nothing new and according to Oldani (2004) has been 
practiced for decades in the USA. As by my respondents, such trainings were 
introduced to their organisations in Germany during the first half of the 1990s. Since 
then they have been gradually intensified both in scope and frequency. Two senior 
managers conveyed that originally these technique were used ‘covertly’ by which they 
meant that physicians were guided indirectly, for example by means of knowledge 
implication (‘I am sure doctor you know that…’). These accounts reflect what 
Fairclough (1992, 1994) referred to as ‘technologization’ of discourse which entails the 
strategic construction and precise training of discursive practices with the intention to 
exert influence over others. 
 
Yet today, with higher pressures on managers and drug reps to succeed, discourse is 
also aimed at producing a tangible result already during the talk. Influence generation 
that remains undefined in terms of outcome is simply judged as insufficient. In this 
respect, manager-respondents frequently spoke about obtaining a ‘firm agreement’ or – 
in a more euphemistic tune – talked about reaching a ‘common understanding’ with the 
physician. As such, one respondent explained, the detailing address must convey a 
relevant benefit to the doctor but at the same time it must build up pressure for him to 
reciprocate immediately.  
  
I simply believe that drug reps are trained to conduct the talk as efficient as possible. 
They must try to structure the talk in a way that they are possibly pre-empting the 
physicians’ objections and then…and I think that is a very, very important point in a 
detailing conversation…that they come to a concrete agreement. Physicians tend to 
leave the conversation by saying: ‘Yes, I do something for you. Yes…!’ In the past 
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one was happy with that and said: ‘Well, he said he would do something for me’. 
Today you immediately ask: ‘What do you mean by that?’…and if he replies: ’Well, I 
will prescribe your product!’...then you ask: ’To how many patients?’[…] And you 
do it not so much in terms of a sales pitch but in order to better understand the 
collaboration with the particular physician.    (M1, General Manager)     
 
To my reading this statement is reflecting management’s need for greater control in 
detailing. In that it relates to the concept of ‘control’ presented earlier in context of 
actors’ motivation. In context of discursive planning, it further illustrates that 
management does not intend to let things slide. The quote displays that discourse is 
constructed to lead the physician to enter into a contract. This contract is equally about 
control (‘to better understand’) as it is about securing sales. At the end of the quote, the 
respondent is suddenly understating the sales aspect, stressing that agreements are 
mainly about improving the collaboration with the physician. I took it as a discursive 
reflex driven by a mixture of ‘cultural scripting’ and ‘moral storytelling’ (Alvesson, 
2003). The respondent is perfectly aware that ‘concrete agreements’ are sought with the 
intention to push sales. In his role as general manager he was likely to be responsible 
for deploying or adopting this strategy in the first place. Nevertheless, towards the end 
he chose to present himself less aggressively and more in tune with the corporate image 
of being ‘the physicians’ partner’. 
 
Overall, managers in my study revealed that they try to orchestrate discourse with the 
aim of leading the physician. This evaluation was also confirmed by some drug reps 
who pointed to various types of training ranging from objection management to sales 
psychology. Different from the past, however, today discourse is constructed to build 
up pressure for the physician to commit to a tangible result. Still, one senior manager 
claimed to conceive agreements with physicians mainly as contributing to a better 
understanding of the collaboration. Remembering the same respondent’s motives with 
respect to ‘simplification’ of discourse, I took his claim as an institutionally scripted act 
of ‘moral storytelling’. 
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7.4.3.2. Drug reps’ translation 
 
The theme ‘drug reps’ translation’ is reflecting how drug reps perceive marketised 
discourse as designed and presented to them by management. The theme is pillowed by 
first order concepts of ‘triviality’ and ‘embarrassment’. The concept of ‘triviality’ is 
assembling drug reps’ accounts about the trifling character of discourse, while the 
concept of ‘embarrassment’ collects their feelings in response to the conceived 
discursive strategy. I will start with presenting drug reps’ readings on the concept of 
‘triviality’. 
 
 
Triviality 
 
Nine out of ten drug reps in my study were criticising the trivial contents they are told 
to pass on to their physicians. Respondents typically defined trivial contents as topics 
that the physician is long familiar with and that are pre-packed into standardised 
phrases. These phrases are further described as ‘loud’ or ‘slogan-like’. Two 
respondents even referred to them as ‘vulgar’. Respondents thereby measured triviality 
against the high intellectual standards they assign to physicians. Remarks about the 
trifling character of the talk were frequently coupled with comments about doctors’ 
sophistication and high educational level.  Several drug reps said that neither the 
presentation mode nor the content of the talk would meet the intellectual standards and 
informational demands of their customers. Further to that point, two respondents said 
that the banality of discourse is indicative of the fact that management obviously thinks 
the doctor is ‘plain stupid’.  In terms of actual contents, drug reps stated that discourse 
is just delivering selected aspects of a drug’s profile and indication spectrum in a 
highly compressed manner. Typical aspects presented are key indication, key benefit 
and key study outcome to support that benefit. All this is reduced to a chewable piece 
of talk containing a few sentences and one or two key figures. According to two thirds 
of the drug reps this oversimplification is offending their customers simply by 
assuming that physicians could be palmed off with this marginal input. The following 
quotation is symbolic of a number of equal statements.  
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It’s highly compressed communication…and above all it has nothing to do with 
quality and aspiration. You could just as well send a postman who says: Listen 
doctor, please remember [product name]! And the postman could even do this at a 
much lower pay.     (D8, Drug rep)  
 
Triviality in discourse is further underlined by the requirement to constantly repeat the 
same subject. According to several respondents this makes discourse essentially self-
destructive because any significance that was left is ultimately eradicated by 
replication. Following the demands by management to constantly repeat rather petty 
topics would make it very difficult to stay connected to the physician. As one drug rep 
phrased it: 
 
They expect support from me in their in work as medics. But if I start talking in 
slogans I lose them.     (D5, Drug rep) 
 
Further to that end, one drug rep conveyed that ‘losing’ the physician due to 
irrelevance in discursive contribution is the worst thing that could happen to someone 
working in the field. This is typically manifested by the drug rep sensing that during 
the encounter the physician would be glad if the rep left his office. This, according to 
the respondent, will surely happen on a large scale if they keep on following the 
strategy the company expects.   
 
To my interpretation of the respondents’ accounts the notion of triviality has two 
dimensions. One is about disappointing or even offending the doctor by not delivering 
the information and service demanded. The other is about drug reps feeling devalued 
compared to their ideal role perception of being scientific consultants. A drug rep who 
– as illustrated above – is sarcastically comparing his task to that of postman is not 
conceptualising himself as a consultant anymore. During the interviews all respondents 
took to the first dimension when commenting on the effects of trivial content delivery. 
None of them approached the topic from a self-devaluation perspective. I got the 
impression that my respondents are truly interested in their physicians, nevertheless, 
their one-sided presentation also had a touch of ‘moral storytelling’ (Alvesson, 2003) 
to it. By advocating solely the physician’s case they wanted to convey an image of 
selflessness which is not convincing. In my view, respondents judged discursive 
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triviality equally as an attack on their own self-conception. The level of sarcasm 
employed during their reports – using terms like ‘regurgitating’ or ‘postman’ to 
describe their tasks – is strongly pointing to personal frustration. Yet this was not 
addressed openly. When pressing them further on this on one or two occasions they 
kept arguing from the physicians’ interest point of view.  As with some of their 
superiors who ‘sold’ self-interested discursive practices as beneficial to the doctor, 
drug reps – in my view – also used the physician’s interest as an excuse, this time to 
hide their feelings of being marginalised in their roles. This will become also apparent 
during the next section, where I will present drug reps’ views on the concept of 
‘embarrassment’ with regards to marketised discourse.  
 
 
Embarrassment 
    
Very early in the process of interviewing drug reps, one respondent stated – without 
prompt – that she felt embarrassed to talk promotionally. She claimed to be 
embarrassed to mention petty topics with her customer. Further to that end, she was 
ashamed to engage in twisted communication practices aimed at obscuring the 
scientific profile of the drug to the benefit of augmenting prescriptions. It was a very 
forceful statement and remained unique with regards to its frankness. This statement 
became the impetus for exploring the notion of embarrassment with respect to drug 
reps’ reception of marketised discourse. In the course of the interviews I repeatedly 
came across reactions of bewilderedness with regards to demands for discursively 
selling something to the physician. Although statements were less outspoken and 
accusing they nevertheless could not be overheard. On some occasions, drug reps threw 
in comments like ‘you cannot ask the physician to promote…’ when e.g. describing the 
particularities of the detailing situation. In turn, I confronted the respondents with my 
impression that to them selling is something embarrassing. Indeed, half the 
interviewees voiced back that they feel embarrassed when asked to engage in 
promotional discourse. Inquiring further to the reasons of such feelings, I found that 
their rejection is largely based on the conviction that selling is not the focus of drug 
detailing. I have introduced this attitude earlier in this chapter with regards 
motivational grounds to engage in detailing. When now being directly asked to 
deliberate on the notion of marketised discourse, many interviewees expressed the 
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opinion that any promotion should be avoided because the doctor is unable to 
appreciate this concept at all. Again, respondents used physicians’ attitudes or 
expectations to fend off promotional discourse. Irrespective of this, drug reps claimed 
to be aware that ultimately the company needs to generate sales. Yet in terms of 
internalising and implementing this objective most of the respondents imply to have 
stranger anxiety. This is exemplified by the following quote: 
 
I mean we are not selling anything to the physician. The physician is not a buyer. 
The physician is a person who wants to help patients and therefore he needs drugs.  
Yes, of course, we have to make sales. Yet the physician has a different perspective: 
He wants to help the patient. And we have to make it clear to him that his patients 
can best be attended to when using our products. […] Yes, at the end of the day it’s 
selling but…by another route.    (D4, Drug rep)  
 
To my reading, this quote is indicating that the respondent conceives sales promotion 
as convincing the physician on the basis of facts alone. More importantly, it implies 
that drug quality, performance and price are perfectly meeting requirements and that 
these facts simply need to be communicated. This is a scenario that may hold true in 
emerging drug categories or in markets which are under monopolistic control. Yet drug 
markets in Western countries like Germany are characterised by enormous competition 
and very little product differentiation. Given that, it seems unrealistic to assume that 
discursive practices in detailing can ignore that. Many other interviewees confirmed 
my assessment of the situation claiming that they are urged to promote rather 
aggressively. This is why I read the above statement mostly as the respondent 
demonstrating his unwillingness to engage on the dishonourable level of selling.  
 
The guiding feeling expressed by many respondents was that of being embarrassed to 
market upfront. Drug reps frequently mentioned that physicians would disapprove of 
such practices which in turn are weakening their standing with the physician. 
Exemplifying this view one very experienced drug rep reported: 
 
For years, I have never even mentioned the name of a competitor. That was not 
necessary, and that would have been out of place. I speak for my product and that’s 
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it. And my doctors always appreciated that. Today, you have to do it […]. It’s a 
different level now. Actually, this level is becoming increasingly rude. (D5, Drug rep)  
 
To me this statement is showing several things: on the one hand, the respondent rates 
promotion through differentiation from other products as somewhat low-level and as 
such discomforting to her. Furthermore, the interviewee is inversely implying that 
upfront marketing is not appreciated by physicians and hence it is not aiding to a 
productive relationship between drug reps and physicians. Third, the underlying feeling 
of embarrassment is probably also originating in the perceived disrespectful treatment 
they are receiving from management. In other words, drug reps are not only 
embarrassed on view of physicians but equally because they are assigned a petty task 
that undermines their occupational self-conception. Criticising marketised discourse is 
thus not only a moral or ideological issue but also an identity issue. Drug reps in my 
study openly adhere to a collective interest yet I have reason to believe that their 
critique and embarrassment is also self-interested. Drug reps essentially want to protect 
their function as scientific consultants on which their occupational self-actualisation is 
based.  Being a consulting partner to the physician can be regarded as a meaningful 
activity satisfying a higher order need such as expressing oneself through one’s work 
(Marx, 1932). To my interpretation drug reps feel embarrassed because they sense to 
be professionally downgraded vis-à-vis the doctor.  
 
Altogether, subjects have been found to be very critical of marketised discourse. 
Subjects have openly voiced moral as well as customer relational concerns to engage in 
promotional discourse. Morally, criticism was related to the deceiving character of 
promotional discourse, relationally, their disapproval was about fear to terminally 
offend and thus ‘lose’ the doctor. Though not having addressed it directly, respondents 
have still provided considerable evidence that they also have occupational identity 
concerns. To that end, many subjects expressed a feeling of being used mainly as a 
speaking tube of marketing which is seen as underrating their professional qualification 
and thus undermining their occupational self-conception.   
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7.4.3.3. Physicians’ reception 
 
The overriding theme ‘physicians’ reception’ is reflecting how the discourse is 
perceived by doctors. Different from the previous section, these accounts are 
assessments of real discourse experienced. When before drug reps were commenting 
on the concept of marketised discourse as devised by management, now physicians 
provide insights about its implementation. The main theme is carried by three first 
order concepts which I will present in the following section. The concept of 
‘contribution’ is gathering doctors’ accounts about the functional value drug reps are 
providing during the talk. The concept of ‘manipulation’ assembles physicians’ stories 
about how drug rep talk is trying to exert influence. Finally, the notion of ‘being sold 
to’ is collecting views expressed with respect to the selling aspect of discourse. I will 
begin with displaying interviewees’ perceptions on ‘contribution’. 
 
 
Contribution 
 
During the interviews physicians have been asked to reflect on the discourse as 
produced by drug reps and how they rate its value with regards to their work as medics. 
This question was embedded in the context of physicians commenting on their 
interaction with drug reps. Six out of ten physician in my study stated that drug reps are 
not meeting their scientific and technical information needs. Out of the six respondents 
who criticised drug reps’ performance, four were hospital based. As shown earlier, 
hospital physicians by structure of their work setting tend to be more demanding in 
terms of informational detail. This attitude was clearly reflected in their assessments. 
The most prevalent point of critique was that of superficiality with regards to scientific 
contents presented. Further to that point, all six respondents referred to a situation in 
which drug reps were unable to competently answer questions more in-depth. 
Typically, doctors said to be interested in things like mode of action, side effects and 
the drug’s interactions with other medications. They often prefer to flexibly address 
partial aspects of a subject in greater detail. In such cases, physicians wish to enter into 
a technical discussion with the drug rep. To their frustration, many drug reps are unable 
to rejoin proficiently; instead they are offering to pass the questions on to their central 
office.  The following reference is illustrative of several similar comments. 
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They advertise their product, of course, but how the drug actually works that they do 
not know. Too little background knowledge…too little knowledge of the basics. I 
mean: how does the drug act, where does it intercept? How does it really work…in 
the cell? […] Drug reps do not know anything thereof…that’s at least my experience. 
They come here, ask us if we want to take part in some sort of CME (continuous 
medical education) event or they give us some nice looking brochures. Well, then you 
have to study the brochure in detail to get the information because the talks do not 
give me anything.  (P4, Hospital physician) 
 
As per the respondents’ reports, all this runs counter to their ideal conception of a fast 
and competent knowledge update by the industry. The perception is further intensified 
by the high frequency of visits which causes the talk to lack novelty.  
 
Feedback by office-based physicians with regards to drug reps’ discursive contribution 
was altogether more favourable. Three out of five respondents said that they generally 
value the talks with drug reps. Respondents claimed that in most cases drug reps are 
providing helpful information with regards to the key features and uses of a drug. 
Furthermore, detailers’ presentations were regarded useful for learning about new 
trends and developments in certain product categories which doctors otherwise would 
not always know about. Importantly, whenever physicians spoke positively about drug 
reps’ talk they pointed to their long lasting relationship with them. Conversely, when 
expressing dissatisfaction with detailers’ contribution they mentioned high (personnel) 
turn over rates. This became a noticeable feature during the field work. In the course of 
the interviews it became evident that office-based physicians in my sample primarily 
value the personal contact with the drug rep. Compared to their hospital-based 
colleagues, technical information was significantly less relevant to them.  Challenging 
them further by asking what they would miss the most if their drug reps would not visit 
them any longer, three interviewees immediately pointed to the ‘personal exchange’ 
with the drug rep.  
 
To my reading the more positive assessment by office-based physicians is mainly due 
to the following: office-based doctors’ demands for high applicability of technical 
information are fostering the acceptance of compact information delivery. This is 
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strongly in line with the compactness of marketised discourse strategies as – according 
to my findings – devised by management. Even more important is the insight, that 
office-based physicians value, above all, the personal exchange with the drug rep. On 
that note, two respondents remarked that talking with the drug rep is a welcoming 
change in their daily routine with the patients. One office-based doctor conveyed that 
she regularly shares her sorrows with some of her drug reps. This would include talks 
about problems with health insurance policies as much as personal stories about family 
affaires. Value of drug rep talk is thus assessed very differently across the scope of the 
sample. Hospital physicians require functional contributions and are mainly 
disappointed by the quality of the delivery. As per my respondents, drug rep discourse 
to them is of very little functional value and often simply a nuisance. Office-based 
physicians, on the other hand, largely expect concise updates and look for relationships 
beyond functional matters. They value discourse by different standards and thus 
altogether come to a more favourable rating.    
 
However, to my perception positive accounts by office-based physicians were partly 
determined by respondents acting politically. During the interviews two respondents 
quite obviously wanted to protect their drug reps from any negative consequences 
potentially developing from the interview. It became evident because respondents were 
eager to withdraw or relativise any negative statements they have made about drug rep 
performance. For example, one physician mentioned that ‘talk appears to be 
memorised’ yet quickly added that this is not the case with any of her regulars. Another 
one commented on drug reps’ unpleasant assertiveness just to finish the story with how 
much she is altogether pleased with her detailers. In my view this was reflecting their 
suspicion that I was a management spy who could potentially harm the drug reps. It is 
what Alvesson (2003) referred to as disturbances emerging from interpersonal relations 
between interviewer and interviewee. Respondents’ inner speculations about my true 
role probably lead to a politically manoeuvring in support of the drug rep. Assuming 
that I have interpreted this correctly, their political acting still provides a valuable 
insight in its own right. Namely, that the relationship between physicians and drug reps 
is important enough for the physician to engage in any politically motivated discourse 
with me.     
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Manipulation 
 
While some physicians commented positively about drug reps’ overall contribution, the 
majority of respondents were highly aware and thus very critical of detailers’ methods 
to discursively exert influence over them. Hospital physicians expressed their disfavour 
quite vividly while office-based doctors were slightly more reserved. On a general 
note, more than half of the physicians said that drug reps’ discourses are easy-to-see 
attempts to influence script writing. They asserted to recognise this right away and all 
but one claimed to be unaffected by it. In other words, promotional talk was argued not 
to influence their script writing. As mentioned before, this is a typical reaction and 
pretence of control which has little basis in fact as several studies have shown (e.g. 
Cleary, 1992; Rizzo, et al., 1999; Manchanda & Chintagunta, 2004). In terms of its 
form and mode of presentation respondent painted a quite homogenous picture. 
Promotional discourse was described by and criticised for its schematic and mechanic 
character of talk. One respondent referred to a ‘standard loop of talk’ that the drug rep 
is following through, yet missing to show any personal commitment or verve. 
Interviewees furthermore pointed to the designated character of promotional talk that 
did not welcome flexibility. 
 
The typical drug rep presents a glossy brochure or shows five, six slides on his lap 
top […] and you notice that he wants to machine down his arguments exactly as 
written in the brochure. And he does not like to be interrupted by any questions in 
this phase of the talk.   (P3, Hospital physician) 
 
The respondent further voiced his anger about being virtually plastered with talk which 
makes the communication to him highly asymmetrical. Mechanical and designated talk 
as perceived by respondents is indicative of the sending character of promotional 
discourse. This is in turn is characteristic of hegemonic discursive behaviour as 
described by Gramsci and later by Fairclough. (Gramsci, 1971; Fairclough, 1992). It is 
hegemonic because the sender obviously has no interest to enter into a dialog with the 
receiver. Instead, he tries to subject the addressee to his interpretation of the world. Yet 
out in the field the sending status of drug reps is highly exposed and unprotected. 
Inconvenient questions by physicians are potentially destroying the sham integrity of 
promotional talk and thus are gladly avoided or ignored by the drug rep. Different from 
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e.g. print or TV advertising where discourse can not be directly responded to, 
promotional talk is vulnerable to immediate challenge and criticism. In particular, if the 
recipient has a knowledge advantage that the sender cannot possibly match (Greene, 
2004). To my interpretation this is why promotional discourse is aiming for a coherent 
story that remains mainly at the surface of things. From my personal experience, the 
dramaturgy and content of the talk is designed so that everybody can agree to its logic. 
Yet by my respondents’ accounts, smoothness hardly passes through with physicians. 
Altogether, the industry is not unaware of this and according to Oldani (2003) 
increasingly tries to address the patient directly in order to circumvent physicians’ 
scrutinising the promotional argument. However, this type of consumer pressure 
building – which is typical of the US market – is very limited in Germany where the 
law on advertising in the healthcare system (Heilmittelwerbegesetz) is prohibiting any 
direct talk to the patient.  
 
The other outstanding characteristic of promotional talk – according to many 
respondents – is its one-sided and often decrying presentation of contents. All 
physicians in my study reported to have experienced this. However, to three office-
based doctors this was rather the exception than the rule. Their feedbacks largely 
connect to the insights obtained with respect to the concept of ‘contribution’ presented 
in the previous section. The majority of respondents, in particular the group of hospital 
doctors, revealed that biased promotion was rather a common phenomenon in drug 
detailing. Doctors were irritated and at times amused about the bluntness in which 
unilateral updates were presented. For example, one physician said that whenever the 
term ‘better than’ is mentioned he gets alarmed. Further to that point, several 
respondents criticised that drug reps always try to convey the impression that their 
product is invincible. They always attempt to differentiate their product pretending 
there are facts to support their case. 
 
His product is the best, of course! All other products are blanked out. […] Or he 
brings along a table where his product always wins…more tolerable, less side 
effects…blah, blah, blah…and the other products are run down badly…all other 
products…which is simply incorrect!   (P4, Hospital physician)    
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Next to an unpleasant feeling of deception physicians are vexed about the extra time 
and effort associated with ‘disentangling’ biased discourse. By that they meant 
researching the credibility of certain statements in the literature or tediously 
interrogating the drug rep to get to the bottom of things. Yet scrutinising is time 
consuming and, as per several respondents, sometimes just cannot be followed through. 
According to one interviewee, these circumstances are damaging the overall trust in the 
industry and its representatives. It corresponds to Fairclough (1999) who spoke about 
‘pathological effects’ that promotional discourse is having on society. Fairclough 
argued that there will be growing distrust in discursive practices because of people’s 
rising inability to recognize authenticity in communication. As per my results, although 
physicians are intellectually able to scrutinise the talk they still lack the time, 
manpower and endurance to do so.    
 
Four out of ten physicians concluded that schematic and biased presentation is a sign of 
discursive prefabrication triggered by meticulous company training. When pressed 
further on this, respondents conveyed that some drug reps have told them about various 
rhetorical trainings they are receiving. Altogether, the majority of respondents claimed 
to know that discourse is essentially controlled by management. In this respect one 
respondent pointed to the hierarchical system within the industry that becomes quite 
obvious during medical congresses. At such occasion the industry usually shows with a 
lot of different people and – according to the respondent – it is easy to observe that 
drug reps are the least important of them all. All in all, respondents are consciously 
distinguishing between drug reps and their managers. Drug reps are typical conceived 
as simple agents who have to follow instructions. In turn, some (3) physicians 
expressed their empathy with drug reps’ for being in a position of dependency and little 
intellectual challenge. 
 
 
Being sold to 
 
Last not least, I like to present physicians notion with regards to the concept of selling. 
It clearly connects to the notion of ‘manipulation’ yet it has a more general quality to it. 
For that reason I prefer to present it separately. As the act of selling is usually a 
discursive one, some respondents were inspired to comment on it whilst evaluating the 
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concept of ‘manipulation’. Essentially, physicians wished to explain why to them 
selling or being sold to is an awkward experience. 
 
Physicians took issue with the notion of selling on the representational as well as on the 
ideological level. At the representational end, some physicians were simply piqued by 
the improper intrusiveness associated with the act of selling. 
 
If drugs are boosted I just think it’s bad style…but that’s probably just me. […] I 
believe physicians are generally not the type of people who respond well to such 
practices. Things should be presented with a certain integrity and dispassion.  
 (P6, Office-based physician)  
 
Physicians’ claims for decency in discursive practice may be explained with the 
bourgeois value system the profession is socially embedded in. Equally, demands for 
discursive decorum could be due to physicians’ ‘affectivity neutrality’ (Parsons, 1958) 
which they are trained to develop during medical school. Both reasons surely play a 
prominent role in shaping an attitude like the one illustrated above. To my reading, the 
quote is furthermore demonstrating that the physician is used to be shielded from the 
market in which the concept of selling plays a fundamental part. In other words, one 
must be able to afford an attitude like this. It could be given by the fact that one’s 
income supply is still largely independent from market forces.  
 
This directly leads to the ideological aspect behind rejecting the notion of selling. 
Physicians in my study have barely been dogmatic yet several respondents made it 
clear that trading is something they do not wish to be involved in. They pronounced 
that medical work must not be influenced by any commercial interest. For example, 
they repeatedly voiced that they are not interested in any brands or brand related 
promotions but solely care for applying chemical or biological compounds. One older 
physician emphasised that she advocates social equity and therefore she ‘cannot always 
do everything for money’. By this she was referring to constant price increases to the 
benefit of the industry and pharmacists which she was disapproving of. During the 
interview she further conveyed that she was rather critical of the market economy 
system in general. However, a system critical attitude like this was not typical among 
the other respondents in my study. Confronted with the direct question of why 
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physicians are reluctant to accept any sales promotional interest a young hospital 
doctor explained: 
 
If the notion of selling shimmers through it becomes deterring for doctors. Doctors 
really do not see themselves as selling drugs to patients and therefore they have 
difficulties passing this concept along. I personally think that’s why they handle it 
rather badly if one tries to approach them on this level.   (P3, Hospital physician) 
 
Physicians expressing their scepticism towards the act of promotion and selling can be 
traced back to Parsons’ interpretation of medical professionalism. In their role as 
safeguards of social cohesion, according to Parsons, doctors are to adhere to collective 
rather than particularistic interests (Parsons, 1958). From this perspective, promoting a 
particular drug on grounds other than therapeutic indication must principally be seen as 
an act of corruption. However, we have also learned that Parsons’ concept was 
criticised for being a rather normative reading and – at no point in time – a realistic 
sketch of the actual situation. Along these lines many researchers have accused 
physicians of promoting their own financial interest quite vividly (Freidson 1970, 
1986, Daheim, 1992; White, 2002). However, traces of such immediate particularistic 
orientation could not be found in my study. Naturally, I would think physicians were 
reluctant to admit to any commercial bias as it would be contradictory to their own 
self-conception based on the Hippocratic Oath. 
   
 
7.4.4. Response to marketised discourse 
 
The fourth overarching dimension as displayed in Table 10 (p. 140) is dealing with 
responses to marketised discourse. Different from the previous dimension ‘marketised 
discourse’ (section 7.4.3., p. 166) it entails insights about how drug reps and physicians 
operate in response to their perception of discourse. Thus the focus lies on accounts 
about action not on statements of evaluation. Importantly, the reader has to keep in 
mind that action taken by drug reps and physicians are following sequentially. Drug 
reps react to management’s instructions concerning the design and presentation of 
discourse. Subsequently, physicians are reacting to drug reps’ implementation of 
discursive practices originally conceived by management. Altogether, this is done to 
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display variances in goal attainment between management’s instructions, drug reps 
effective implementation and physicians’ actual reactions to marketised discourse.  
 
The analysis of the interview data has brought about two main themes describing the 
protagonists’ reactions, namely ‘drug reps transforming marketised discourse’ and 
‘physicians avoiding marketised discourse’. I will begin with presenting drug reps’ 
accounts regarding how they transform marketised discourse instructions. 
 
 
7.4.4.1. Drug reps transforming marketised discourse 
 
The main theme is fed by two underlying first order concepts that both collect stories 
about how drug reps influence the discursive provisions received by their company 
management. In this respect ‘sabotaging’ is gathering all accounts about how detailers 
wilfully damage marketised discourse. On the other hand, ‘constructing’ is collecting 
stories about drug reps scripting their own discourse. The two concepts are also 
connected in that respondents use ridiculing of marketised discourse to introduce their 
own discourse versus the physician. I will start with presenting accounts on the concept 
of ‘sabotaging’. 
 
 
Sabotaging 
 
The phenomenon of sabotaging came to the fore early during the interviews. Several 
drug reps who expressed their disapproval and frustration with instructions to talk 
promotional subsequently revealed how they dealt with it in practice. Four out of ten 
candidates conveyed that they engage in some sort of impairment of discourse. This 
ratio may even understate the actual situation, taking into consideration that some 
respondents may still have had doubts about interview confidentiality. In their accounts 
respondents have varied considerably in frankness but their degree of openness was not 
necessarily related to their level of frustration displayed. While all statements were 
reflections of dissatisfaction, none of them was uttered in a fit of temper.  
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Analysing the accounts of the four interviewees, tampering of marketised discourse is 
typical carried out in a combination of unmasking and ridiculing marketised discourse 
in front of the doctor. Unmasking is done by virtually announcing that promotional 
discourse is coming. According to one respondent this is sometimes performed in an 
ironic tune, which to my interpretation is done to bring criticism across rather 
smoothly. Asked for their motivations, subjects said that they always try to remain 
honest with their physicians. If prefabricated discourse is against their conviction or 
style they simply would not hold back on their disagreement. Acts of sabotaging is thus 
not a permanent mode replacing all marketised discourse. It is employed rather 
selectively whenever the drug rep feels that the talk is exceeding a particular level of 
triviality or mendacity. The exemplary quotation below indicates that this is done in a 
very direct fashion. 
 
I convey to the physician: You know, I just had another marketing training and I 
have to present this to you now because tomorrow you will be called. There will be a 
day-after-visit study tomorrow and you will be asked about that. That’s why I have to 
present it to you now.        (D2, Drug rep) 
 
This is a strong example of sabotaging because the drug rep is ‘a priori’ devaluating the 
contents to follow plus she is also influencing the mechanisms of control. Informing 
the physician about a day-after-visit study beforehand is like prompting the answer to a 
quiz. In fact, the drug rep enters complicity with the physician. Harming the actual 
message but nevertheless ensuring that feedback will be in line with management’s 
expectations, the drug rep is covertly sabotaging the marketing strategy. The detailer is 
taking sides yet ensures that she is covered. Such form of feigned adaptation is 
understandable and also typical for subjects in a position of e.g. powerlessness and 
economic dependency (see e.g. Merton, 1949). Yet it also shows that there is a degree 
of self-interestedness on part of the detailer that she otherwise tried to play down in the 
interview. Her morally loaded claims of honesty and scientific service to the physician 
obviously are not as resilient to be defended openly versus management. My reading is 
less meant to be a reversed form of critical discourse analysis whereby I am now 
unmasking the discursive manoeuvres of the powerless in order to accuse them. It is 
much more to avoid any black and white thinking in the context of detailing by 
scrutinising accounts for disturbances like ‘moral storytelling’. Irrespective of this, the 
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crucial finding is that some drug reps do not accept marketised discourse implicitly but 
strongly oppose it by undermining management’s strategy in practice.  
 
 
Constructing 
 
The concept of ‘constructing’ emerged out of respondents’ stories about how they 
circumvent marketised discourse by composing their own talk versus the physician. 
Seven out of ten respondents said that they would – at least in parts – put together their 
own contents and speeches. The concept is different from ‘sabotaging’ in that it is 
creative not destructive in nature. Although the revised discourse is not in line with 
management’s directives, it nevertheless offers an alternative discursive product to the 
physician. Sabotaging and constructing are also intertwined in that drug reps first 
unmask discursive practices after which they continue performing their own format. 
However, construction does not mean that all contents and formats are changed. None 
of the respondents voiced that they would totally ignore discursive instructions. 
According to several interviewees it rather entails that new talk is added or that 
prefabricated parts are combined with individual ones. Despite taking the liberty of 
personal discourse construction, to some drug reps it is a highly stressful act because 
the talk must be at least half way balanced with the management brief. Furthermore, 
due to the triviality and quick wear-out of promotional messages, drug reps constantly 
have to come up with new mostly scientific themes in order to legitimise their frequent 
visits versus the doctor.  The following quotation is illustrative of a number of identical 
comments. 
 
I try to sidestep, I try to bring about different topics, and I try to weave something 
into the talk that might interest him. But then I am not always in line with what the 
company expects from me.        (D3, Drug rep) 
 
Construction of new talk is driven by what the drug rep believes the doctor is really 
interested in. As per my respondents, this implies providing impartial scientific and 
technical service as well as catering to doctors’ wishes to talk about issues that bear 
down on them. The latter is typical for drug reps who have long-lasting relations with 
their physicians. Three of them said that they try to get the promotional bit out of the 
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way by mentioning just a few key points. Then they would quickly shift into a personal 
conversation mode sometimes initiated – as one drug rep reported – by the physician 
offering ‘to have a cigarette’. Several candidates revealed that their talk then becomes 
comforting in nature and sometimes seems to have a therapeutic function to the 
physician. One of the interviewees found that this is emotionally burdening at times, 
still all of them expressed their satisfaction to be able to communicate with their 
physicians on this level. 
 
Altogether, the notion of ‘constructing’ to drug reps means combining various types of 
discourse, namely promotional, scientific and personal discourse. Promotional or 
marketised discourse is thereby said to be kept to a minimum and if possible set apart 
from the rest of the talk. Drug reps are aware that they have to sell but none of them 
showed to identify with it. This differentiation was manifested in a dual role conception 
on part of respondents as the following quotation indicates. 
 
I have two roles in this. One, I am the representative of [company name] and as such 
I have a clear mandate: I am supposed to generate sales…and I have to manage this 
somehow. And then I also see myself as a partner to the doctor giving advice to him.  
          (D2, Drug rep)  
 
The above account is symptomatic of a drug rep who – defiant of a very different 
organisational goal – is trying to adhere to a role as an advisor that obviously satisfies 
her intrinsic need. To classic sociologists like Durkheim and Merton such behaviour is 
suggestive of anomie, a cognitive state in which the individual feels alienated due to 
lack of or disagreement with the normative system. In line with the slightly more 
contemporary perspectives of e.g. Seeman (1959), Blauner (1964) and Mottaz (1981), 
strong disagreement with organisational goals leads to social isolation, a variant of 
work alienation. In the particular case the respondent did not act in a pure fashion as 
defined in Merton’s (1949) typology of defiant behaviours. Instead she showed a 
combination of rebellion and ritualism, a mixture of active opposition and feigned 
adaptation.  
 
Organizational commitment theory (e.g. Reichers, 1986) provides an additional 
explanation for such conduct. In this context McGee & Ford (1987) spoke about 
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continuance organizational commitment, describing a condition of attachment where 
individuals simply lack an alternate employment opportunity and/or there would be 
high personal sacrifice associated with leaving a particular association (Angarwal & 
Ramaswami, 1993). Indeed, the majority of respondents in my study voiced that they 
see very little opportunity for a job change as they expect to find the same situation 
(marketization of drug rep work) prevalent across the industry.  
  
 
7.4.4.2. Physicians avoiding marketised discourse 
 
This main theme emerged from stories about how physicians react to discourse they are 
experiencing during the detailing encounter. In this respect, we have learned already 
that doctors perceive marketised discourse to be highly prevalent despite drug reps 
claiming that they try to reduce it to a minimum. I have reported that many physicians 
disapprove of the overt promotional character of the talk claiming that these practices 
are obvious attempts of manipulation. Furthermore, I have shown that doctors claim to 
have difficulties with the notion of marketing, both on representational as well as on 
ideological grounds. At this point now, I am interested to know how physicians handle 
marketised discourse in practice. The overarching theme of physicians avoiding 
marketised discourse is carried by two first order concepts, which I have called 
‘inhibiting’ and ‘escaping’. The first is collecting accounts about how doctors restrain 
promotional talk during the encounter. The second is gathering reports about 
physicians literally running away at the prospect of being talked to promotionally. I 
will begin with presenting doctors’ perceptions on the concept of ‘inhibiting’. 
 
 
Inhibiting 
 
Half of the doctors interviewed said that they prevent promotional talk to expand 
during the encounter. This was particularly the case in situations where drug reps 
produced overtly biased talk or kept repeating the same promotional messages over 
many visits. Respondents varied in their handling of the issue. Three doctors reported 
that they would simply display their disinterest with ostentation. This would include 
measures like asking the drug rep to hurry up or inviting him to ‘skip this part’ 
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completely. Two respondents declared that they voice their disapproval quite directly 
with the drug rep. To them this means criticising the drug rep on the spot for e.g. 
whitewashing the facts. Furthermore, to openly voice back to the drug rep that they do 
not want to be pressured into prescribing a particular product. Further to that point, one 
respondent said to be scorned by inquisitions about her prescribing pattern and stated 
that she would block this off immediately with those drug reps who try. Altogether, 
several respondents felt the need to inhibit any attempts to be directed or lectured by 
drug reps during the encounter. 
 
Then there is the ‘pointer’ act…and I do not want this…that’s really like them 
playing schoolmaster.        (P1, Hospital physician)  
 
The quote points to the power aspect of marketised discourse. According to Greene 
(2004) physicians – based on their self-conception as autonomous experts – do not 
want to be lectured in their area of proficiency by non-physicians. This insight was also 
confirmed by one of my respondents in the study. To my interpretation the directing 
and goal attaining character of marketised discourse is seen as an inappropriate 
challenge to their position as experts. Thus if discourse becomes leading and 
demanding it seems to spurn physicians’ resistance to that discourse. I suspect that 
inhibiting promotional discourse is equally done for power than for ideological reasons. 
This was confirmed during the course of the interview. As the respondent was further 
elaborating on the schoolmasterly treatment by drug reps, any ideologically or morally 
grounded critique faded into the background: 
 
The general rule is that he wants to sell me something... […]…this means he wants 
something from me. And I would argue that this requires a certain behaviour… 
which is seldom the case. It’s sometimes as if they had something to offer...and I do 
not see that!        (P1, Hospital physician)  
 
Interestingly, the respondent is clearly acknowledging the trading character of the 
encounter. While several of her colleagues previously expressed to have an uneasy 
relation to the notion of selling, this respondent takes it all rather pragmatically. 
However, she is obviously agitated with the way matters are presented by drug reps. 
Yet to my reading the above quote is not only about missing or demanding respectful 
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behaviour. It is much more reflecting the respondent’s consternation that drug reps are 
attempting to challenge the traditional role allocations. It becomes particularly evident 
in the last sentence in which the physician is denying drug reps to deliver any added 
value (‘as if they had something to offer’). In its absoluteness her last sentence is 
probably an exaggeration. Still, the respondent is negatively reacting to a discursive 
strategy by which drug reps overtly demand support (e.g. prescriptions, endorsement or 
critical information) in return for their services. This observation connects to the 
practices as devised by the industry (see section 7.4.3.1. on page 159). According to 
accounts given by managers in my study, obtaining a firm tangible agreement with the 
doctor is a crucial objective in today’s detailing.  The above quoted doctor, however, 
takes a different perspective on the matter. To her view the industry has to provide 
extensive information and service and leave the physician to decide what to do with it. 
She contests the right of the industry to demand something in return, whereby in my 
opinion the issue lies with the notion of ‘demanding’. Naturally, every physician in 
charge will eventually reciprocate to the industry be prescribing or recommending a 
particular drug. Yet, according to my study learning, many interviewees believe – or 
like to convey the impression – that this is done on the basis of objective analysis only. 
It must not be done on grounds of an individual ‘quid pro quo’ obligation to a self-
interested commercial party. Physicians’ attitude again can be ascribed to their ideal 
self-conception as ‘affectively neutral’ experts following a collective interest as 
portrayed by Parsons (1958). However, different from Parsons’ idea but in line with 
Freidson’s (1970) critique of it, those physicians obviously derive a claim to social 
power from their ideal self-conception. This claim, amongst other things, prohibits 
them being directed or pressured by non-professionals like drug reps. 
 
Altogether, physicians in my study reported to stop any attempts by drug reps to spin or 
pressure them discursively. Doctors claimed to intervene either by displaying their 
indifference or by directly reprimanding drug reps on the spot for e.g. whitewashing 
the facts. To my interpretation, their reasons for stopping marketised discourse are 
equally motivated by critical market ideology as by fending off contests to professional 
and thus social power. 
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Escaping 
 
The concept of ‘escaping’ is describing a situation in which the doctor is physically 
avoiding the encounter with the drug rep. Stories gathered under this concept are 
relating specifically to avoidance caused by dissatisfaction or enervation due to 
marketised discourse practices. This is an important specification, because in the 
course of the interviews I found that many encounters were said to be dodged simply 
due to time constraints caused by increased work loads. However, in some cases time 
constraints were obviously brought about by increases in drug reps’ call frequency 
which is a strategic facet of drug marketing. Irrespective of this, I focussed my 
attention on those accounts clearly relating to escaping due to disapproval with 
marketised discourse. 
 
Six out of ten physicians interviewed spoke about incidents where they escaped from 
drug rep visits. Out of the six respondents five came from a hospital background. For 
hospital doctors, characteristic modes of escaping were said to be e.g. changing one’s 
course at the sight of a drug rep waiting in the hallway of the ward or by pretending to 
be busy with a patient. Two interviewees reported that they often pass the 
responsibility of having to meet with a drug rep on to another colleague. This is 
frequently done by delegating detailing talks down the hierarchy which to me is 
indicative of the event being rated as irrelevant or highly unpleasant. When asked 
directly about their motivations for escaping, the majority of hospital doctors 
confirmed my assessment. The subsequent citation is typical of several accounts given 
in this context.    
 
The drug rep is mostly a disruptive element, you have to say it. […] And if you have 
to deal with him and he is not delivering quality than this is really annoying.  
         (P2, Hospital physician)         
 
Although in this quote the respondent is not referring to marketised discourse directly 
he nevertheless implied it. Throughout the interview he kept complaining about the 
‘pushing and hyping format’ of the talk that comes at the expense of quality 
information delivery. This, he declared, would let him avoid these encounters at any 
opportunity. To bring his point across, he equally kept referring to one exceptional 
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detailer who by means of sound knowledge and dedication was highly accepted and 
basically treated like a member of the medical team. However, this account was 
overwhelmingly contrasted by his stories about the irrelevant and distracting character 
of detailing encounters.   
 
By matter of spatial setting, office-based doctors have little room to escape from drug 
reps. As per my sources, they handle the situation differently by simply refusing to see 
certain drug reps in their offices. According to one respondent, reception is now 
increasingly controlled and granted only against advance notification of the visit – a 
modus which used to be highly uncommon in Germany not long ago. Yet office-based 
physicians in my study were also torn between two needs. On one hand they liked to 
prohibit commercially laden talks, on the other hand – in their situation as single 
doctors – they longed for outside information and network contacts. Thus none of the 
office-based doctors reported about any severe measures against drug reps talking 
promotional. At the other end, one drug rep gave her view about how physicians escape 
the detailing encounter yet still manage to receive the drug rep. Her observation may 
act as juxtaposition here. The respondent reported that increasingly office-based 
physicians give her a short shrift at the front desk. Instead of being invited to enter the 
doctor’s office or meet in the private setting of the lunch room, she is asked to remain 
in the public area at the entrance. To her perception the doctor is reverting to this 
‘public setting’ modus to keep the detailer in check and – most importantly – to be able 
to retreat at any time. I read this behaviour simply as a covertly and flexible form of 
escaping from drug rep talk.  
 
All in all, hospital physicians in my study conveyed to physically abscond at the 
prospect of having to meet with detailers. They typically delegate the responsibility to a 
colleague or simply hide away. Due to their different work setting, office-based doctors 
tend to take a different approach. According to my sources, they revert to either 
controlling access or engage in brief encounter under the screen of the public. When 
asked about their motivations for escaping, both groups of physicians in my study 
pointed to the informational irrelevance as well as discursive directedness of 
promotional talk which they wish to get away from. 
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7.4.5. Summary of representative quotations  
 
In Table 10 below I have summarized the key representative quotations for each main 
theme that has been discussed.    
 
 
Table 10:  Data supporting interpretations of impact of marketised discourse 
 
Main Theme Representative Quotations 
Situational Background 
Loss of professional 
power & autonomy 
• Then let these paper pushers prescribe drugs to the 
people…this is not my idea of being a physician. As a 
doctor I decide what is good for you. And I prescribe the 
drug for you. […]. And now they are telling me what I 
should prescribe. This cannot be. For a doctor this is 
hardly acceptable.                  (P8, Office-based physician) 
 
• The way this is organised…and politically 
intended…namely to set up some sort of ambulatory 
healthcare centres, not run by physicians, where we 
simply are instruments... to me is no alternative to 
professional freelancing. Although there is already little 
professional freedom left I would still not let me force 
into that. Only if there is no other way forward.   
                                                      (P6, Office-based physician) 
 
Marketization of 
detailing 
• I think the biggest change has been that when I started 
the drug rep’s self-conception was such that he was 
there to inform the doctor. The selling aspect, in the 
sense that I also try to convince the doctor to prescribe 
my product, was almost seen a little sleazy and 
disreputable. For this reason one’s self-conception was 
more like: It is my job to inform the doctor about our 
product. And in the course of time it changed more and 
more towards sales and volume generation. The change 
was manifested when the field force was beginning to 
receive special trainings in selling and sales psychology 
[…].If before you had the sense of being a scientific 
advisor to the doctor and then suddenly the selling aspect 
took over…to many of us that was embarrassing.   
                                                                            (D1, Drug rep)   
 
• Actually the drug rep has moved away from individual 
consulting to becoming an accessory to marketing 
management. I once said it is like being marketing’s 
talking parrot. […]You have firm instructions by 
marketing and you have to get them across – accident-
free – via ten memorised catchphrases.      (D8, Drug rep) 
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Motivations 
Driving sales • Due to its high profits over the past 40 years the industry 
faces new challenges to meet these margin expectations 
in the future. And that is why every coq in the wheel - in 
the area of sales and marketing - that is able to hold or 
enhance profits and efficiencies is put in motion. 
                                                    (M2, National Sales Director) 
 
Serving physicians • I see myself as a service provider to the physician, one 
that brings the essential information to him…as fast as 
possible. […] To do whatever makes life easier for him, 
that’s how I see my role as a drug rep…to make life 
easier for the physician. But not trying to enlighten him 
with banalities.                                             (D3, Drug rep) 
 
• I am a consultant…not a salesman…a consultant! I 
pass on scientific information.                    (D2, Drug rep) 
 
• We love our physicians. They are our family. We spend 
the majority of our lives with them…         (D1, Drug rep) 
  
Seeking impartial 
information 
• The drug rep should inform me about new drugs on the 
market and about the advantages of his drug compared 
to other drugs. He should also precisely demonstrate why 
me of all people should actually use this new drug…for 
which indications. That should come across very 
precisely. […] Actually, I am always interested in the 
pathomechanisms. How does it originate and how does 
the particular drug act? What kind of interactions do I 
have to pay attention to? When can I apply it? I am also 
interested in doses, how to apply it, how long to apply 
it…do I have to reduce the dose or adjust the dose?          
                                                             (P4, Hospital physician) 
 
Marketised Discourse 
Management’s 
instructions 
• You always think, Wow! Physicians are such intelligent 
people […] you can communicate with them on a very 
high intellectual level. Yes, you can. But they don’t 
retain it. That’s why I have to keep simplifying my 
detailing address to the doctor. […] Many drug reps are 
just too proud to express things in simple terms. 
Actually, physicians are just as everybody else and 
communicating with physicians is just like 
communicating with any other person.                                 
                                                              (M1, General Manager)  
 
• I simply believe that drug reps are trained to conduct the 
talk as efficient as possible. They must try to structure 
the talk in a way that they are possibly pre-empting the 
physicians’ objections and then…and I think that is a 
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very, very important point in a detailing conversation… 
that they come to a concrete agreement. Physicians tend 
to leave the conversation by saying: ‘Yes, I do something 
for you. Yes…!’ In the past one was happy with that and 
said: ‘Well, he said he would do something for me’. 
Today you immediately ask: ‘What do you mean by 
that?’…and if he replies: ’Well, I will prescribe your 
product!’...then you ask: ’To how many patients?’[…] 
And you do it not so much in terms of a sales pitch but in 
order to better understand the collaboration with the 
particular physician.                     (M1, General Manager) 
 
Drug reps’ 
translation 
• It’s highly compressed communication…and above all it 
has nothing to do with quality and aspiration. You could 
just as well send a postman who says: Listen doctor, 
please remember [product name]! And the postman 
could even do this at a much lower pay.                         
                                                                            (D8, Drug rep) 
 
• They expect support from me in their in work as medics. 
But if I start talking in slogans I loose them.  
                                                                            (D5, Drug rep) 
 
• For years, I have never even mentioned the name of a 
competitor. That was not necessary, and that would have 
been out of place. I speak for my product and that’s it. 
And my doctors always appreciated that. Today, you 
have to do it […]. It’s a different level now. Actually, this 
level is becoming increasingly rude.           (D5, Drug rep) 
 
Physicians’ reception • The typical drug rep presents a glossy brochure or shows 
five, six slides on his lap top […] and you notice that he 
wants to machine down his arguments exactly as written 
in the brochure. And he does not like to be interrupted 
by any questions in this phase of the talk. 
                                                             (P3, Hospital physician) 
 
• His product is the best, of course! All other products are 
blanked out. […] Or he brings along a table where his 
product always wins…more tolerable, less side 
effects…blah, blah, blah…and the other products are 
run down badly…all other products…which is simply 
incorrect!                                      (P4, Hospital physician)  
 
• If drugs are boosted I just think it’s bad style…but that’s 
probably just me. […] I believe physicians are generally 
not the type of people who respond well to such 
practices. Things should be presented with a certain 
integrity and dispassion.       (P6, Office-based physician) 
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Response to Marketised Discourse 
Drug reps 
transforming 
marketised discourse 
• I convey to the physician: You know, I just had another 
marketing training and I have to present this to you now 
because tomorrow you will be called. There will be a 
day-after-visit study tomorrow and you will be asked 
about that. That’s why I have to present it to you now.  
                                                                            (D2, drug rep) 
 
• I try to sidestep, I try to bring about different topics, and 
I try to weave something into the talk that might interest 
him. But then I am not always in line with what the 
company expects from me.                         (D3, Drug rep) 
 
Physicians avoiding 
marketised discourse 
• The drug rep is mostly a disruptive element, you have to 
say it. […] And if you have to deal with him and he is not 
delivering quality than this is really annoying.  
       (P2, Hospital physician)   
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8. Conclusions  
 
Over the last 50 pages I have presented my research results in detail and have 
structured them according to a conceptual model that aims to portray the phenomenon 
of marketised discourse in drug detailing. The model (Figure 5, p. 128) is inductive in 
kind because it is essentially the product of my interpretation of the data. Due to the 
research methodology I have chosen the model is thus only representative of my own 
cognitive grasp on the subject. However, in that it can eventually become the impetus 
for further research on the issue, some of it being also deductive in nature. What is left 
for me to do is to balance my findings against the research questions that drove this 
project. Furthermore, I wish to provide the reader with my conclusions drawn from the 
results, both on a theoretical and on an operational impact level. I will begin with 
comparing my results to the three research questions I have put forward at the 
beginning, namely 
 
1. Is there discursive construction of marketization in drug detailing? 
2. If there is marketised discourse how does it manifest in discursive terms? 
3. How does such discourse impact the roles and attitudes of drug reps & physicians? 
 
 
8.1. Balancing findings with research questions 
 
In discussing the findings with regards to the research questions I equally provide a 
summary of the research outcomes as presented in chapter 7. I will approach this task 
by addressing the research questions in the above listed order.  
 
Is there discursive construction of marketization in drug detailing? 
 
Yes, according to my respondents marketised discourse is constructed in drug 
detailing. However, reports regarding scope and intensity of marketised discourse vary 
between the protagonists. To managers in my study marketised discourse is the essence 
of drug detailing. They confirmed that discourse is strategically employed to drive 
sales and profits. To that objective, discourse is sharpened with the intention to 
influence the physician’s behaviour with regards to prescribing or endorsing a 
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particular drug. Managers revealed that drug reps are trained and briefed to employ 
promotional discourse in their daily encounters with physicians. From a management 
point of view, marketised discourse is said to be highly prevalent in today’s drug 
detailing versus physicians. 
 
All drug reps in my research confirmed that they are instructed to talk promotionally 
with their customers. At the same time they conveyed that they do not implement these 
instructions as devised. Instead, they claimed to reduce marketised discourse to the 
benefit of scientific information, a service that they regard to be the focus of drug 
detailing. Despite their noble intentions, drug reps admitted that they nevertheless have 
to employ promotional talk to a certain extent. This was said to be necessary as 
pressures by management for tangible results are high. Thus according to drug reps, 
marketised discourse is happening yet it is mainly presented in a reduced form. 
 
Altogether, physicians in my study experienced marketised discourse regularly in their 
interactions with drug reps. Hospital physicians, in particular, confirmed that they are 
typically addressed in a promotional manner. Office-based physicians also reported 
about the spreading of marketised discourse yet painted a less dramatic picture 
compared to their hospital colleagues. I rated the differences between the two doctor 
groups to be essentially caused by different work settings which in turn had influence 
on physicians’ accounts. In their need for highly applicable information, office-based 
doctors are less critical of the compressed (in fact disfigured) content delivery typical 
of promotional talk. Furthermore, in their often remote single practice setting, office-
based doctors are torn between rejecting commercialised addresses and keeping 
connected to market information. As such they are experiencing a conflict of interest 
which also shun through in some of my interviews. To my interpretation this is why 
office-based physicians tend to understate the dissemination of marketised discourse. 
Nevertheless, all doctors in my study were confirming that marketised discourse is 
happening. 
 
The fact that each of the three actor groups gave different accounts about the intensity 
and scope of promotional discourse is not surprising. First, the three groups were not 
subjected to the same experiences as only parts of them share the same work sphere. 
Furthermore, in case of managers interviewed, accounts are largely based on normative 
  
 193
ideas and secondary information whereas drug reps and physicians are experiencing the 
encounter first hand. Last not least, the protagonists’ perceptions are driven by their 
motivations to engage in discourse. As such they compare their individual observations 
against their ideal objectives or self-conceptions. Naturally, this will result in different 
assessments, even in cases where the underlying situation is – in a positivistic reading – 
the same. If, for example, a drug rep is motivated by providing scientific information to 
his physicians, he probably is less open to admit that in fact he is just reproducing 
prefabricated commercial talk. Of course, reasons for interpreting a particular event are 
endless and many of them work both ways. For example, I could equally argue that 
precisely because a drug rep is seeing himself as a scientific advisor, he is particularly 
alert to any activities compromising this ideal. Thus in his accounts he should tend to 
overstate the spreading of promotional talk. In essence, reports about the prevalence 
and quality of marketised discourse are subject to individual interpretations. These 
interpretations are driven by structural as well as cognitive settings. To reflect these 
determinants appropriately in my analysis is the key task in my function as a qualitative 
researcher. Yet in parallel I have to ensure that the research design is constructed to 
allow for a clustering of similar interpretations. I have provided this by roughly 
outlining the definition of marketised discourse – as I read it – with every respondent. 
This way I have ensured that all my respondents had a similar point of reference to 
base their assessments on. As a constructionist researcher I have no interest to 
standardise meaning, yet I nevertheless have to ensure that respondents broadly align 
on the phenomenon they should comment on. In line with Alvesson (2003) this avoids 
interview questions to be misinterpreted which would otherwise lead to a rather inferior 
empirical outcome.          
 
 
If there is marketised discourse, how does it manifest in discursive terms? 
 
Since all respondents have confirmed that marketised discourse is happening I now like 
to review how according to their perspectives discourse is manifested. To managers in 
my study marketised discourse is seen as a helpful simplification of complex contents. 
As such it is valued altogether as an improvement in terms of clarity and data handling. 
Managers said to construct marketised discourse by means of translating key product 
features into relevant user benefits. Preferably, discourse is not to transport scientific 
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detail (e.g. active substance level built up in the blood) but should bring across the key 
practical advantage to the doctor (e.g. the patient can be released one day earlier on 
average). From a management point of view this is more helpful to the busy doctor 
than any complex sets of clinical information which the doctor is unlikely to remember. 
In my opinion the ‘end benefit’ focus of marketised discourse is characteristic of the 
utilitarian ideology management is governed by. Essentially, information is not used to 
describe something but to demonstrate a useful purpose. The interesting aspect is not 
that management operates from a utilitarian position. That is of little news value. The 
interesting point is that the utilitarian approach is used to shortcut the communication 
process. Marketised discourse is constructed to skip – or at least critically shorten – the 
information stage whereby a matter is first of all presented before it then gives rise to 
an argument which in turn leads to a particular position or recommendation. 
Promotional discourse, however, directly starts at the recommendation end, reducing or 
dimming the steps beforehand to a minimum. While this practice is typically sold as an 
act of simplification it is in fact an act of controlling. Marketised talk is to ensure that 
decisions turn out as planned by limiting time and information that would allow a 
critical deliberation by the recipient. Thus in my view promotional discourse has 
essentially a sending mission and its originators have no interest in a dialogical 
communication whatsoever. Instead they have an interest to dominate and control by 
discourse (Gramsci, 1971; Fairclough, 1992). This makes promotional discourse an 
instrument of power, thereby following Foucault (1976) who argued that discourse is 
systematically shaped to serve the interests of those in command.   
 
Its utilitarian directedness is also causing marketised discourse to aim for a tangible 
outcome at all times. Managers revealed that detailing talks are designed to obtain a 
firm agreement from the doctors with regards to script writing or endorsing a particular 
drug. Furthermore, marketised discourse is characterised by constant repetition of key 
messages versus the doctor. As by my management sources, key messages are to be 
repeated over many months until the physician has truly memorised them. All these 
characteristics of marketised discourse have been largely confirmed by physicians as 
well as drug reps in my study. Yet with regards to the benefits and motivations of 
promotional discourse both doctors and drug reps come to a different evaluation 
compared to managers. Physicians perceive simplified talk as highly superficial and 
often not substantiated. To drug reps promotional talk is exemplified by its 
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informational triviality and non-scientific content. Both drug reps and physicians are 
annoyed by the constant replication of discourse and value it more as an act of 
indoctrination. Furthermore, doctors perceive promotional talk rather schematic, 
inflexible and little authentic. This means that marketing related product features are 
worked off rather monotonously and discussions are rather avoided. Thus many doctors 
see promotional discourse as prefabricated scripts that are centrally geared. Last not 
least, marketised discourse is perceived to be manipulative in that certain aspects of a 
drug are hidden, overstated, played down or wrongly represented altogether. The fact 
that doctors and drug reps are critically challenging and unmasking these practices is 
signifying the limitations of power driven discourses. Even if talk is designed to exert 
control over other groups it does not necessarily mean that it sticks with those who 
receive it (Alvesson & Karreman, 2000). People may stay resistant to promotional 
discourse on grounds of knowledge and access to rivalling discourses. Physicians, for 
example, based on their expert knowledge on the subject can scrutinise assertions made 
during promotional talk. Drug reps can look behind the scenes of discourse invention 
during sales trainings and interactions with management. Furthermore, they are 
constantly exposed to rivalling discourses as they spend a large part of their working 
lives in a medical environment. These factors are surely strengthening the subjects’ 
resistance to marketised discourse.  
 
However, marketised discourse in its compactness and intense penetration is still prone 
to leave its marks on doctors and drug reps. Many physicians in my study have 
reported that they have very little time to scrutinise the vast information influx 
thoroughly. One respondent revealed that although he knows that the discourse is 
manipulative, he is still happy to have a piece of information he can refer to in stressful 
situations. Drug reps who claimed that they do not wish to pass on trivial or deceiving 
talk to doctors, equally find themselves in a situation of operational pressure. Faced 
with tight schedules, internal monitoring and performance targets many adopt 
promotional discourse simply because they want (or need) to remain in the system.  
 
Altogether, marketised discourse in drug detailing can be described on two levels, 
namely on a technical and a perceptual one. While there is largely agreement on the 
technical characteristics of promotional talk there are fundamental differences at the 
perceptual end. From a technical aspect, marketised discourse is said to be brief, non-
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scientific, repetitive, and results oriented. From a perceptual level, marketised 
discourse has been found to be consolidating yet disfiguring, practical yet trivial, easy 
to memorise yet indoctrinating, helpful yet deceiving. Simply said, marketised 
discourse does manifest itself differently in different minds, which of course is not a 
surprise to a constructionist researcher. What is surprising though is that the divide 
does not run between industry and physicians, but mainly between management on the 
one side and drug reps and physicians on the other.    
 
Finally, I like to deliberate on the question why, after all, marketised discourse as 
devised by management is suspected to be harmful. One could argue that promoting 
one’s product is a legitimate act in a highly competitive market place. Moreover that 
unilateral presentation of facts is common to nearly all other markets and categories 
around the world. Given enough competition in the market, contending players will 
make sure that one-sided presentations are eventually balanced by rival discourses. 
Essentially, drug marketing could be treated as marketing of any other good, a thought 
that – to my experience – is prevalent on many executive floors in the pharmaceutical 
industry.    
 
I am of the opinion that promotional discourse in the prescription drug business is to be 
assessed differently compared to promotional discourses employed in e.g. the 
consumer goods industry. Biased presentations of e.g. branded consumer or luxury 
goods can potentially trail financial disadvantages to individual consumers because 
market pricing is exceeding use-value. Although from a Marxist position one could 
denounce excessive ‘rates of exploitation’ (Giddens, 1971) as immoral, still I would 
argue that the ‘spiritual’ surplus value consumers are getting in exchange for many 
branded goods is probably making up for any calculatory rip offs. In a liberal society I 
think every consumer should be allowed to invest his personal resources freely.    
 
However, biased presentations of drugs are potentially harmful to patient health and 
present a financial burden to society. They are potentially harmful if physicians are 
promotionally spun about a drug’s indication spectrum, side effects or interaction with 
other drugs. A typical example is the endorsement of off-label drug use as typically 
employed by the industry to increase the target market (Angell, 2004; Steinman, 2006, 
2007; Lauterbach, 2009). As a result of such doings patients might take a drug at an 
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inappropriate occasion or point in time thus needlessly risking their health. If drugs are 
priced far beyond their evident use-value – and physicians are swayed into believing 
that there is a positive correlation between price and efficacy – promotional discourse 
becomes a financial burden of the collective body of the insured. From an opportunity 
cost perspective this is aggravating because it slows down therapeutic productivity. 
This should neither be asked of patients in need nor of individuals as payers of taxes or 
insurance fees.  
 
 
How does marketised discourse impact the roles and attitudes of drug reps and 
physicians? 
 
Drug reps in my study rated marketised discourse as trivial and deceiving in kind. 
Many saw it as an insult to their physicians and equally as an offence to their own role 
conception as scientific advisors. Further to that point, respondents explained that in 
the past (c. 15 years ago) their role was defined as being a consultant to the physician, 
providing him with scientific and technical information about the product and its 
indication. Yet today the focus of their work is meant to be selling which in turn 
fundamentally impacts the discursive approach to the physician. Before, drug reps were 
servicing the doctor largely according to his needs. In that they had relative freedom in 
terms of targeting and call frequency. One respondent characterised his role as being a 
‘small entrepreneur’ within the company. In the past the notion of selling or prescribing 
drugs was not directly addressed during the detailing talk. It was simply implied that in 
return for a good service the physician would ‘do something’ for the drug rep in terms 
of prescribing or endorsing his product. Yet doctors’ engagement was always tentative 
and thus remained largely intangible during the encounter. Today, drug reps have said 
to be precisely instructed whom to visit at what time. Importantly, they are trained and 
directed to transport mainly marketing related catchphrases in a highly repetitive 
manner to the physician. Most of the talk is prefabricated and its implementation is 
frequently monitored ‘ex post’ via market research. As such they now see their role 
largely as instruments of the marketing department rather than individual consultants 
addressing the needs of their customers.  
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At the same time, all respondents revealed that they do not follow their management’s 
instructions with regards to promotional discourse. Motivated by a collective interest to 
adequately inform the physician, many drug reps try to reduce promotional talk to the 
benefit of scientific advice. This is done by circumventing or sabotaging promotional 
talk whenever possible. Typically, detailers replace promotional discourse partly and 
selectively with their own newly constructed talk. Although not displacing marketised 
discourse in total, drug reps claim to at least significantly transform the discursive 
provisions they receive from management. Although it provides a feeling of relief it 
nevertheless puts drug reps in a conflict of interest whereby they try to adhere to a 
traditional or idealised role while their management is following a fundamentally 
different objective. Disparity in objectives and norms is aiding to process of 
detachment from the organisation. Circumventing the actual company strategy is 
characteristic of defiant behaviour in response to a cognitive state of detachment or 
‘anomie’ (Durkheim, 1964; Merton, 1949). Respondents are no longer supportive of 
the organisational objectives yet they not openly contest them. In the respondents’ case 
avoidance of promotional content delivery happens rather covertly. This further relates 
to the work of Merton (1949) who developed a typology of how individuals may react 
to discrepancies between their own and e.g. organisational objectives. I like to briefly 
outline his theory because I find it highly applicable to my research findings.  
 
According to Merton, people will either respond with conformity (which means that 
they simply accept the goals as well as the institutional means to achieve them), 
innovation, ritualism, apathy or rebellion. Innovation refers to the acceptance of 
cultural goals while refusing the legitimate means to achieve them. In other words, the 
individual finds that to attain given goals it is necessary to employ socially unapproved 
behaviour (e.g. criminal behaviour). Ritualism describes a phenomenon whereby 
people refuse cultural or organisational goals yet they nevertheless adhere to them. In 
such scenario people almost obsessively employ institutional means to attain the goals 
(e.g. feigned adaptation to bureaucracy). Apathy denotes a state where both cultural 
goals and legitimate measures are refused and where people react with apathy and self-
seclusion (e.g. outsider role). Rebellion on the other hand describes a type of behaviour 
where people actively strive for a re-structuring of the existing order, although goals 
and means have not necessarily been defined in great detail. Transferring Merton’s 
theory to my research findings I would argue that drug reps do not display truly 
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rebellious behaviour as defined by Merton. While e.g. sabotaging promotional 
discourse surely is a radical measure to employ, it is still only an indirect attack on 
those in power. Instead, I would locate drug reps’ behaviour somewhat in between 
rebellion and feigned adaptation (‘ritualism’). It is a highly destructive act of 
opposition against the establish system yet it is practised without risking the comforts 
of that system (e.g. financial rewards, social security etc.).   
 
In any case, attitudes displayed and roles taken by drug reps stand in contrast to the 
functional assignments given to detailers by management. Thus marketised discourse 
has a cognitive impact as well as an operational one. On the cognitive level, drug reps 
are showing signs of isolation which implies the absence of a feeling of identification 
with the work organisation and its goals (e.g. Blauner, 1964). This disconnect may lead 
to a great sense of frustration which in turn causes divergent role behaviour to emerge. 
At this stage then, the operational integrity of the organisation is disturbed because 
drug reps do not implement the marketing strategy as conceived. Certainly, this will 
have a negative impact on marketing productivity as costly brand management efforts 
and promotional marketing plans virtually grasp into nothing. Yet, because defiant 
behaviour is performed covertly it remains undetected – at least for a certain period of 
time.  
 
At the physician end, the rise of marketised discourse has further alienated the 
profession from the industry. Many doctors in my study expressed that promotional 
talk is not providing a relevant contribution to their work as medics. Instead, physicians 
have developed a growing distrust with respect to the correctness and integrity of the 
talk presented to them by drug reps. On first sight this outcome seems like a surprise, 
considering the fact that drug reps have reported to reduce promotional discourse to the 
benefit of scientific content delivery. Differences between self-perception and external 
perception can have an endless number of causes, yet I like to mention those which I 
consider the most likely in my research case. First of all, drug reps and doctors in the 
interviewee sample did not come from the same work sphere, which means that doctors 
voiced back experiences about a different set of people. This could be valued as a 
shortcoming of my sample and research design. However, my aim was not to 
investigate discourse within a clearly delineated local system. Instead, I assumed that 
promotional talk is widely spread across all practices & clinics for which I took a 
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macro-system or ‘grandiose’ (Alvesson & Karreman, 2000) approach to my analysis. 
Given that, direct interaction of sample members would have been neither necessary 
nor beneficial to my research method.  
 
Furthermore, drug reps as well as physicians may have exaggerated their accounts 
about promotional discourse. Drug reps – in an act of e.g. moral storytelling – may 
have verbally inflated their degree of resistance to marketised discourse as devised by 
management. Physicians – in a mode of cultural scripting – may have artificially 
amplified their pre-existent reservations towards the industry. Their accounts may 
therefore dramatise promotional discourse performed during the encounter. Last not 
least, perceptions will have been influenced by motivations to engage in discourse in 
the first place. I have addressed this point previously with respect to subjects’ divergent 
perceptions on the prevalence of marketised discourse. To my reading, the 
‘motivational pre-set’ argument also holds true in this context. Physicians who are 
moved by receiving sound and impartial scientific information may react overcritical if 
their (high) expectations are not met by drug reps. I found this to be happening 
especially among hospital doctors in my study who’s sometimes harsh responses to 
drug rep talk were probably due to their idealised view on the purpose and content of 
detailing. 
 
Doctors’ experiences with marketised discourse let them increasingly retreat from 
interactions with drug reps. The industry’s overt and direct attempts to exploit the 
physician via promotional talk is recognised and in most parts rejected. Sporadically 
doctors in my study admitted to fall for promotional discourse, typically in cases of 
data overload and severe time constraints. Yet, in the majority of cases they claimed to 
fend off these practices immediately. In other words, physicians reject to be pushed 
into the role of an arbiter to drug marketing. In their responses they said to inhibit 
promotional talk on the spot by e.g. reprimanding the drug rep or, alternatively, they 
simply avoid the discursive contact by physically retreating from it. 
 
Altogether my findings point to a situation in which drug detailing is utterly traversed 
by marketised discourse. Results are suggesting that due to marketised discourse 
collaboration among the protagonists is in decline and thus total system viability is at 
risk. Originally conceived to enhance commercial performance, marketised discourse is 
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leading to cognitive detachment and operational unproductiveness. From an outside 
perspective none of the protagonists attains their goal which they are associating with 
drug detailing. Costly marketing strategies devised by management significantly lose 
their momentum during implementation. Drug reps, despite trying to transform 
promotional discourse into a relevant service to physicians, nevertheless fail to obtain 
their customers’ appreciation. Physicians, in search for impartial scientific and 
technical updates, increasingly turn away in frustration about a discourse that is little 
helpful yet greatly annoying.  
 
Do these findings point to a drug marketing system in decay or are they merely a 
matter of technical adjustment? To my reading, these insights point to a systemic 
problem caused my marketization of pharmaceutical knowledge in general and 
marketised discourse in particular. This will have serious repercussions both at the 
theoretical and at the operational end. I will present and discuss some of these 
implications – notably with focus on discourse – in the section to follow. Some aspects 
surely will have impact on science as well as on practice yet for the purpose of clarity I 
have tried to allocate them to one or the other camp. I begin with presenting 
implications to theory and science. 
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8.2. Implications for theory 
 
One key contribution to theory is the insight that managers and drug reps do not form 
an ideological monolith with regards to drug detailing. Instead, they display quite 
distinct motivations for engaging. Managers ultimately wish to advance sales and 
profits while drug reps primarily strive to serve physicians. In consequence, drug reps 
do not implement a promotional discourse as devised by management. So far, critical 
studies on sales and marketing practices in the drug industry (e.g. Strang et al. 1996; 
Lexchin, 1997; Greene, 2004; Oldani, 2004) solely took to a bi-lateral approach, 
whereby industry or a drug company as a whole was confronting physicians. Typically, 
physicians’ reception of industry measures was assessed without paying attention to the 
interim stage of internal translation and transformation. Current contributions are 
merely referring to the industry – physician interaction and make no attempt to 
deconstruct the detailing phenomenon (as meaning-making) any further. Researchers in 
the field have simply viewed the industry as an ideological block, thereby wittingly or 
unwittingly implying detailers’ unconditional agency. Normative disparity between 
marketing management and drug reps is not being addressed at all. Greene (2004) for 
example regarded the drug rep simply as an extension of the marketing apparatus. As 
by my research findings, this assumption is no longer sustainable because drug reps 
have shown to follow a separate agenda. Thus future research studies on drug 
marketing – critical and non-critical in nature – can benefit from these outcomes by e.g. 
placing additional focus on role conceptions and attitudes of drug reps. Viewing 
managers and drug reps as separate meaning-making entities will result in a more 
diverse assessment of drug marketing measures against doctors. Besides, it may spark 
other researchers to examine the in-between role of drug reps, focussing on aspects like 
commitment, identity or re-professionalization.   
 
To discourse studies, I have contributed a qualitative description of what manifests 
marketised discourse in context of drug detailing. While marketised discourse has been 
investigated in other areas like e.g. higher education (Fairclough, 1993) its 
particularities have not been investigated with respect to drug detailing. Drug detailing 
is interesting to discourse studies because it tries to discursively link two very distinct 
worlds and interests. In a truly constructionist fashion I have presented three (groups 
of) different perspectives on how marketised discourse is figured. A genuinely novel 
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insight was to learn about how discursive pre-patterning is transformed by drug reps. 
My findings have supported the theory of Alvesson & Karreman (2000) whereby even 
powerful discourses can be rejected. Despite artful construction and training, 
marketised discourse has been recognised and largely refused by both physicians and 
drug reps in my sample. However, marketised discourse nevertheless keeps breaking 
ground in modern drug detailing. Drug reps reported to reject and subsequently 
transform marketised discourse yet doctors in my study still complained about the 
promotional character of the talk they are receiving. Obviously, feelings of opposition 
to marketised discourse are not strong enough to fully escape from its binding powers 
in practice. This connects to the work of Zizek (1989) and DuGay & Salaman (1992) 
who proposed that discourses should always be understood as a dimension of material 
practices. In other words, people cannot fully discard unwanted discursive practices 
because they are bound to them by factual procedures (e.g. sales targets) or conditions 
(e.g. lack of alternative employment options). In the area of drug detailing, my 
observations can be a point of departure for further research about being trapped in 
discourse despite rejecting it.  
 
By portraying drug reps’ role conceptions and attitudes, my research has pointed to a 
cognitive disunity of detailers. Irrespective of the potential consequences these inner 
conflicts may have – for example that drug reps may feel alienated from work – my 
study first and foremost highlights the fact that drug reps are moving in between two 
systems. We have learned from the representatives of each system (i.e. managers and 
physicians) that their motivations and attitudes towards detailing are quite distinct. I 
like to add to this empirical insight that also from a systems theory perspective the two 
spheres are seen as functionally differentiated autonomous social systems each one 
having its own code of communication (e.g. Luhmann, 2005). Thus it is difficult for 
drug reps – as we have seen – to communicate in both systems successfully. Those who 
try may fail in either direction. From an ideological or identity point of view, it is 
challenging to be simultaneously exposed to the divergent discourses emerging from 
the two systems. One discourse is promoting sales and profit generation the other is 
advancing the notion of patient wellbeing and/or physician protection. Further to that 
note, my research has drawn attention to the fact that drug reps spend much of their 
working lives in the medical community (We love our physicians. They are our 
family. We spend the majority of our lives with them…, D1, Drug rep, p. 154). 
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Although my work has not investigated the ultimate consequences of this exposure, it 
is still suggesting that constant exposure aids to drug reps’ alienation from their 
organisations. This has clearly a practical implication and hence will be discussed in 
that context later on. Still, my study outcome can benefit scientific research on 
discourse and alienation (sociology domain) and discourse and commitment 
(psychology domain). Both alienation and commitment theories strongly deal with an 
individual’s relation to an existing normative system. Being a sociology-minded 
researcher I like to focus on the alienation aspect. According to existing theory (e.g. 
Blauner, 1964; Shepard, 1971; Mottaz, 1981) an individual’s alienation from work is 
sparked by his continuous inconformity with the organisation’s norms and values. 
Alienation is expressed in feelings of powerlessness, meaninglessness and isolation 
(Blauner, 1964). My research is presenting a situation whereby the individual (drug 
rep) has to deal with two fundamentally different value systems within his work sphere. 
I do not know of any other occupation where this is the case. Business-to-business 
sales representatives typically remain within the ‘capital’ system. Even if they should 
trade with another system (e.g. the Army) they still find a business representative as 
their counterpart (e.g. purchasing manager of the Army). Drug reps’ unique exposure 
to two very different systems and discourses adds a new dimension from an alienation 
point of view. Thus research in this area could benefit from investigating the particular 
situation of drug detailing. 
 
 
8.3. Implications for practice 
 
I anticipate my research outcomes to impact the work of managers, drug reps and 
physicians. Furthermore, I hope to contribute to an overall discussion about how 
pharmaceutical knowledge and expertise is made available to society. I start with 
presenting the various practical implications grouped by key protagonists concerned. 
Certainly, most of my suggestions will somehow have an influence on all players in my 
research set. Yet, because I view this final part of my thesis as a recommendation for 
action I like to identify those groups of people who I think should take the lead in 
implementing my proposals. As such I want to abstain from producing an intangible 
piece of advice that many may concur with yet no one feels responsible or inspired to 
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act upon. After all, producing tangible and serviceable proposals that address a 
concrete business issue is distinctive of a DBA thesis. 
 
 
8.3.1. Practical implications for management 
 
My research outcomes have demonstrated that the current approach to detailing is 
neither convincing nor effective. Trying to address the divergent interests by means of 
pseudo scientific promotional talk seems to widen the cognitive gap between industry 
and physicians, as much as between managers and drug reps. We have ascertained that 
from a management perspective marketised discourse is not devised to enlighten 
physicians but to sway them. This policy is enforced by the fact that competition in the 
pharmaceutical industry is strong, financial expectations are high yet product pipelines 
are increasingly empty. Before this background it is idealistic to assume that news from 
academia will spark an ideological change among drug managers. In other words, 
managers will continue to follow their self-interested objectives of sales and profit 
generation. Yet based on my research findings I propose that they display their goals 
more honestly, openly and thus productively for all players involved. Managers of 
research based drug companies (those who offer patented original drugs) should re-
organise the interaction with doctors by dividing drug detailing into two separate 
strands: a scientific and a commercial strand. Simply put, the scientific arm is to inform 
the physician about pharmacological and medical specifics with regards to the drug and 
its indication. Members of the scientific team should be specialists, educated and 
trained to competently service physicians. Still, I do not foresee their presentations to 
be unbiased. Yet I expect that in a dedicated expert discussion format critical 
shortcomings (e.g. regarding side effects, clinical study design) are more difficult to 
whitewash. Importantly, scientific detailing of a drug would then not be clouded by 
promotional catch phrases aimed at inducing action. A dedicated expert team like this 
would surely become of greater relevance to physicians. This could lift doctors’ 
attention to detailers talk as well as their willingness to receive drug reps in the first 
place. Drug makers could thus benefit from doctors’ increased responsiveness. 
 
The ‘commercial’ drug rep, on the other hand, should approach the physician with the 
mandate to win his support for prescribing or recommending his products. This 
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mandate should be openly displayed versus the physician. As per my study results, 
physicians are fully aware that drug companies want to lure them into prescribing, 
therefore an open address of one’s commercial interest could be trust-building after all. 
A prerequisite for this open conduct – both from a motivational and from a legal aspect 
– would be that argumentation focuses on demonstrating that the drug is feasible from 
an economic point of view. The product would hence be ‘sold’ on grounds of e.g. 
lower total therapy cost, smaller risk of relapse, shorter residence time or higher 
reimbursement share. In addition, the commercial team would increasingly visit health 
insurance companies to secure a preferred supplier status. Dividing the detailing task 
into a scientific and a commercial strand is resource intensive in a service landscape 
comprising of single practices. However, as office-based physicians progressively 
grow into larger organisational settings like ambulatory care centres, practice networks 
and medical care chains, drug companies could develop a key account management to 
communicate more efficiently. In turn, larger medical units will likely entail a division 
of labour at the physician end. This, for example, implies the instalment of a dedicated 
position responsible for scientific information and training as much as the hiring of a 
commercial manager.  
 
All this is not to stop managers from constructing discourse to the benefit of company 
interests. However, I anticipate that a divided and dedicated communication structure 
will improve the overall quality and relevance of the talk because the recipients will be 
able scrutinise discourse more profoundly. But why should a manager be interested to 
mitigate his promotional strategy to the benefit of the better argument? To my reading 
it is a matter of recognising and addressing structural changes in due course. My 
findings indicate that leverage from promotional discourse is shrinking. Drug reps’ 
solidarity with their companies is dissolving and physicians are increasingly avoiding 
detailing encounters. Crucially, structural changes in medical care are leading to higher 
concentration and functional specialisation. While the individual physician may lose 
autonomy and power, the newly emerging medical units and networks are likely to gain 
in influence. Thus managers are advised to re-think their promotional sending approach 
in order to avoid unproductive and de-motivating conduct of business as much as to 
prepare for the fundamental restructuring of the medical market in Germany.       
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8.3.2. Practical implications for physicians 
 
According to my findings physicians feel inadequately informed by drug reps. 
Furthermore, doctors complained about the overt promotional and at times deceiving 
character of detailing talks. As my results show, physicians increasingly respond to 
these practices by avoiding the detailing encounter altogether. This is a consequent yet 
little productive attitude to follow. Instead, physicians could understand my study 
insights to recognise that the industry’s position is not uniform and thus open for 
challenge. Provided that physicians have a genuine interest – as they have stated during 
the interviews – in receiving scientific information, they should demand for more 
unbiased information by the industry across a broad front. In this respect I foresee three 
main approaches. 
 
First, my results should provide additional argumentation for improved quality controls 
with respect to clinical study design. In 2004, the institute for quality and efficiency in 
healthcare (IQWiG) was established to examine – among other things – the usefulness 
of drugs launched in Germany. The institute was modelled on the UK’s National 
Institute of Clinical Excellence (NICE). While the IQWiG is a helpful institution it can 
only act very selectively with regards to scrutinising the relevance of clinical studies 
circulating in the market. In my opinion, physicians’ associations (e.g. organised by 
specialist society) should establish their own checkpoints responsible for the evaluation 
of clinical study outcomes. Let me explain why this is a critical point of influence: in 
the process of registration, clinical studies are substantiating a drug’s efficacy, safety 
and tolerability (industry term that describes a patient’s tolerance to a drug). In the 
process of marketing and detailing, clinical study results carry promotional messages. 
This seems reassuring on first sight yet it still leaves enough of room for interpretive 
manoeuvring. Study protocols are typically designed to ensure a favourable outcome 
by all means. Most notably this occurs with so called ‘post marketing’ studies which 
are executed to promote a drug’s efficacy or tolerability after its launch. Critical 
observers (e.g. Angell, 2004) note that companies like to optimise outcomes by e.g. 
playing with a drug’s dosing, presentation format or length of application. While the 
studies are technically correct they are often reflecting an unrealistic scenario. A typical 
example would be comparing tolerability scores against a competitor that has a higher 
dosage. Based on these constructions promotional messaging is built. However, if 
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physicians were able to put these studies to a professional observer located within their 
own system, three things would happen: (1) irrelevant or unrepresentative studies 
would be eliminated from the market. (2) In the long run, drug companies would likely 
respond by raising the quality of their marketing studies. In turn, this would aid to the 
robustness of the detailing talk which is (3) prone to build physicians’ trust in the 
industry (see also Lagace, et al., 1992). 
 
A second approach to control marketised discourse practices is for professional 
associations to provide their own drug detailing to their members.  This approach is 
known as ‘academic detailing’ (e.g. Avorn & Soumerai, 1983; Soumerai & Avorn, 
1990; Kondro, 2007) and has been established in countries like USA and Canada but is 
still hardly present in Germany to date. In academic detailing a trained healthcare 
professional is visiting doctors or otherwise disseminates evidence-based information 
about particular drugs or drug classes. Detailing contents are based on impartial, 
independent reviews of drugs’ efficacy. The long-term goal is to advance optimal and 
cost-effective prescribing from within the medical community. Given my research 
findings, I recommend to initiate a similar project within the German system. 
Academic detailing will thereby not replace commercial drug detailing.  Due to high 
costs associated with running a large scale detailing network and due to exclusivity of 
technical information held by makers of drugs, commercial drug detailing will continue 
to play a major part. Yet academic detailing could be established as a corrective source 
of information to doctors. Operated in parallel to commercial detailing it will challenge 
and eventually reduce promotional discourse practices. However, for this to happen 
academic detailing requires a critical size which can only be achieved if physicians are 
prepared to finance the project by means of significant contributions. This would be the 
ultimate test to the validity of physicians’ claims that they are primarily motivated by 
receiving impartial information.  
 
While the first two approaches presented can be significant in leverage, I still anticipate 
that their implementation may be delayed by a low degree of organisation, 
disagreement across specialities and last not least pharma lobbying. I therefore like to 
present a third approach which to my view is highly practical, low cost and can be 
implemented fast.    
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In response to inadequate detailing characterised by marketised discourse, physicians 
should leverage their criticism by means of internet technology. Analogue to online 
assessments of physicians by their patients (e.g. www.docinsider.de), doctors (e.g. the 
association of physicians or single societies) can operate an evaluation website of 
individual drug rep service. Professionally devised to ensure factual, relevant and non-
offending appraisal of service, this instrument can be elucidative in that it allows 
(subjective) comparison of service, disclose of malpractice and thus altogether increase 
transparency. All this could be done in accordance with German data protection laws 
by simply defining the drug rep by company and region. Detailing regions are more or 
less uniformly defined across Germany to ensure that private research companies like 
IMS (Institute for Medical Statistics) can monitor script-writing and pharmacy sales on 
the drug rep level. By mentioning company name and detailing region, other physicians 
in the region will know. Access to the website could be restricted to doctors and 
industry representatives. Provided that it is used on a large scale the instrument will 
have enough informational reliability to be accepted as a point of reference. This can 
result in physicians e.g. critically questioning drug reps or their managers as to the 
reasons behind a negative rating. As such it is expected to impact industry behaviour, 
as pharmaceutical firms are sensitive to wide-scope negative reporting by their quasi 
customers. If physicians are willing voice their critique about discursive doctor 
spinning in that way, it is likely to improve the quality of detailing contents and their 
discursive presentation. 
 
 
8.3.3. Practical implications for drug reps 
 
Of the three groups of actors, drug reps are in the weakest position. To my reading, 
drug reps experience affective frailty, caused by inner conflict with regards to their 
organisational belonging as displayed by my research findings. Their in between role is 
not fostering a strong self-confidence to resist openly and hence, they do it covertly. 
Furthermore, their non-managing function within the company makes them highly 
dependent on management policy and goodwill. Before this background, 
recommendations for (self-induced) changes in drug rep behaviour are comparably 
limited in terms of their ability for structural change. To further illustrate my point: 
Drug reps’ access to physicians’ attitudes (e.g. to the study insight that physician still 
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rate drug rep talk as highly promotional) will probably result in even greater 
transformation of marketised discourse schemes. Yet this will still happen covertly, 
which is only raising the operational contrast between management’s instruction and 
drug reps’ implementation. Essentially, structural changes to the system will have to 
come from management reacting to outside events like physician pressure or – to a 
lesser degree – research information.  
 
Assuming for a moment that structural changes are not happening (i.e. ceteris paribus), 
I foresee implications for drug reps’ behaviour to be largely motivational in kind. 
Reflecting on my study results, certain drug reps may decide to discontinue a career in 
drug detailing based on the existing ideological contradictions as well as on the new 
insights regarding the low appreciation by physicians. Candidates interested in a career 
in drug detailing may critically evaluate their personal values and motivations against 
the system described by my study findings. Some may see reason to follow a different 
career path. Several of those remaining in the system might take my research outcomes 
to develop a more relaxed attitude towards the controversial situation they are 
experiencing (see e.g. Turner & Bruner, 1986). Knowing that one’s perception and 
attitude is shared by others can produce a feeling of relief and re-assurance in coping 
with the circumstances. 
 
 
8.3.4. Practical implications for public discourse 
 
Last not least I like to speculate if my research on marketised discourse in drug 
detailing may influence society’s perception of drug marketing. My research is 
providing a look behind the scenes of a highly secretive yet influential industry. 
Insights gained about strategic discourse construction illustrate how careless the 
industry is using its pharmacologic and pharmaceutical information advantage versus 
physicians and ultimately versus patients. Reported defiant behaviour by drug reps is 
highly interesting from a sociological research point of view, yet its actual corrective 
impact in practice is – according to my findings – at least doubtful. Physicians’ 
accounts about detection of and resistance to marketised discourse must be critically 
judged before the background of information overflow, time constraints and also 
personal interests and obligations. As of now, both, deviant drug reps and observant 
  
 211
physicians are not reliable filters or correctors of promotional drug discourses. My 
qualitative sketch of discourse in drug detailing leaves a worrisome picture about 
today’s drug detailing. My research findings may help to stimulate a critical debate 
about discursive dissemination of drug information in the public. Increasingly, the 
pharmaceutical industry (as well as the medical profession) is subjected to critical 
reports by the public media. Yet media reports typically shed light on outright criminal 
behaviour like bribery (e.g. German news magazine ‘Stern’ reported in 2005 about the 
Ratiopharm case in which the drug company was accused of bribing physicians to 
prescribe its products). So far, the German public has not been informed about the 
rather sublime influence-taking via marketised discourse. I would thus wish to raise 
this crucial aspect of drug marketing to the public awareness level.   
 
 
8.4. Limitations of the research 
 
My research shows certain limitations which I like to address in the following 
paragraphs. The first limitation concerns the research sample. While generalizability 
and representativeness is not of concern to the qualitative researcher, he nevertheless 
aims for a certain degree of transferability by e.g. ensuring variety in his sample. My 
research sample surely displays diversity of respondents in certain aspects, still drug 
reps and managers came from only three different companies. Given the scope of my 
research questions I would have wished for a greater number of institutional 
backgrounds. This sample condition – caused by the immense difficulty of getting 
access to drug companies – clearly restricts the transferability of my findings. 
 
The second limitation comes with the method of qualitative interviewing. Although the 
interviews lasted 45 minutes on average the contacts with the respondents have been 
relatively brief compared to e.g. a long term observation. I experienced moments of 
great communicative intensity, however, I am aware that the exchange had just a 
snapshot character after all. Furthermore, I have semi-structured the interviews to 
address my ‘a priori’ believes and to ensure a fair degree of comparability. This kind of 
structural designation on my part will probably have limited my investigative 
flexibility and openness e.g. with regards to uncovering unexpected topics. Still, the 
strongest limitation with regards to interviewing is that I ultimately had to rely on what 
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has been said. While I have scrutinized the interview data for signs of e.g. moral 
storytelling, cultural scripting or political manoeuvring, there remained a great deal of 
leeway in terms of ascertaining respondents’ meaning-making. Finally, I have not 
subjected my data analysis and interpretation to any kind of secondary analysis by e.g. 
fellow researchers or the respondents themselves. Due to this omission the credibility 
of my research findings is likely to be limited to some extent. 
 
 
8.5. Scope for future research 
 
I see my work as a point of departure for future research, both inductive and deductive 
in kind. Quite generally, a quantitative investigator might want to test to which extent 
my findings are generalizable and if they are representative of any specific population. 
This could entail e.g. a structured interview study about discourse transformation to 
cardiologists in former Eastern Germany.  
 
Researchers in critical pharmaceutical studies may be inspired to further explore the 
role of drug reps in drug marketing. Qualitative studies may shed light on whether drug 
reps are (seen as) agents, mediators or saboteurs of marketing. Ideally, this could be 
done by long term observations of drug detailing events which would enable the 
researcher to be closer to the social setting he is studying. Those interested in work 
alienation may take my study to further investigate the dynamics and consequences of 
normative disunity between management and sales reps in the context of the 
pharmaceutical industry. Investigators in the field of organizational discourse may 
continue to examine how resistance to discourse is curtailed by material practices in the 
social setting of drug detailing. Altogether, I believe that due to its considerable 
investigative span my work is providing a great variety of routes for further research in 
the field of sociology. Naturally, the above mentioned options are only a brief selection 
of ideas for further research. 
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8.6. Final remarks 
 
Altogether, my research has given me a new (and critical) perspective on the conduct 
of the pharmaceutical industry. Investigating especially the views of drug reps and 
physicians has provided me with a better grasp of the shortcomings and consequences 
associated with an established system of commercial promotion. Moreover, I feel that 
conducting the research has enhanced my ability to identify and critically evaluate acts 
of discursive control and manipulation. From this I will benefit in my role as a critical 
consultant, aiming for a more transparent and evidence-based service in drug detailing.  
 
The research has also sparked a quite practical idea to increase the quality of drug 
detailing in the future. The concept of having physicians evaluate drug rep performance 
via the internet has been further refined in the meantime. I have already registered a 
suitable name (www.drugrepmonitor.com) and I will present a comprehensive business 
plan to potential supporters in due course. While this instrument might not necessarily 
be a great commercial success I am convinced that it can lift the relevance and standard 
of drug information provided to physicians.   
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Appendix 1:   Interview guide - Drug reps (back-translated from German) 
 
 
Introductory remarks 
 
Hello, my name is Jost-Tilo Gehrke, I am a doctoral research student at Durham University 
in England researching in the area of drug rep – physician interaction. Thank you for 
taking the time to share some of your views and experiences regarding this topic with me. 
 
Your accounts given during or after the interview will remain strictly confidential. I will 
tape record this interview. This is for practical use only. Recording the interview prevents 
me from taking notes while you speak which enables me to pay full attention to everything 
that you say. At any time during the interview you can ask me to stop the recording. Do 
you agree to this procedure? 
 
I will start asking you some questions about you and your work environment: 
 
 
Work environment 
 
1. For how many years have you been working as a drug rep?  
 
2. What made you choose this career? 
 
3. Could you please describe your current work situation?  
 
4. What have been the key changes in your work environment over the past 10 – 20 
years?  
 
5. How has the detailing of physicians changed in that time? 
 
6. How do you rate these changes? 
 
7. Who or what do you think is responsible for these changes? 
 
 
Detailing the physician 
 
8. Could you please describe a typical detailing visit? What – if any – are the key 
differences compared to the past? 
 
9. What is your role during the detailing encounter? Has your role changed over time? 
 
10. What would be your preferred role during the detailing encounter? 
 
11. What – in your view – is the role of the physician during the detailing encounter? 
Has the role changed over time? 
 
12. How would you describe a typical physician that you are visiting? 
 
13. What do you think about the medical profession in general?  
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Detailing discourse 
 
14. How would you describe the discourse (i.e. the speech, talk, address) you are 
employing when detailing physicians? What are – if any – the key changes 
compared to the past? 
 
15. What are typical features of this discourse? 
 
16. How do you rate this discourse? What do you like / dislike? 
 
 
Responses to detailing discourse 
 
17. How do you think your detailing discourse is received by physicians? 
 
18. What do you think are the key reasons for this reception? 
 
19. What are your reactions to this? 
 
20. How would you describe an ideal interaction with physicians? 
 
 
 
21. Do you like to add anything (opinion, observation etc.) to the matter of drug 
detailing or else? 
 
 
 
Thank you very much for your time & support! 
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Appendix 2:   Interview guide - Physicians (back-translated from German) 
 
 
Introductory remarks 
 
Hello, my name is Jost-Tilo Gehrke, I am a doctoral research student at Durham University 
in England researching in the area of physician – drug rep interaction. Thank you for 
taking the time to share some of your views and experiences regarding this topic with me. 
 
Your accounts given during or after the interview will remain strictly confidential. I will 
tape record this interview. This is for practical use only. Recording the interview prevents 
me from taking notes while you speak which enables me to pay full attention to everything 
that you say. At any time during the interview you can ask me to stop the recording. Do 
you agree to this procedure? 
 
I will start asking you some questions about you and your work environment: 
 
 
Work environment 
 
1. For how many years have you been practising as a physician?  
 
2. What made you choose this career? 
 
3. Could you please describe your current work situation?  
 
4. What have been the key changes in your work environment over the past 10 – 20 
years?  
 
5. How has the detailing by drug reps changed in that time? 
 
6. How do you rate these changes? 
 
7. Who or what do you think is responsible for these changes? 
 
 
Detailing by drug reps 
 
8. Could you please describe a typical detailing visit? What – if any – are the key 
differences compared to the past? 
 
9. How much time do you typical spend with a drug rep? On what does it depend how 
much time you dedicate to a drug rep?  
 
10. What is your role during the detailing encounter? Has your role changed over time? 
 
11. What would be your preferred role during the detailing encounter? 
 
12. What – in your view – is the role of the drug rep during the detailing encounter? 
Has the role changed over time? 
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13. How would you describe a typical drug rep visiting you? 
 
14. What do you think about the drug rep profession (occupation) in general?  
 
 
Detailing discourse 
 
15. How would you describe the discourse (i.e. the speech, talk, address) that drug reps 
are employing when visiting you? What are – if any – the key changes compared to 
the past? Who or what has caused these changes in your view? 
 
16. What are typical features of today’s detailing discourse you are receiving?  
 
17. How do you rate this discourse? What do you like / dislike? 
 
 
Responses to detailing discourse 
 
18. How do you react to this discourse? 
 
19. How would you describe an ideal interaction with drug reps? 
 
 
 
20. Do you like to add anything (opinion, observation etc.) to the matter of drug 
detailing or else? 
 
 
 
Thank you very much for your time & support! 
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Appendix 3:   Interview guide - Managers (back-translated from German) 
 
 
Introductory remarks 
 
Hello, my name is Jost-Tilo Gehrke, I am a doctoral research student at Durham University 
in England researching in the area of drug rep – physician interaction. Thank you for 
taking the time to share some of your views and experiences regarding this topic with me. 
 
Your accounts given during or after the interview will remain strictly confidential. I will 
tape record this interview. This is for practical use only. Recording the interview prevents 
me from taking notes while you speak which enables me to pay full attention to everything 
that you say. At any time during the interview you can ask me to stop the recording. Do 
you agree to this procedure? 
 
I will start asking you some questions about you and your work environment: 
 
 
Work environment 
 
1. For how many years have you been working in the pharmaceutical industry?  
 
2. What made you choose this career? Could you briefly describe the key stages of it? 
 
3. Could you please describe your current work situation?  
 
4. What have been the key changes in your work environment over the past 10 – 20 
years?  
 
5. How has the detailing of physicians changed in that time? 
 
6. How do you rate these changes? 
 
7. Who or what do you think is responsible for these changes? 
 
 
Detailing the physician 
 
8. In your view, what is the role of the drug rep during the detailing encounter? Has 
his/her role changed over time? What was (your) drug reps’ reaction to these 
changes? 
 
9. What – in your opinion – is the role of the physician during the detailing 
encounter? Has the role changed over time? 
 
10. How would you describe your role with respect to the function of drug detailing? 
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Detailing discourse 
 
11. How would you describe the discourse (i.e. the speech, talk, address) drug reps in 
your company are employing when detailing physicians? What are – if any – the 
key changes compared to the past? 
 
12. What are typical features of this discourse? 
 
13. How do you rate this discourse? What would you say is the purpose of it? 
 
 
Responses to detailing discourse 
 
14. How do you think the detailing discourse is received by physicians? 
 
15. What do you think are the key reasons for this reception? 
 
16. How do you think your drug reps are rating the discursive practices they are 
employing? 
 
17. What are your reactions to this? 
 
18. How would you describe an ideal interaction between drug reps and physicians? 
 
 
 
19. Do you like to add anything (opinion, observation etc.) to the matter of drug 
detailing or else? 
 
 
 
Thank you very much for your time & support! 
 
